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Abstract 
At around 10:30 am on 7
th
 August, 1998, a truck was stopped as it approached the rear 
entrance of the U.S. embassy building in Nairobi, instigating a brief argument and 
confrontation between the 'Arab-looking' men in the truck and the embassy guards. This led 
to a shoot-out between them before a powerful explosion completely tore down half of the 
embassy while the entire Ufundi Cooperative Building next to it collapsed to the ground. The 
site of the embassy and its adjacent streets were in a total state of chaos. In the aftermath of 
the attack 218 people were declared dead, over 5000 injured and property worth billions of 
Kenyan shillings destroyed. The bombing remains one of the worst terror attacks to have 
happened on Kenyan soil. Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda terror group, through a proxy, (the 
Liberation Army for the Islamic Sanctuary), claimed responsibility. In their reportage of the 
rescue effort, the Kenyan media took what has been perceived as an ethnically inclined 
coverage by focussing on two Kikuyu victims, Rose Wanjiku and Sammy Nganga, as the 
most victimized; portrayed as the paragons of a reckless act of terrorism. 
This study, therefore, focuses on August 7
th
 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi 
and argues that the memories of the attack are constructed and mediated through visual and 
performance art. These memories are utilized in the management of trauma and the 
promotion of reconciliation in a post-terrorism situation in Kenya. An examination of 
ethnicity reveals its perversity and its threat to Kenya’s tenuous nationalism and identity. The 
recent attack on Westgate Shopping Mall, on 21st September, 2013, and the ongoing Islamic 
radicalisation of youth in Kenya, means that the narrative of this study has continual 
resonance. 
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Preface 
Bomb Blasts: A Personal Encounter 
 
The events of 7
th
 August 1998 remain etched vividly in my own memory. On this particular 
morning, I was with colleagues at work in the Department of Ethnography of the National 
Museums of Kenya in Nairobi documenting artefacts as part of our routine work. We 
suddenly heard a loud bang accompanied by a slight tremor but continued unperturbed 
thinking that this could have been an accident along Museum Hill Road. A few minutes later, 
however, another colleague rushed in to inform us that something terrible had just happened 
in the city centre as a huge plume of smoke could be seen billowing somewhere in town. As 
we dashed out of the office, we could see flying objects in the sky and a thin cloud of smoke 
and debris engulfed the city centre. Anxious to know what exactly had happened in town, I 
headed there and on my way I encountered many people running away most of whom could 
not even explain why they were running away. Egged on by my curiosity I continued moving 
towards the site oblivious of the danger I was putting myself in but a few blocks away from 
the site, it occurred to me that a building had collapsed. I joined groups of other people who 
were discussing in hushed tones their version of what they thought had happened; at this 
point, no one was sure of the cause of the collapse. There were still people strewn on the 
pavements bleeding, broken glass was all over the place and even mangled and burning cars 
were still on the streets. People in all walks of life had started rescue efforts and were soon 
joined by the Kenya Red Cross, Kenya Army personnel, Kenya Police and the American 
Marines though the last two appeared more keen to deter people from joining the rescue 
efforts. Reports in the media revealed that a bomb explosion targeting the American embassy 
had occurred. What I saw was gruesome, like watching a scene from hell. I will never forget. 
My cousin, Dr. Robert Bett, who was visiting Kenya from London, was within the vicinity 
but only received minor bruises; the event nevertheless continues to scare him. 
 
Fast forward to 2005 when the London underground tube bombings occurred. I was then in 
London on an exchange visit to the British Museum and was staying at the Tavistock Hotel. 
One of the bombs exploded on a bus outside Tavistock Square, Woburn Place. I had just left 
the hotel for the British Museum and later watched the whole scene reported on television. 
The Al Qaeda terrorists claimed responsibility. What I saw on television reminded me of the 
12 
 
Nairobi embassy bombing but this one scared me more as it was very close to where I stayed. 
I imagined what could have happened to my family had I died away in a foreign land, what 
memories could they have of me? 
 
In 2007, I was appointed Assistant Director of Museums Sites and Monuments in Kenya 
responsible for the Central Region.
1
 As this was a new position, I decided to base my office 
in Uhuru Gardens. This is Kenya’s biggest memorial dedicated to all those who lost their 
lives in the struggle for independence. It is also in these gardens that Kenya’s flag was first 
hoisted during the independence celebrations held in these grounds. Part of my 
responsibilities entailed identifying, documenting and recommending new sites and 
monuments of national significance to be formally gazetted hence giving them legal 
protection. My work in Central Province proved the most challenging as I discovered that 
there were hundreds of sites associated with the Mau Mau history requiring protection. I 
started engaging with relevant elders to give me the particular histories associated with each 
of the sites. Through this, I encountered first-hand the difficult histories and memories of the 
independence struggle. While some were narrated to me, the monuments I sought to protect 
bore testimony to what happened. I was introduced to two Mau Mau war veterans 
associations and their factions. Most of these veterans thought I could provide them with a 
link to the government so their grievances with the colonial administration could be heard. 
Many are the times they visited me in Nairobi making one request to another. I had to steer 
very carefully to ensure I made no promise that was beyond the mandate of the National 
Museums of Kenya. I, however, allowed them to use Uhuru Gardens for their national annual 
meetings of the Mau Mau War Veterans Association (MMWVA) for I considered the 
monument was purposely designated for the collective memory of the independence struggle. 
The site brings to life the interaction between history and collective memory and is important 
in building Kenyan national identity. 
 
When starting my PhD programme at the University of East Anglia in September 2009 I 
visited my cousin, Dr Robert Bett, in Brighton one weekend and in the course of our 
discussion, we talked about the 1998 Nairobi terror attack and the new monument that was 
built in memory of its victims. We both remembered the terror attack very vividly. Having 
                                                            
1 This is an administrative unit of the National Museums of Kenya covering Central, Eastern, and North Eastern 
provinces and parts of Nairobi and the Rift Valley provinces. 
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studied in Poland, he discussed the elaborate Polish commemoration of the Holocaust in the 
form of monuments dotting its countryside. This reminded me of the Mau Mau monuments I 
had visited in Central Kenya and their associated memories as narrated by the veterans. It was 
at this point that I decided that the interplay and influences between memory, history and 
identity would be the focus of my research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter, which serves as an introduction to my dissertation, is divided into three parts. 
Part I, ‘Research context and methodology,’ discusses the various research instruments and 
methodologies used in assembling data analysed in this work by setting out the objectives of 
the study, the research context and discusses how ethical issues arising from the research 
have been tackled. Part II, ‘Literature Review,’ analyses available literature on the subject 
and demonstrates how this study fits into past research on the subject under study and 
identifies existing gaps. Part III, ‘Conceptual Frameworks,’ defines the main concepts 
underpinning this research, namely: memory, history and identity to situate them in an 
appropriate theoretical perspective. The part also identifies lacunae that will be addressed 
through the research. The subsequent chapters will demonstrate the relevance of these 
theoretical concepts to this study. Part IV, ‘Conclusion’ gives a summary of the discussions 
in this chapter. 
Part I: Research Context and Methodology 
 
1.1.1. The Setting: Why Nairobi? 
Research for this dissertation was mainly conducted within Nairobi,
2
 Kenya’s capital city and 
the place of the 1998 terror attack targeted at the United States (U.S.) Embassy. According to 
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics’ 2009 population census results (KNBS, 2009), 
Nairobi has 3, 138, 369 people concentrated in an area of 696 km2 with a very high 
population growth of 4.1%. Nairobi is Africa’s twelfth largest city. Administratively it is 
divided into eight divisions each headed by a District Commissioner. The divisions include 
Central, Pumwani, Makadara, Kibera, Westlands, Langata, Embakasi and Kasarani. The 
August 7th Memorial Park is located in the space where the U.S. embassy had stood at the 
corner of the intersection of Moi Avenue and Haile Selassie Avenue within the city centre. 
These two avenues are some of Nairobi’s busiest streets with heavy vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic. Indeed, because of this location, the then Ambassador to the U.S. in Nairobi, Ms 
                                                            
2 The word Nairobi is derived from Maasai’s enkare nyrobi whose translation is a ‘place of cool waters’. The 
Maasai pastoralist community grazed their livestock in the plains surrounding this area. 
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Prudence Bushnell, recommended the relocation of the embassy, fearing for its security 
(Driscoll, 2001). 
Nairobi’s history goes back to 1899 when the construction of the Ugandan Railway reached a 
valley then part of the vast Maasai grazing land. The spot was selected as a railway depot, 
shunting yard and labourers’ camp for the thousands of Indian labourers employed by the 
British to work on the railway. The flatness and availability of space for expansion, 
accessibility to water, the cool temperatures and rich fertile soils suitable for agricultural 
production made it a prime choice for the establishment of the railway depot (Morgan, 1967). 
Besides these, it lay at the halfway point between Mombasa and Kampala where the railway 
line was destined. The presence of the railway depot accelerated its growth and by 1907, it 
replaced Mombasa as the administrative capital of the British East Africa protectorate. 
Railway interests took preference in selection of the site without due regard to planning, 
surveying and drainage. Implicitly, the railways officials did not give enough attention to the 
sanitary requirements of their headquarters, a factor that was later ascribed to the epidemic 
plagues of 1902 and 1905 (Muringa, 2005). 
It was in the same year, 1899, that John Ainsworth, the sub-commissioner of Ukamba 
Province, shifted his headquarters from Machakos to Nairobi. This move to Nairobi was not 
well received by the railways administration as it implied the establishment of a parallel 
administration. Ainsworth established his headquarters to the north of the railway, in the 
current Museum Hill area. Soon thereafter, rivalry between the two institutions started 
especially in view of the growth strategies following Ainsworth’s establishment of a 
Township Committee in December 1901 to regulate growth of the town and to ensure proper 
sanitary and hygienic standards (Ibid). While he ensured fair representation of both the Indian 
traders and European settlers in the committee, the arrival of more European settlers from 
South Africa, encouraged by Charles Eliot
3
 made it possible for increased settler participation 
in the committee. The new settlers had racist attitudes against the Indians and Africans, and 
soon, these found their way to the Township Committee. The plague outbreak at the Indian 
Bazaar in 1902, therefore, provided the committee with an excuse to formulate segregation 
policies – mirroring the South African ones – against the Indians and Africans whom they 
saw as unhygienic and hence blamed for the disease outbreak. Safe enclaves, away from the 
                                                            
3 Charles Eliot served as the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate between 1900 and 1904 and was 
instrumental in encouraging white settlement in the protectorate.  
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unhygienic Asians and Africans, were carved out for the settlers, and likewise, new areas 
designated for Asians.  
Henceforth new bylaws were developed to deter Africans from settling in Nairobi; they were 
only allowed to stay as temporary labourers serving the colonial masters. Various other 
pieces of legislation such as those that controlled their movement and employment, housing, 
land ownership, and poor infrastructure, were formulated to make it difficult for them to find 
the urban centres attractive for work and settlement (Muringa, 2005; Otiso, 2005; Werlin 
1974). It is these segregation policies and their exclusion from governance - at times effected 
though coercion and force – that sowed the seeds of resistance. Consequently, out of these 
circumstances emerged Mau Mau, a movement that played a pivotal role in spearheading 
Kenya’s struggle for independence.  
At the height of the independence struggle in the early 1950s, Nairobi was an important 
meeting point for African elites and politicians who were opposed to colonial rule. Though 
the Mau Mau liberation war was not fought within the city, over 30,000 arrests were made, 
most of them Kikuyu. Mau Mau was a military resistance mounted by the Kikuyu-dominated 
anti-colonial group, against the British Army and their loyalists that took place between 1952 
and 1960 (Muringa, 2005). This will have relevance to the discussion on ethnic and national 
identity analysed in Chapter 5 especially vis-à-vis the challenges of nationhood. The growth 
of Nairobi at this point also saw increased movement of people from the rural to the urban 
city in search of employment and other opportunities. Ethnic communities such as the Kikuyu 
and Kamba, whose traditional settlements were adjacent to Nairobi, were among the first to 
emigrate and were soon joined by Luo and the Luhya. Other Kenyan communities did not 
have a significant presence until the late 1970s to early 1980s. It is therefore not by 
coincidence that a majority of those who died during the 1998 terror attack were from these 
communities, as will be discussed at length in later chapters where it will be demonstrated 
that issues of ethnicity even pervaded discussions relating to commemoration. 
 
Nairobi gained city status in 1954 and has grown exponentially since 1963, when Kenya 
gained independence. It continues to be the seat of government with the Presidency, the 
Judiciary and most other government ministries having their headquarters in Nairobi. The 
House of Parliament is also based in Nairobi. 
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Economically, Nairobi has evolved from a small village to an important economic hub for the 
East and Central African region as may be attested by indicators in key sectors such as 
banking and finance, manufacturing and industry to transport and communication. It is the 
biggest economy in the region and is the market driver in these sectors. The choice of Nairobi 
as a target by the Al Qaeda terrorists in 1998, it can be argued, was intended to destabilize the 
region economically and give warning to other countries that they were also in danger of 
attack for their economic dalliance with America and the Zionist state of Israel. This view has 
been given weight as Al Qaeda has launched terrorist attacks in almost the entire region in 
places such as Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Mombasa and Bujumbura. Post 1998 and the 
escalation of terrorism is the main subject of my Chapters. 
 
Nairobi is also a major diplomatic hub within the African continent. It is currently the only 
third-world city to host a global headquarters of a major United Nation’s agency, the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) with UN-Habitat in Gigiri, Nairobi’s diplomatic 
district. Within this diplomatic district are many other embassies and residences of influential 
countries such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands. 
Nairobi is also the regional headquarters of several international Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). The bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, while intended to 
inflict pain and puncture America’s ego, altered the diplomatic landscape in Nairobi seeing 
many embassies relocate from the city centre to the sparsely populated and leafy suburbs 
such as Gigiri. Currently, the August 7
th
 Memorial Park stands in the exact location of the 
bombed U.S. embassy building, the subject of this dissertation. 
 
Kenya has been described as the safari capital of the world. While Nairobi itself is not a 
prime tourist destination, it is a gateway for many international tourists visiting the country. 
One of Nairobi’s unique attributes is its location next to the Nairobi National Park making it 
the only city of its size located next to a game reserve. Other attractions include museums, 
monuments and galleries. In this work I explore a number of monuments associated with 
different types of memories ranging from World War memorials to those commemorating the 
independence struggle such as Nyeri Memorial to the August 7
th
 Memorial Park which 
remembers those who died during the 1998 terror attack. All these are referred to at various 
points in this work. 
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1.1.2. Research Context 
In the twentieth century (and the beginning of the twenty-first, I must add), the world has 
experienced extreme cataclysmic events occasioned by natural and human actions, with the 
latter having culpability in causing them (Gray & Oliver, 2004). The two World Wars, acts of 
terrorism and more recently the war on terror have left their imprint as the worst catastrophes 
of the period. In attempts to come to terms with them, the western world has come up with 
‘collective memory’ projects to eternally commit them to history and ascribe meaning to 
them. Hence, the extensive presence of memorial monuments in Europe dedicated to these 
disasters, especially the World Wars and the Holocaust. In Africa, by contrast, memorial 
monuments devoted to the recognition of national independence struggles, though contested, 
are more common. In Kenya, it is only in the last ten years that a state-driven discussion of 
national heroes started, whilst historical studies on the struggle for independence have been 
prevalent.  
 
Little scholarly attention has, however, been given to other equally significant events that 
define the recent history of the country, such as the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. It is now 16 
years since the United States Embassy in Nairobi was attacked by a terrorist bomb leading to 
the death of 218 people and injuring over 5000 others. The trauma engendered by the Nairobi 
terror attack is still felt individually and collectively, though, efforts to provide a healing 
process have been in place since then. One such initiative was the erection of a memorial 
monument at ground zero, the exact location where the embassy once stood, to “serve as a 
memorial to all the innocent people who lost their lives. The memorial site is a garden of 
solace, offering comfort, strength and hope in an environment of relative peace, a tribute to 
the courage of those who have coped with the injuries sustained or the loss of a loved one, 
and the condemnation of terrorism.”4 While the event and impacts of the Nairobi terror attack 
(Akhahenda, 2002; Driscoll, 2001; Obwogo, 1999) have been studied, there has been no 
study that approaches this event and site from a social-theoretical perspective where concepts 
of memory, history and identity underscore the analysis. 
 
                                                            
4 East African Standard 23.04.2009 
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Alongside the World Trade Centre Memorials, Bologna Railway Station Memorial and the 
Oklahoma City Memorial, the August 7th Memorial has unique connections that make it a 
worthwhile memorial to study. The bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya by the 
Osama bin Laden-linked terrorist group heralded the beginning of long-term terrorist 
activities in eastern Africa affecting the political, economic, and social nexuses in the region. 
For instance, the memory of the bombing rekindles historical and identity tensions between 
different ethnic communities in Kenya and exposes Kenyan Muslims to accusations of having 
sided with the terrorists. These questions of memory, history and identity in Kenya are openly 
played out in this unique scenario as underscored in this study. 
 
A second context is the need to understand how August 7th Memorial Park has contributed to 
and catalysed discussions of ethnic and national identity in Kenya, an issue that has been very 
contentious in the recent past. As the events of the terror attack were overlain with ethnic 
objectification, I use this to broach the ethnic and national identity discourse in Kenya where 
discussions so far have tended to glorify a one-sided Kikuyu-centred narrative of the 
independence struggle. The analyses of Erikson (1959), Connerton (1989) and Huyyssen 
(1995) of how memories and narratives of the past influence the reconstruction and shaping 
of the present (identities) will give a further context to this research. 
 
1.1.3. Research Question 
 
The main question underlying this dissertation is “how are memories of the 1998 Nairobi 
terror attack constructed, mediated through visual and performance art and utilized in the 
management of trauma and the promotion of reconciliation in a post-terrorism situation?” 
 
In addressing this question, I am informed by previous research on the subject of ‘collective 
memory’, notably that by Halbwachs (1950), Connerton (1989) and West (2008). It is 
asserted that the past structurally restricts and shapes our understanding of the present while 
being selectively remembered and evoked in ways that engage with present concerns, needs 
and power structures. Implicitly, therefore, the memory of the Nairobi terror attack is 
determined by the present needs and interests of the survivors, the victims’ relatives, 
government of Kenya and other interested parties such as the American Embassy in Nairobi. 
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What is the body of knowledge generated by these memories and how have present interests 
dynamically shaped them? The focus is on the better understanding of the post-terrorism 
memories in the complete context of post-colonial Kenya. 
 
Pierre Nora’s (1989) reflection of the relationship between history and memory provides a 
framework for analysis in this work. The collapse of ‘memory nations’ – societies that had 
long assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered values, either 
ritually or verbally – necessitated the emergence of lieux de memoire (sites of memory) 
embodying memory in certain sites where a sense of historical continuity exists. This study 
examines the material, symbolic and functional elements of the August 7th Memorial Park as 
a lieu de memoire. 
 
I also apply Winter’s (1995:5-6) observation that “the power to mediate bereavement lies in 
the strength of ‘traditional’ forms of social and cultural life as represented in art, poetry and 
ritual”. This assumption leads us to focus on the visual and commemorative performances 
held at the August 7
th
 Memorial Park and their role in enabling the families of the bereaved 
and the survivors to live with their losses. A series of sites and events are relevant here: the 
monuments in the Memorial Park, the Mukabi-Klarenbeek Aga Khan Walk’s Daily Billboard 
inscriptions, work of the Banana Arts Studio who responded visually to the terror attack in an 
exhibition held in the year 2000, and performances by musicians and poets during the annual 
commemorative events. These and other memorial monuments and commemorative 
performances will be examined to answer the fundamental questions about how the events of 
1998 have been presented, understood and accommodated since. 
 
1.1.4. Research Methodology  
 
The study of memory has received increased academic consideration in the last few decades 
with a noted tendency to transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries (Keightley, 2010). 
Studying it, therefore, requires clarity of research methodology. In this study, I adopt a mix of 
social science methodologies utilizing anthropological, art-historical and historical 
approaches in the elicitation of data for this research. My anthropological background is, 
however, likely to take precedence amongst the techniques applied. 
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An analysis of published and archival documents
5
 pertaining to the Nairobi terror attack and 
the August 7th Memorial Park was undertaken. Documents are a readily accessible source of 
data in action research (Burns, 1999) that yield significant information for researchers 
(Stringer, 2007). The documents analysed are in the archives of the August 7th Memorial 
Park and Documentation Centre, the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, the Nation and Standard media 
houses, and the African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF). Media reports were also 
analysed, especially reportage on the escalating cases of terrorism because it is a dynamic 
phenomenon that is currently unfolding especially along the Kenyan coast. Very few 
scholarly publications on the recent incidents in Kenya are available. The information elicited 
was corroborated by the interviews and focus group discussions held during the period of this 
study. 
 
Participant observation: According to Burns (1999), participant observation involves 
entering the research setting and observing oneself, as well as others in that setting. In this 
study, I researched through observing visitors to the park and participated in the annual 
commemorative events at the August 7
th
 Memorial Park. By virtue of being a participant, I 
actively observed interactions, relationships, actions and events at the park. Sitting in the 
audience, I listened to the speeches, poems, observed the minute of silence and recorded 
ways in which the visitors respond to the key elements in the park. I documented 
observations in the form of field notes and took digital images of what was going on. One 
disadvantage I faced when using participant observation as a research technique was the 
difficulty to observe a situation while participating at the same time. Despite this challenge, 
this research technique enabled me to observe non-verbal expressions of participants during 
commemorations and of those visiting the park. However, I did not find it necessary to have 
an interpreter during my participation. 
 
Ethnographic and qualitative interview is the other instrument I used to elicit data on a wide 
range of issues investigated, especially, on how the terror attack is remembered, coping with 
trauma, the perceptions of the functioning of the Park, cases of terrorism, the functioning of 
the Peace Builder’s Kids Clubs, interfaith relations, and so on. Purposive sampling 
techniques were used to select those being interviewed to include the terror attack survivors 
                                                            
5 See Appendix 2 for the documents reviewed and type of data elicited. 
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most of whom are members of the victims association, relatives of the victims, recovery and 
rescue staff, staff of the Memorial Park, counsellors, select residents of Siyu and Mombasa. I 
mainly conducted interviews on a one-to-one basis and guided the interviewees through 
questions and prompts. In other interviews, however, I gave no structure to my participants 
and just let them talk freely exploring their remembered experiences. Such interviews, the 
structured and the non-structured, are known to elicit in-depth data. 
 
Focus group discussion: Since the 1980s there has been an increase in the use of focus groups 
to research social issues (Madriz, 2003; Morgan, 1997). I used focus groups as a research 
technique to gather empirical evidence of the impacts, coping mechanisms and memories of 
the August 7
th
 1998 terrorist attack, the escalation of terrorism, the activities of the PBKC and 
interfaith relations through group interaction (Morgan, 1997, 1998). As contextual interactive 
group discussions, focus groups are used to explore a specific set of issues (Kitzinger & 
Barbour, 1999) and if held on a regular basis can become a social and political forum in their 
own right (Baker & Hinton, 1999). Focus groups offer a social context for meaning-making 
and shifting the balance of power from the researcher towards the participants (Wilkinson, 
1999). 
 
Fifteen focus group discussions were held in the course of this study each lasting three hours 
in Nairobi, Uasin Gishu, Pate’s Siyu, Kwale and Mombasa. I provided the participants with a 
framework that guided deliberations and interactions, which enabled the participants to 
engage with particular issues pertaining to their specific focus group. This framework 
encouraged active participation of the participants through guiding questions. However, I 
used guiding questions flexibly to allow for open-ended communicative interactions. This 
flexibility proved useful as the memories under discussion in some instances elicited pain, 
trauma and a sense of loss. While this technique enabled a free flow of information and 
generated extensive data within a short time frame, there were challenges using it at the 
beginning of the research especially in facilitating the discussions in view of the rawness of 
the memories under discussion which made some participants very emotional to the verge of 
breaking down. To overcome this challenge I always adopted a different line of questioning 
to avoid injuring the interviewee’s well-being. At the back of my mind, I considered the well-
being of the interviewee more important than my research. In addition to this, there was a 
tendency for some vocal participants dominating the group discussion. For those dominating 
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the discussions, I limited the length of time and frequency of speaking to enable the shy ones 
time to contribute. 
 
1.1.5. Ethical Questions 
My research was faced with ethical issues given the sensitivity of the matter I was addressing. 
Some of my interviewees and members of the focus group discussions sustained injuries and 
were traumatized (and some are still recovering), while others lost loved ones during and in 
the aftermath of the events of August 7
th
 1998. The nature of the suffering borne by the 
victims, and the fact that the tragic event happened quite recently, made it difficult for them 
to open up, as they had not fully come to terms with what happened. Another equally difficult 
aspect was their bitterness over compensation by the American government and the lack of 
any support by their own government as evidenced by the following statement by Mr Ali 
Mwadama.
6
 “…after the blast sometimes we even wish we were made of steel, glass or 
concrete, like the Cooperative Building or Ufundi Cooperative House which alongside others 
were damaged by the blast but were fully compensated while human beings …were left to 
suffer and die from their injuries”. I therefore navigated this territory very carefully ensuring 
no further injury to their suffering was inflicted. I cultivated some sense of trust by being 
introduced to most of my interviewees by the Park management and by attending my early 
meetings as an observer without taking any notes. I assured them that the research was 
mainly for my dissertation and nothing will be published or used for any other purpose 
without their express consent. I accepted the counsellors’ view of the sanctity of the 
counsellor-patient confidentiality in their work; hence my unequivocal assurances that the 
identity of the interviewees will not be revealed. Instead, I do not use their real names to refer 
to their identities when they withheld consent. Similarly, the sensitivity and security risks 
attached to discussing some aspects of terrorism, such as the perpetrators and government 
responses posed a challenge during fieldwork as some respondents were reluctant to discuss 
them. In respect of their wishes, I have changed their names, where necessary, based on the 
agreements I had with the respondents, and in some instances, my own judgement guided 
what identities to apply. It is critical that the identity of these sources becomes protected. 
                                                            
6 Mr Mwadama is the Chairman of the August Seventh Bomb Blast Victims Association and made this 
statement during the 13th Commemorative Anniversary 
Part II: Literature Review 
 
In Kenya, there has been little scholarly literature devoted to the subject of memory, 
especially of the events surrounding the August 7
th
 Memorial Park. This research on 
‘Remembering the 1998 Nairobi Terror Attack: Cultural and Trauma Memory and the 
Reconciliation of a Nation’ contributes towards filling this scholarly lacuna in literature. I 
start this section by reviewing what has been written on memories of this attack before 
turning to other bodies of knowledge to place the study in a fuller context. 
 
Sydney Kasfir’s work (2005) is one of the few studies to have dealt with the subject. She 
focuses on how the Nairobi terror-attack brought Kenyans in all walks of life together in a 
rare show of unity not witnessed in other traumatic circumstances, notably the ethnic clashes 
in the Rift Valley in the early 1990s. She discusses how visual artists from the Banana Arts 
Studio created their own narratives depicting terrorism. In her view, many of the artworks 
only capture the confusion that ensued immediately after the blast. One artwork, however, 
that particularly drew her attention was a painting titled ‘Heartbook’ which intended to 
embed this terror action into historical records that would be opened up time and again for 
remembrance and history. The aspect of healing and reconciliation is what these artists hoped 
to transmit. She has recently written (2012) on memorialisation processes in Uganda where 
she examines Buganda’s public monuments and artistic expressions to reveal the ambiguities 
of memorialising the past in the present. Her focus, however, is the narration of heroism and 
imagined collective representation of various kinds that are staged in significant public 
places. Her discussion on the ways artists and the public renegotiate their interpretation of the 
monuments with their own agenda about memory informs this study. 
 
Obwogo (1999) focuses on the terror attack, the rescue efforts, and the suffering it inflicted 
on its survivors analysing in depth what he identifies as America’s culpability while 
advocating a just compensation for all its victims. Akhahenda’s (2002) work, on the other 
hand, highlights the unity displayed in the aftermath of the attack and offers a historical 
analysis of the political processes towards a united Kenya, beginning from the pre-
independence period, to President Kenyatta’s Harambee7 nation to the ethnically-polarised 
nation following the introduction of multi-party politics in the early 1990s. He, therefore, sees 
                                                            
7 Slogan adopted by President Kenyatta, which became a rallying call to ‘pull together’ in unity and for nation-
building. 
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this attack serving to bridge the ethnic and political divisions threatening to tear the nation 
apart. Whereas my research also describes the attack, rescue efforts and the quest for justice, 
it goes beyond Obwogo’s by examining how this attack is represented in visual and 
performance art and how these media contribute to providing closure to the trauma it 
engendered. My chapter on national identity, though, inspired by Akhahenda’s analysis, 
broaches the subject by providing an in-depth analysis of its origins in pre-independent 
Kenya and its perpetration by post-independent Kenyan leaders. 
 
Having stated that literature on the subject of this dissertation is very limited for Kenya, there 
is work on similar themes elsewhere in Africa. Theses in South Africa studies have sought to 
demonstrate the role of memorialisation in promoting healing after apartheid, an approach 
that also formed a key plank in the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission. Coombes (2003) discusses extensively the South African scenarios using 
different examples. She mainly focuses, though, on the symbolic transactional roles of 
monuments in engendering debates on democracy and the need to build a united post-
apartheid South Africa that is accommodating of all while promoting healing and 
reconciliation. Her work engages with different forms of historical knowledge and experience 
through a variety of material and visual means in museums, monuments and the re-animation 
of particular public spaces. One example is the transformation of the Robben Island from a 
prison into a memorial shrine dedicated not to the history of suffering but to the triumph of 
the human spirit over suffering and hardship. It was to be treated as a monument preserving 
the country’s political history in a forward-looking way, like the Martin Luther King Centre 
in Atlanta.  
 
Another example that has dominated memorial studies in the early years of this decade - and 
still does - is the genocide in Rwanda where several memorials have been constructed in 
memory of the hundreds of thousands killed during the genocide. Bay & Donham (2006) 
discuss the violence in Rwanda instigated by a Hutu-led government by appealing to the 
collective memory of the pre-colonial and colonial era depiction of the Tutsi as foreigners 
exploiting them. The Hutu resorted to violence as a means of re-establishing the order with 
them remaining at the helm of leadership hence the genocide. They examine the means 
through which the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government has sought to create 
and reshape the collective memory of a unified post-genocide Rwanda-wide vide 
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institutionalization of the gacaca
8
 courts; promotion of patriotism; and creation of new 
national symbols. They elaborate on the commemorations and memorials preserving the 
memory of the genocide while laying emphasis on the negative impacts of ethnic division. 
While acknowledging the RPF government claims to promotion of democracy, human rights, 
and commemorations as means to creating a peaceful Rwanda, Bay & Donham (Ibid) point 
out the government charade that completely mask out the atrocities committed by the RPF. 
Similarly, RPF has ensured that there are no memorials marking any of the atrocities they 
executed. Caplan (2007) and Clark & Kauffman (2009) describe the chain of genocide 
memorials in Rwanda erected not only in the city but also even in the villages – in schools 
and churches - to pass the message that those who died are not going to be forgotten; the 
memorials prove to those denying the genocide that the people are actually dead. Its 
commemoration to quote Rwanda’s President is ‘a means of seeking appropriate sustainable 
ways of doing justice, achieving reconciliation and building a strong vibrant society for all 
Rwanda’ (Clark & Kauffman, 2009).  
 
Breed (2008) interrogates the role of theatre as a tool for nation-building in Rwanda in the 
aftermath of the genocide. Her focus is of two parallel initiatives, she studies the state-driven 
theatre companies performing at national level with intent to create a re-imagined Rwandan 
identity, and grassroots theatre associations performing at community level. These initiatives, 
she observes, embody nationalist slogans of reconciliation through text, song and dance 
proclaiming that Rwanda is one country with the same culture and language. While slogans 
and government rhetoric of reconciliation are central in both groups’ performances, she 
considers state-driven theatre is impeding genuine reconciliation because it is politically 
motivated, unlike the more altruistic grassroots ones. She observes that in grassroots theatre 
(2008:47) “survivors and perpetrators use theatre to unite their communities; dancing, 
singing, and acting together have enabled them to forge new relationships; and to reconcile 
and heal themselves”. In some of these performances, theatre has been used to activate 
memories of the conflict and to promote confessions in support of the gacaca courts aiding 
reconciliation and healing. De Becker (2012) examines the commemorative practices of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide that remember this conflict at a national, public and official level. 
She mainly focuses her analysis on the national genocide memorials, with specific attention 
                                                            
8 A system of community justice system inspired by tradition initiated in Rwanda in 2001 to deliver justice at 
the grassroots level in the wake of the 1994 genocide. 
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on the bone memorials at Nyamata, Bisesero and Ntarama and the Kigali Memorial Centre in 
Kigali. Just as De Becker’s analysis of the Rwanda memorials reveals how the genocide is 
remembered, I adopt a similar approach to examine how the August 7
th
 Memorial Park’s 
monuments and objects in the Documentation Centre remembers the Nairobi bombing 
tragedy. 
 
A paradigmatic shift in the understanding of monuments is that by the German anti-
monument movement discussed by Young (1993) which challenge the ethics and aesthetics 
of the very notion of building an artifice to represent violence that led to the extermination of 
many lives. While aware of their duty to remember, but aesthetically sceptical of the 
traditional forms of memorial monuments previously exploited to objectify Nazism, a new 
generation of artists has sought to challenge traditional practices of monument-making by 
designing counter-monuments. The first of these counter-monuments was built in 1986 at the 
invitation of the city of Harburg to create a “Monument against Fascism, War and Violence- 
and for Peace and Human Rights”. The artist, Jochen Gerzes designed a twelve-meter-high, 
one-meter-square obelisk of hollow aluminium coated with lead, inviting citizens and visitors 
to Harburg to inscribe their names and messages on its surface. As it filled up, it was 
gradually lowered into the ground until it eventually disappeared, leaving the memories of 
those who visited the site previously as the only tangible trace of the monument. Counter-
monuments are seen as the inversion of phallic victory monuments: they are monuments to 
defeat, in a sense, not monuments to the genocide (Young, 1993). The ‘counter-
monumentalists’ argue that the static monuments have forgotten the reason for their creation 
by assuming “...the polished, finished veneer of a death mask, unreflective of current 
memory, unresponsive to contemporary issues” (Ibid: 46) inevitably driving memory into 
oblivion. To enliven and make them relevant in conveying the impacts of catastrophes like 
the holocaust, this movement calls for their liberation from their indifference through 
community participation. This is achieved through commemorative performances that give 
meaning to their existence. Its advocates further argue that by dematerializing memory, 
people approach them with their own subjectivity while remembering that it is their civil duty 
not to let the past be repeated. In Gerzes’s words, lacking of a permanent memorial, “the 
visitors are left standing in remembrance, looking inward for memory” (Young, 1993: 46). 
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Bordner (1992) explores the subject of publicly constructed memory in modern America 
discussing different phases of commemoration in Cleveland, Ohio. In the context of 
America’s Vietnam War Memorial, he distinguishes between two types of memory, 
vernacular and official. Vernacular memory, he asserts is that originating from those ordinary 
people most directly involved in the war: the veterans who participated and those who 
supported the war who advocate a monument commemorating all those who fought and died. 
In contrast, are the proponents of an official monument dedicated to patriotism and ideals of 
national duty exhibited by all Americans. The contest between patriotism and grief or sorrow 
underlay public debate in the case of the Vietnam War Memorial. “Vernacular expressions 
convey what social reality feels like rather than what it should be like. Its very existence 
threatens the dogmatic and timeless nature of official expression” (ibid: 75). He then presents 
what happened in Cleveland in terms of public commemoration during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries where emphasis oscillated between vernacular and official expressions to 
a cultural hybrid resulting in the creation of the Cleveland Cultural Gardens serving the 
interests of both American patriotism and ethnic nationalists. Public memory of the Vietnam 
War emanates from this intersection of vernacular and official expression of memory. 
However, a decline in the cultural power of official symbols in the 1960s, he suggests, 
explains the emergence of vernacular interests in the Vietnam Veteran Memorial itself 
(Bordner in Gillis, 1994). 
 
In Tourists of History, Sturken (2009) examines kitsch objects as America’s touristic, 
consumerist response to trauma illustrated through two recent post-Cold War period terrorist 
attacks: the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and 
the September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Centre and the aftermath of each. She argues 
that the emergence of kitsch objects
9
 has created a touristic relationship to these two 
traumatic events promoting the notion of Americans’ innocence while obfuscating the real 
global, political context of these attacks (Gerson, 2009). Having said this, she argues that the 
‘kitsch effects’ are only temporary and with time, traumatic memory returns. This assertion 
of ‘American innocence’ resonates with the effects the American embassy bombing in 
Nairobi had on Kenyans. They too have talked of their innocence. However, rather than 
                                                            
9 Used in this context in reference to mass-produced objects embodying a particular kind of pre-packaged 
sentiment but conveying the message that the sentiment is universally shared. Memory kitsch encourages 
visitors to feel sense for the loss of lives in a way that discourages any discussion of the context in which the 
lives were lost.  
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‘kitschification’ of trauma as seen in the two American memorials in question, the August 7th  
Memorial Park is devoid of it but acknowledges the politics involved, blaming the Americans 
for their suffering. While there are sentimental objects on exhibition in the Documentation 
Centre, these are not kitsch in the sense examined by Sturken (ibid). The park represents their 
memories while mediating their trauma instead of seeking the palliative comfort of kitsch. 
 
One common strand uniting all these studies is their intention to heal the traumatic effects of 
the tragedies they commemorate while ensuring that their histories are remembered. 
However, in the South African and Rwandan studies, reconciliation is highlighted. This is 
informed by the discord prevailing among its different communities based on their recent 
histories of apartheid and the genocide respectively. The need for internal harmony is what 
their memorials promote.  
 
As previously stated, there is limited literature in Kenya on the subject of memory, especially 
that touching on how monuments represent the collective memories of particular events such 
as the 1998 Nairobi U.S. embassy bombings. This study therefore intends to fill this gap by 
not only generating data on the monument dedicated to the memories of those who perished 
during the attack, but will also refer to other monuments relating to other types of memories 
and their linkage to questions of identity in Kenya. 
 
Part III: Conceptual Frameworks 
 
Defining ‘collective memory’ is not an easy task. It is a term that has been used in very 
different ways across disciplines ranging from psychology to anthropology, art history to 
history, and political science to literary criticism. It is at once a rich and a complex 
abstraction. Despite the differences, the common feature uniting these approaches is that 
‘collective memory’ is a conceptualisation of memory that transcends the individual and is 
shared by the group. Simply put, it is a collective concept for all knowledge that directs 
behaviour and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that remains 
through generations in repeated societal practice. It is not, however, distinct from individual 
memory since it is clearly entwined with it. 
 
33 
 
While it was initially studied as part and parcel of psychology, its social dimensions were 
given serious attention in the early twentieth century by Bartlett (1932: 296). His main 
argument is that the memory of individuals is influenced fundamentally by the social contexts 
in which they are engaged. In his formulation he posits “that collectives in and of themselves, 
do not have some sort of memory”. Instead, social organization gives a framework into which 
all detailed remembrance must fit; and in that, it very powerfully influences both the manner 
and the matter being remembered. This position emphasises ‘memory in the group’ and not 
‘memory of the group’ – a perspective shared by Halbwachs (1992). Durkheim also 
contributed a brief early discussion of commemorative rituals in ‘primitive’ societies 
attributing “collective effervescence” to human cultural creativity. Durkheim (1915:347) 
derives the characteristic attributes of an individual from the society, which gives the 
individual a distinct character and a special place among other beings. On the other hand, 
society can only exist in and through individuals’ shared beliefs, traditions and aspirations as 
members of a group. Without individuals, there would be no society. Collective 
effervescence excites physical and mental life, resulting in an outer and ‘inward 
transformation’ of the individual that serves to sustain group life. It is through this 
intoxicating feeling of hyper-excitement that individuals become aware of the collective 
dimensions of their bodies, and motivated to pursue impersonal ends and follow ‘collective 
rules of conduct’ (Shilling & Mellor, 2011). In this, he sees creativity being a product of the 
collective group rather than simply individuals, as previously advocated (Halbwachs, 1992). 
  
The problem with Durkheim’s formulation, though, is that it only addresses itself to periods 
of heightened cultural activity and does not explain what happens to the group during 
‘ordinary’ times of inactivity (Douglas, 1980). It is here, perhaps, that we find Halbwachs’ 
theory of ‘collective memory’ most useful as he explains that during such times, ritual and 
ceremonial acts of commemoration stimulate the community to collectively recall certain 
events from the past enhancing group solidarity. He transposes the concept of ‘collective 
memory’ from a biological to a cultural context and states that, “it is in society that 
individuals normally acquire their memories. It is also in society, that they recall, recognize, 
and localize their memories”, (Halbwachs, 1992:38). Implicitly, it is through the socialization 
process of a group that an individual is able to remember and reconstruct meanings in a 
coherent way. Assmann (2001) and Connerton (1989: 3) refer to the same concepts as 
‘cultural memory’ and ‘social memory’ respectively. Connerton, however, takes a step back 
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to Durkheim to elaborate that while our experiences of the present largely depend on our 
knowledge and images of the past to qualify the present social order, it is through ritual 
performances that these experiences are transmitted and sustained. 
 
The ritual performances that Connerton (Ibid: 72-73) mentions are not only represented in 
words and images, they are also present in habitual remembering sedimented in the body’s 
re-enactment of the past through incorporated and inscribed practices (Rowlands, 1993). I 
will apply this concept of transmission to examine forms of behaviour such as the bowing of 
heads, kneeling in prayer or making bodily marks of the cross during visits to the August 7th 
Memorial Park by survivors and their relatives, especially during the annual commemoration. 
The monuments, photographs, documentaries and flyers used at the site provide evidence of 
the inscriptive practices of social memory that informs this study. 
 
However, there has been criticism levelled against Halbwachs for seemingly placing 
emphasis on the group to the detriment of the role of the individual in recollections of the 
past. Kansteiner (2002) and Margalit (2002: 51) introduce new terms: ‘collected memory’ 
and ‘common memory’ respectively which denote the same thing, that is, both terms 
“aggregate the memories of all those people who remember a certain episode which each of 
them experienced individually”. What they aim to do is to relocate the individual within the 
collective, thereby emphasizing the role of human agency in the construction of shared or 
social memories. 
 
Arguably, this criticism is a semantic one, which elaborates on but does not invalidate 
Halbwachs’ concept of ‘collective memory’. In my understanding, the memories of terrorism 
are still to be approached through the broader ‘collective memory’ frame as advanced by 
Halbwachs and Connerton (ibid). It is through the annual commemorative performance 
rituals of narration, poetry and speeches that the survivors are able to remember the details 
collectively. With time the memories start weakening at the individual level and risk thinning 
out if left to individual remembrance. This frame of analysis is embedded in my study of the 
memories of the bomb blast: I argue that it is through their gatherings to commemorate the 
events and share their experiences that the memories of this tragedy are transmitted. As the 
subsequent chapters will demonstrate, their annual commemorative rituals give them the 
opportunity to reminisce about the past and through this reminiscing (through oral narratives, 
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songs, performance and visit to the monuments) they are comforted and have the effects of 
personal trauma pacified. 
 
My second framework of discussion relates to the contentious relation between collective 
memory and history. In Halbwachs’ formulation, ‘formal history’ differs from memory: 
“History”, he says, “is dead memory, a way of preserving pasts which with we no longer 
have an ‘organic’ experiential relation” (ibid). To distinguish between collective memory and 
history Halbwachs (1980; 1992) further elaborated on these concepts breaking them into 
autobiographical memory, historical memory, history and collective memory. Nora’s (1989: 
8-9) elucidation of these two terms provides a useful insight into how they relate to each 
other. According to Nora, memory and history are in fundamental opposition:  
“memory ...remains in permanent evolution, open to dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation 
and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived but 
remains perpetually tied to the present while history, because it is a secular and 
intellectual production of the past, calls for analysis and criticism. In this, history is a 
critical discourse that is antithetical to memory and always seeks to exterminate it 
(Nora, 1989:8)”.  
In this line of reasoning, Nora does not imply that analytical history supplants memory; 
instead, it is difficult to categorise equivocally  accounts as belonging to either. 
 
History and memory are always considered to be in conflict because the two approaches have 
different aspirations of representing the past. History presents an accurate account of the past 
even when that record reflects negatively on the people being represented; in collective 
memory, in contrast, negative aspects may be omitted in representing what type of people we 
are. Novick (1999:3-4) records this difference thus: “to understand something historically is 
to be aware of its complexity, to have sufficient detachment to see it from multiple 
perspectives, to accept the ambiguities, including moral ambiguities, of protagonists’ motives 
and behaviour. Collective memory simplifies; sees events from a single, committed 
perspective; is impatient with ambiguities of any kind; reduces events to mythic archetypes”. 
 
This understanding of the relations between history and memory has recently been critiqued 
because historiography has broadened its remit beyond the ‘traditional’ discipline to include 
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wider social and cultural fields (Novick, 1999). Novick doubts whether historians can 
succeed in being objective arguing that because history is written by people in the present for 
particular purposes, the selection and interpretation of sources is always arbitrary. If on the 
other hand ‘experience’ (read memory) occurs by way of narrative, then, there is no original, 
unmediated experience that can be recovered (as this will have been pre-selected). Burke 
(1989) remarks that history should perhaps be more appropriately defined as a particular type 
of cultural memory, because, “neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer”. In 
both cases, we are learning to take account of conscious or unconscious selection, 
interpretation and distortion - processes that are socially conditioned. Clearly, memory itself 
has a historiography (Samuel, 1994). Implicitly, any separation of the two is difficult. 
 
New conceptual dimensions continue to emerge following the increased interest in ‘collective 
memory’; many of these tend to reduce collective memory to the effect of human agency. 
However, to maintain and enhance the understanding of Halbwachs’ materiality, ‘cultural 
memory’ is a term increasingly being applied. Assmann’s (1995) espousal of this term 
becomes relevant to this discussion. He breaks cultural memory into ‘communicative 
memory’ and ‘cultural memory’ with the former used to refer to the everyday 
communications about the meaning of things from the past that are still remembered (for up 
to between 80 and 100 years) and can, therefore, be influenced by contemporary events, thus 
making them susceptible to instability. Cultural memory, on the other hand, comprises 
reusable texts, images, monuments, buildings and rituals (commemorative) which are 
particular to a society at a given historical period. Their adoption helps in the stabilization 
and objectification of that society’s image as they are designed to recall fateful events in the 
history of the collective. A further elaboration by Assmann (ibid) differentiates between 
‘potential’ and ‘actual’ cultural memories and goes on to argue that when representations of 
the past are stored in museums, archives and libraries, they constitute potential memory. 
However, once these representations are adopted and given new meaning in a new social and 
historical context they become actual memory. In this elaboration, it becomes possible, then, 
that some specific representations of the past can traverse all these stages from 
communicative memory through potential memory to actual memory; and the reverse is 
equally possible. This conceptualization also lays emphasis on the importance of the present, 
because communicative memory is mainly about remembering events that happened within 
the lifetime of its producers and consumers. 
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There is resonance between the interpretations by Assmann (ibid) and Halbwachs’ 
conceptualization of collective memory for they both end up having this difference defined 
by a lineal time trajectory that positions collective memory giving way to history. This 
conceptual frame is appropriate for interpreting the results of my study for it deals with 
different types of memories associated with the World Wars, the Mau Mau memories relating 
to the struggle for independence and those generated by the 1998 terror attack. It is by 
positioning history and collective memory in such a continuum that the two are recognized as 
a mixture of ways of relating to the past (Boyd & Werstch, 2009). 
 
Collective memory and materiality is the other conceptual framework that I consider in this 
dissertation. Materiality, Miller (2005:1) asserts, “…represents the merely apparent, behind 
which lies that which is real. It remains foundational to most people’s stance in the world; 
without it, indeed, it becomes difficult to define humanity, as it is central to the way we 
understand ourselves. It is the force behind humanity’s bid to transform the world to conform 
to our beliefs on how it should be” (ibid: 2). While this stance on materiality is fundamental 
in almost all aspects of man’s engagement with the world from fields as diverse as religion, 
science, cosmology to finance, I narrow its application to the relationship between collective 
memory and materiality, specifically focusing on how memories are externalized by human 
agencies into materials and subsequently, how these materials influence human actions.  
 
In developing his arguments in support of a theory of ‘things’ or material culture, Miller 
based his analysis on Goffman’s (1975) Frame Analysis10 and Gombrich’s (1979) The Sense 
of Order
11
 to arrive at what he termed “the humility of things” (Miller, 1987:85-108). He 
concluded that objects are important not because of their intrusive physical presence, but 
often because we do not ‘see’ them. The less we are aware of them, the more powerful they 
are in determining our expectations by setting the scene and ensuring normative behaviour, 
without being open to challenge. Implicitly, material objects have the capacity to fade out of 
focus and into the ‘environment’ yet continue prompting us to behave in certain ways. 
                                                            
10 Goffman argues that much of our behaviour is cued by expectations, which are determined by the frames that 
constitutes the context of action. 
11 In his examination of artworks, Gombrich asserts that when a frame is appropriate we simply do not see it, 
because it seamlessly conveys to us the appropriate mode by which we should encounter that which it frames. 
Put differently, it is the frame, rather than any quality independently manifested by the artwork, that elicits the 
special response we give it as art. 
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Bourdieu (1977) likewise shows that objects condition human actors by becoming the 
primary means through which people become social beings. Hegel had (1807) taken this 
further “suggesting that there can be no fundamental separation between humanity and 
materiality-that everything that we are and do arises out of the reflection upon ourselves’ 
given by the mirror image of the process by which we create form and are created by this 
process”. Simply put, we understand ourselves through the object forms we create, or 
alternately, the objects we create ‘make’ us by acting on us through their own agency. 
 
This thesis is further inspired by recent contributions by Bruno Latour (1999) and Alfred Gell 
(1998) in working towards a theory of material culture and materiality especially with the 
introduction of the concept of agency. In his formulation, Latour (ibid), takes away the role of 
human as agents and applies it to the non-human world, demonstrating that material forms do 
also possess the agency that can cause effects. He therefore concludes that what matters is 
often not the entities themselves, human or otherwise, but rather the network of agents and 
the relationships between them (Miller, 2005:12). Gell’s (1998) approach on the other hand 
focuses on inferred intentionality where we assume that there must have been a kind of social 
agency for an effect to be encountered. Latour’s and Gell’s perspectives differ in the sense 
that while the former lays emphasis on non-humans below the level of human agency, the 
latter looks through objects to the embedded human agency they contain. How does this play 
out in the externalization of memory through materiality? 
 
Gell’s perspective suggests that it is through the actions of humans that a monument was 
conceptualized, designed and installed with the sole purpose of collating, externalizing and 
transmitting memories. In the context of this thesis we may assert that without the concerted 
efforts of designers and contractors the August 7
th
 Memorial Park would not generate and 
communicate the collective memory of the tragic event that happened in 1998. As a 
monument, it embodies human agency bringing together the memories of both those who 
perished in the terror attack and those surviving the trauma, and collectively distributes the 
memories to a wider people hence materializing their engagement with the world. 
 
A discussion of collective memory is never complete without looking at the means of 
memory transmission. An important development in the understanding of its working was the 
shift of focus from the intellectual to the external, material, forms of memory in ‘artificial’ 
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sites. Over millennia, however, there has been a whole range of systems developed to 
transmit memory starting from orality where reliance on memory was the norm in what Le 
Goff (1992) refers to as prehistoric times, to the written word, print culture and lastly to 
electronic formats in the twentieth century (Ong, 1982; Hutton, 1993; Goody, 1986). A 
further elaboration of transmission of cultural heritage or memory is provided by Goody and 
Watts’ (1968) discussion comparing literate and non-literate societies. In the latter, all beliefs, 
values and forms of knowledge are transmitted orally through words or imitations and stored 
in human memory. This way, what is transmitted resides in the particular range of meanings 
and attitudes that are attached to that particular society’s verbal symbols. Implicitly, oral 
transmission does not enable the development of ‘dictionary definitions’ or allow words to 
accumulate successive layers of historically validated meanings which they acquire in literate 
culture. Instead, the meaning of each word is ratified in a succession of real circumstances, 
vocal enunciation and physical gestures, all of which combine to localize both its particular 
denotation and its accepted connotative meanings (ibid). Definitions become localised within 
the group. 
 
In non-literate societies, what is remembered is that which is of practical significance to one’s 
experiences of social relationships. Bartlett (1925) and Halbwachs (1950) argue that whatever 
has ceased to be relevant to an individual is discarded by the process of forgetting while what 
continues to be of social relevance is stored in memory and that anything new is incorporated 
by a process of interpretation and rationalization. Language is the effective medium of 
transacting this process of remembering or forgetting. However, not everything whose 
relevance has ceased is easily forgotten: mnemonic devices, recital under ritual conditions 
and employed ‘people of memory’, and so on, offer resistance to new processes of 
interpretation ensuring that not everything from the past is forgotten. 
 
Conversely, in literate societies, historical sensibility of the past is transmitted through 
historical records. With writing, a more general and abstract kind of relationship between the 
word and its referent that is less closely connected with the particularities of person, space 
and time is established than obtains in oral communication (Goody and Watt, 1968). Based 
on this premise, it is critical to note that with the widespread use of the alphabet, “the idea of 
‘logic’ – an immutable and impersonal mode of discourse – arose. And it was only then that 
the sense of the human past as an objective reality was formally developed; a process in 
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which the distinction between ‘myth’ and ‘history’ took a decisive importance” (ibid: 44). 
While written culture has made literature easily available, it does not impose itself forcefully 
or as uniformly as is the case with oral transmission of cultural tradition. 
 
In my study of the August 7
th
 Memorial Park, I explore how a mix of these transmission 
modes have functioned to keep the memory of the tragic bomb blast alive and how the same 
modes have benefitted the processes of trauma healing, social cohesion and identity building. 
 
The other important framework applied in this study is the understanding of the concepts of 
ethnicity
12
 and nationalism.
13
 These two phenomena have become so visible in many aspects 
of Kenyan life that I find them difficult to ignore in a study focussed on memorialisation. The 
study of nationalism, (Anderson, 1983; Eriksen, 1994) as an artefact of cultural processes is a 
relatively new topic for anthropologists – it was for many years left to political scientists, 
historians and sociologists – having only attracted their interest towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. Anderson (1983:6) defines the nation thus: “it is an imagined political 
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” By ‘imagined’ he 
means people defining themselves as members of a nation “will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of 
their communion” (ibid:6). Behind the ‘imagining’ is a strong force of horizontal 
comradeship and sentiment shared by those in the ‘communion’. A central tenet in 
Anderson’s notion of the ‘imagined’ nation is language. He asserts that the arrival of new 
forms of communication, especially the print media and the use of vernacular language in the 
16
th
 century catalysed this sense of belonging as it united people across large stretches of time 
and space. The centrality of language as a membership ticket to this collectively-imagined 
nation strengthens the bond among all those subscribing to this imagination, hence the 
readiness with which people are willing to sacrifice themselves for the nation. 
 
                                                            
12 Refers to aspects of social relationships between groups, which consider themselves, and are regarded by 
others, whom they are aware of, and with whom they enter into relationships, as being culturally distinctive. 
 
13 See (Gellner’s, 1983:1, Eriksen, 1994) definition: ‘a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic 
boundaries should not cut across political ones’. According to this view, there is a peculiar link between 
ethnicity and the state with the former’s ideology dominating the latter. However, in a poly-ethnic state like 
Kenya, nationalism as an ideology expresses the shared civil rights rather for all the citizens. 
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This centrality of language is challenged by Billig (1995:30) who suggests that “language 
does not create nationalism, so much as nationalism creates language,” arguing that while 
nations may be imagined communities “the patterning of the imaginings cannot be explained 
by the differences of language for languages may have to be imagined as distinct entities.” 
Billig (ibid) additionally disagrees that print capitalism rationalized the importance of 
vernacular languages in fostering the consciousness of belonging because in the mid 
nineteenth century large parts of a nation’s population were still illiterate. They could not 
therefore be influenced to imagine belonging to a nation if this was restricted to the ‘reading 
class.’ In this regard, Anderson fails to show how the imagined community of the nation 
extended to include members of different classes. 
 
McCrone (1998:6) criticises Anderson for not developing an account in which the imagining 
is carried out and sustained by paying more attention to the aspect of ‘community’ in 
nationhood beyond its ‘imagining’ alone. Social anthropologists have, thus, sought to 
strengthen Anderson’s analysis. Eriksen (1993) like Anderson adopts anthropological 
approaches in identifying the nation as a cultural community describing the process of 
reification through which national traditions and identities emerge. He illustrates how this 
happened in Norway where an urban middle class created a ‘national’ culture borrowing 
elements from different traditions and presenting it as authentic Norwegian national culture, 
enabling people to talk of their culture as though it was a ‘constant’. Gellner (1983) is cynical 
of this form of nationalism seeing it as an arbitrary historical invention, though 
acknowledging that such devices can be used as a framework to build and foster the sense of 
national belonging. 
 
In Kenya, the construction of a national identity has always been tenuous. Instead of pulling 
towards the centre, each ethnicity has tended to assert its own identity
14
 leading to persistent 
tensions in the construction and portrayal of a unified sense of national identity. In a poly-
ethnic and a linguistically diverse country like Kenya, any approach to national identity on 
the basis of attributes such as language and boundaries alone fails. Instead, processes of 
social construction as advocated by Barth (1969) become relevant to the Kenyan situation. 
Following the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, which brought the country to the 
brink of civil war, a new institution aptly named the National Cohesion and Integration 
                                                            
14 See 13 above 
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Commission (NCIC) was formed with a view to promoting national unity. It is still too early 
to determine whether this commission will succeed or not. The on-going interaction between 
the different communities within the confines of the nation generates external differences but 
at the same time highlights certain similarities; the commission seeks to exploit the latter to 
forge national identity. Jenkins (1996; 1997) asserts that this dialectical movement involves 
the selective use of markers and indicators, which are changeable over time to bring about 
social separation, exclusion and inclusion. In this sense, national identity is historically and 
locally variable but bound up with ethnicity. 
 
To Cohen (1985), all communities are ‘imagined’, constructed through the symbolism of 
‘belonging’ and ‘not belonging’. Hence, distinctions are made based on ‘them’ and ‘us’. 
These are formulated most critically – and carefully – at the margins, in the definition of 
boundaries and the identification of the different characteristics of those considered to be 
within the group and those outside it. He posits that while not everyone within the 
‘community’ is alike; there are circumstances and situations in which people attach more 
importance to their similarities than their differences. These are symbolized in various ways, 
including the use of names, images and ideas, which nevertheless require interpretation to be 
understood. In other words, the processes through which these symbols are created, 
manipulated and appropriated command attention. 
 
Cohen’s (1985) and Anderson’s (1983) conceptualization of the construction and 
sustainability of national identity can as well be interpreted through Connerton’s (1989) 
concept of incorporated and inscribed practices. Elias (1996) and Jenkins (2007) argue that 
the depth of meaning associated with symbolization increases with a larger ‘collectivity’, like 
a nation where members do not know each other but ‘imagine’ belonging together as 
advocated by Anderson (1983). In such circumstances, symbols create loyalty and a sense of 
oneness. An examination of the Kenyan national identity, while contentious, relies on 
inscribed symbols – flag, national anthem, currency, maps and national monuments. These 
symbols not only instil a sense of nationalism but also provoke habitual responses in their 
deference (Bordieu, 1977; Connerton, 1989; Elias, 1996). Standing at attention on the 
hoisting of the national flag and singing of the national anthem has unconsciously been 
incorporated in our minds eliciting such habitual reaction. Arguably, though, this does not 
always equate to a deep feeling of belonging and deference to the Kenyan national identity. A 
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recent statement by Dr. Sally Kosgei
15
 supports this view as she asserted that, as a 
government Minister, the flag only aided her in evading traffic jams - otherwise it did not 
symbolize anything meaningful to her. Given that she made the statement in a meeting where 
she shifted her political support to a politician from her own ethnic group, this already 
suggests the importance Kenyans attach to ethnic over national identity. 
 
National identity is something new that was taught in schools and narrated in public political 
meetings and does not, therefore, evoke strong sentiment of nationalism among all Kenyans. 
The common national narrative of a national identity born of shared objectives, history and 
collective memories of the past is often an empty rhetoric serving the interests of the 
privileged few at the centre and in power. Those in the periphery with a different narrative of 
the nation are discriminated against and excluded from national discourse and resource 
allocation - hence the tension, which, if not attended to (as has been the case), often leads to 
strife. The struggle of the disenfranchised against the centre perpetuates the tensions in the 
idea of national identity. Since Kenya’s national identity is constructed from the centre, it 
becomes necessary to engage the periphery in the identity discourse if their views are to be 
incorporated. These views notwithstanding, I still agree with Anderson’s (1983) and Castel’s 
(1997) conceptualization of nationalism as they assert that in the final analysis, nationalism is 
culturally and politically constructed, as are all identities. While Kenyans may have diverse 
communities, our shared history is generally underpinned by experiences that are common to 
all the people. Chapter 5 will discuss issues of ethnic and national identity and how the terror 
attack brought to the fore the ambivalent nature of these concepts. 
 
Another important conceptual strand underpinning my arguments derives from Turner’s 
(1982) application of Van Gennep’s sociological insights on rites of passage. Turner 
introduces the word ‘liminality’ denoting the life-crisis transition rituals that places the 
participants or initiates in a state of ‘betwixt and between’; a state of being ‘almost there’ but 
‘not yet there’; a period during which cultural symbols, as previously experienced by the 
initiates, are inverted, mixed and re-combined enabling them to reflect on their culture and its 
rules. They go through “a period and area of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo which has few 
of the attributes of either the preceding or subsequent profane social or cultural statuses” 
                                                            
15Kenya’s Minister for Agriculture and a former Head of Public Service as reported in the Daily Nation 
6.02.2011 
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(Turner 1982). If in liminality normative societal structures are suspended and re-worked, 
(my words) then, these liminal situations could be seen as the settings in which new models, 
symbols and paradigms emerge as seedbeds of cultural creativity. These new symbols then 
inform other socio-political and economic arenas hence infusing them with new goals and 
aspirations (Turner, 1970; Sutton-Smith, 1972; Douglas, 1980: 119-120)). Applied to my 
study, it explains the rupture caused by the bombing that placed not only the survivors, but 
also the entire country in a liminal state, destroying ‘statuses’ previously held. A period of 
great anxiety, suffering and retrospection followed. This paved the way for the emergence of 
stronger ties between Kenya and the U.S. leading to the formulation of new strategies to 
combat terrorism.
16
 Arguably, what emanated from this tragedy was a country emerging 
anew with strategies to combat terrorism, a phenomenon that continues defining Kenya’s 
status vis-à-vis neighbouring countries and the whole war on terror. This framework is 
equally applicable in looking at the survivors and families of the bereaved. 
 
The relevance of this concept to the entire study will become clearer in the subsequent 
chapters by showing how it accords with my data. 
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
 
In this introductory chapter, I stated the overall purpose of my PhD research, that is, to 
undertake a systematic study of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. To enable me to achieve this 
goal, I provided the historical, geographical and civic information of the city of Nairobi hence 
placing my study in context. I discussed my personal motivation for undertaking this study: 
personal experience of the 1998 Nairobi bombing; my work-related responsibility of 
facilitating the legal protection of monuments associated with Kenya’s independence 
struggle; and discussions of the struggle with MAU MAU War Veterans Association 
revealing its deep-seated memories. I examined the research methodologies used in 
assembling the data supporting my key arguments in the study. I also did an extensive review 
of available literature on the subject of my study beginning with memorialisation in Kenya 
before looking at other memorialisation processes in Africa, then the rest of the world. I 
discussed ‘collective’ memory projects that the Western world has developed as a means of 
                                                            
16 See 6.1.5 for counter-terrorism initiatives. 
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committing to history; and ascribing meaning to some of the worst catastrophes of their time 
through extensive construction of memorial monuments dedicated to these disasters, 
especially the World Wars and the Holocaust. The August 7
th
 Memorial Park serves a similar 
purpose by enabling the understanding of not only the memories of the bomb blast but also of 
how this site of memory has contributed to, and catalysed discussions of, ethnic and national 
identity in Kenya, an issue that has been very contentious in the recent past. I interrogated 
such broad conceptual and theoretical frameworks as – collective memory, history, 
materiality, ethnicity and nationalism, and liminality – that underpin my key concepts of 
memory, history and identity. This chapter sets out the value of this study that collective acts 
of memorialisation are important in mediating healing and providing closure emanating from 
traumatic events such as the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. Memorialisation provides the overall 
context of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Historical Perspectives to 
Memorial Monuments in Kenya 
 
In this chapter, I describe the processes leading to the establishment of the August 7
th
 
Memorial Park in Nairobi and discuss issues relating to memory arising from it. Part I, ‘The 
Nairobi terror attack,’ offers a detailed narrative account of the bombing itself by the 
Liberation Army for the Islamic Sanctuary, a group claiming affiliation to Al Qaeda on the 7
th
 
August 1998.Its ramifications have been far and wide, it took many lives while injuring many 
others. Part II, ‘Monuments and memorials: a historical background’ provides the necessary 
historical background to the development of commemorative monuments in Kenya with a 
focus on three specific examples: the Nairobi War Memorial; the Kolowa Massacre 
Memorial and the Nyeri Memorial. Part III, ‘Towards the Establishment of the August 7th 
Memorial Park’ delves into the main focus of the chapter, namely: historical perspective to 
memorial monuments in Kenya. Part IV, provides a brief summary of what this chapter 
entails. 
 
Part I: The Nairobi Terror Attack 
Prior to the 1998 terror attack targeted at the United States of America Embassy in Nairobi, 
Kenya prided herself as being an ‘island of peace’ surrounded by countries in turmoil 
struggling with one form of instability or the other. Sudan to her immediate north west was a 
country engaged in one of Africa's longest civil wars pitting the Islamic north against the 
Christian and traditionalist south over control of resources and the latter's quest for 
independence. Uganda in the west had been engaged in struggles with the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA), a quasi-religious movement fighting the regime of President Yoweri Museveni. 
Ethiopia in the north had the ‘still unfinished’ boundary dispute with Eritrea that led them to 
war in 1998 even with the latter's independence recognised internationally since 1993; and 
there were other incessant internal strife. To Kenya's northeast was the ungovernable 
Somalia, a country without any known functional government since the ousting of Siad Barre 
in 1991 and the resultant inter-clan wars. The wider Great Lakes region extending to Burundi, 
Rwanda and Congo was also embroiled in one form of war or the other, the 1994 Rwanda 
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genocide being the single most calamitous event whose effects reverberated across the entire 
region, Kenya included. 
 
In 1997, Kenya had just come through a tumultuous electioneering period that saw the then 
incumbent President, Daniel arap Moi,
17
 defeat the opposition parties in that year’s elections. 
The country, however, was in a relative state of peace. Though some minor inter-ethnic 
tensions prevailed, this paled in comparison to the state of instability in the eastern African 
region at the time. 
 
However, one Friday morning, on the 7
th
 of August 1998, the country was awoken from its 
self-assured state of security by a bomb attack in downtown Nairobi targeted at the United 
States embassy. Terrorist attacks were so far removed from Kenyan reality that no one 
imagined the country could be a target. In the minds of many, terrorism was a Middle Eastern 
affair and the closest it came to them was through television and radio news. The Norfolk 
Hotel attack in Nairobi in 1980 was many years back and had effectively faded in the 
memory of many.  
 
Located at the intersection of two of Nairobi's busiest streets, Moi Avenue and Haile Selassie 
Avenue and next to the Railway station and a busy Nairobi bus terminus, the attack caused 
extensive damage. The solid and imposing building was in an instant transformed from a 
milieu de memoire - the embassy served in the production of daily memories and meanings, 
transacting international political, economic and social relations between the U.S and Kenya- 
into a lieu de memoire. It, thus, became a national symbol and a means of memory-making 
(Nora, 1989; Nelson & Olin, 2003). 
 
In an exclusive report in a local daily newspaper,
18
 Joash Okindo, a guard at the embassy, 
reported that at around 10.30 am, a truck approached the embassy building through its rear 
entrance but when they stopped the vehicle, a brief argument and confrontation ensued 
between the 'Arab-looking' men in the truck and the embassy guards. This led to a shoot-out 
between them before the powerful explosion. 
                                                            
17 President Moi hails from the Tugen ethnic community 
18 East African Standard, 11.08. 1998. 
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The impact of the explosion was felt almost a kilometre away from the scene. Half the 
embassy was completely ripped off, while Ufundi Cooperative building next to the embassy 
collapsed; buildings within a radius of four hundred metres of the embassy had their 
windowpanes shattered and in others the walls cracked. The site of the embassy and its 
adjacent streets were in a state of total chaos.  
 
 
Fig.2.1: The bombed U.S. embassy building, Nairobi, 1998. 
(Photo: Jacob Otieno). 
 
Writing in the East African,
19
 John Githongo described this situation as follows: 
“An acrid smell filled the air and bewildered Nairobians held handkerchiefs to their noses as 
they walked about..., within the vicinity of the targeted U.S. embassy, there were small 
patches of blood mixed with shards of glass. The scene on the Haile Selassie side of the 
embassy was even more staggering; a huge crater remained where the bomb had gone off and 
vehicles around the scene had been burned black and twisted into bizarre shapes. Like a scene 
frozen in time, several buses including two city buses, stood mangled and silent on the 
avenue... some buses still retained bodies that were terribly mutilated”. 
 
                                                            
19 10th - 16th .08.1998 
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Many people lost their lives, either buried by the collapsing buildings or burnt in the 
aftermath of the explosion. Many others died while undergoing treatment. Many bodies 
remained trapped in both the embassy building and Ufundi Cooperative House. A massive 
rescue mission to search for any survivors trapped and recover bodies from the rubble was 
mounted with the Kenyan military forces leading the process but soon joined by the Israeli, 
French and American rescue missions. In the aftermath of the blast, the American marines 
stood guard and prevented the now gathered crowds from effecting rescue efforts. Newspaper 
reports
20
 claimed that they only assisted American embassy staff. Their treatment of the dead 
among the embassy staff smacks of racial discrimination. The American dead were taken to 
the Lee Funeral Home – a morgue perceived to cater for the elite in the Kenyan society – and 
other facilities of a similar nature, while the Kenyans were first taken to a warehouse in the 
Industrial Area before being transferred to the City Mortuary. I mention this aspect of the 
marines and the treatment of non-American embassy staff here because in Chapter 5, I 
discuss the ethnicalised dimension witnessed during the rescue efforts that renders ironical 
any such complaints of America’s racial discrimination. At the site of the collapsed Ufundi 
Cooperative House nearby where American marines’ intervention was minimal, citizens 
clambered up the rubble using their bare hands, ropes, stones, pieces of wood and any other 
thing they could find, to retrieve the bodies of those who were trapped.
21
  
 
Reading these accounts, one might mistakenly conclude that the terror attack only ignited 
nationalistic feelings against the Americans. However, this was not entirely true. First, 
immediately after the terror attack and before it became known that it was the American 
Embassy, which had been hit, many Kenyans assumed this attack to have been a result of a 
number of local issues within the country. According to Akhaenda (2002), some Kenyans 
thought that the blast might have occurred at the Cooperative Bank Building, which housed 
the Teachers Service Commission after the teachers union had called their members to a 
major strike to pressure government to pay them a 200% salary increase as promised during 
the previous year's general election. While others thought that the blast might have been 
caused by the bankers who were then on strike protesting against withdrawal of low interest 
on their loans. 
 
                                                            
20 Daily Nation, 16.08.1998. 
21 East African, 10th -16th .08. 1998. 
50 
 
A third strand, and the most important to my discussion, is that some people thought initially 
(Akhaenda, 2002) it was the Kikuyu ethnic community that had implemented its pre-election 
threat to kick the rest of the Kenyan ethnic groups out of Nairobi should a majimbo
22
 system 
of government be introduced. Prior to the 1997 elections, a number of Kikuyu Members of 
Parliament threatened to create a Kirinyaga Kingdom with its headquarters in Nairobi should 
the majimbo system be introduced. Non-Kikuyu feared for their lives. This last aspect brings 
out the underlying levels of ethnic tensions in Kenyan society. 
 
In their reportage of the rescue effort, the Kenyan media took what has been perceived as an 
ethnically inclined coverage. Obwogo (1999) convincingly argues that while Kenyans 
accused the Americans of having displayed racism, no one turned to look into the 
ethnocentric coverage displayed by the mainstream media. The media picked on two Kikuyu 
victims, Rose Wanjiku and Sammy Nganga and focussed exclusively on them as the most 
victimized and portrayed as the paragons of a reckless act of terrorism. Trying to turn Rose 
into another Princess Diana and referring to her to as “Kenya's candle in the wind” was a pure 
show of ethnic chauvinism at play as a similar story could have been written about all the 
victims. The whole notion of ethnicity and national identity will be addressed substantially in 
Chapter 5. 
 
That said, the terror attack saw Kenyans display a sense of unity that had never previously 
been witnessed in the country. The heightened inter-ethnic divide and tensions reignited with 
the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992 seem to have vanished on this day. Nowhere 
was the sign of unity more evident than at the scene of the blast where every Kenyan who 
arrived at the scene offered to help. Politicians were equally at the forefront of displaying this 
unity of purpose. No one could imagine these were the same politicians who had just 
emerged from an acrimonious election that created a big inter-ethnic divide across the nation. 
The picture of the President and the opposition party leaders shaking hands, grieving together 
in their joint press conference at the site, gave Kenyans hope of national unity (Akhaenda, 
2002). The sense of unity shown in the first few days after the attack was only transient; as 
soon as the natural reaction spurred by the attack settled’ Kenyans reverted to looking at 
subsequent issues using ethnic or religious trajectories. 
 
                                                            
22 A form of federal system of government requiring that each region run its own affairs. 
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In the aftermath of the attack, 218 people were declared dead, over 5000 injured and property 
worth billions of Kenyan shillings destroyed. Of the dead were 24 embassy staff, 11 of them 
American citizens and the rest Kenyans. The bombing remains one of the worst terror attacks 
to have happened on Kenyan soil, it killed people who were not the primary targets but 
ordinary Kenyan citizens going about their daily routines who just happened to be at the site 
when the bombs exploded. Its perpetrators were external, namely, the Al-Qaeda terrorists 
who claimed this attack and not the enemy of Kenya but the U.S. Kenyans, therefore, saw 
this as a tragedy visited upon them as a people collectively. “It was an assault on their 
sovereignty and social peace,” Otenyo & Volker (2005: 101) assert. The bombing directed 
against the U.S. had happened on Kenyan soil. Kenya, the implication was, was a new 
modern post-colonial state, part and parcel of the international community, making its 
contributions and taking sides on political and economic issues at the international level. The 
choice of Kenya for this act of terrorism, it could be asserted, was due to its perceived 
connection to a superpower that has belligerently bullied other nations or people in pursuit of 
its senseless, unbridled economic, political and security pursuits in the World. Sharing 
military intelligence and cooperating with the U.S. on regional security matters provided the 
necessary ingredients for an anti-American backlash in Kenya. 
 
In Tanzania, though not the subject of this dissertation, another terrorist bomb targeting the 
United States of America embassy in Dar es Salaam exploded simultaneously with the one in 
Nairobi. At exactly 10.39 a.m., an explosive-laden truck drove up the Laibon Road in Dar es 
Salaam to one of the gates next to the Consulate/Administration complex where the bomber 
intended forcing his truck through. However, reaching this gate, an embassy water bowser 
blocked this access forcing the suicide bomber to detonate his charge. The explosion’s impact 
was devastating; 11 people died while 85 others sustained injuries. The dead were local 
people working at the embassy. Though the embassy building did not collapse, it suffered 
major structural damage, as did other buildings within the vicinity. 
 
However, while this was the largest single terror attack in Kenya, it was not the first one in 
her recent history. Since her independence in 1963, there had been a number of terror attacks 
in the country, though small in magnitude. Of relevance to this discussion is the 31
st
 
December 1980 bombing of Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, at the time owned by the Blocks, a 
Jewish family. In the aftermath of this attack, carried by Popular Front for the Liberation of 
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Palestine (PFLP), 16 people died and over 100 others were wounded. It was viewed as a 
revenge attack for Kenya’s assistance to Israel’s rescue operation to free hostages from a 
hijacked Air France plane at Entebbe airport in July 1976. I pick on this particular event 
because, just like the 1998 U.S. embassy attack, innocent civilians lost their lives, many of 
them Kenyans working in the hotel. 
A discussion of the events of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack would not be complete without 
mentioning the 28
th
 November 2002 Kikambala terrorist attack in Mombasa. Although an 
unknown group calling itself ‘The Government of Universal Palestine in Exile’ claimed 
responsibility, Palestinian officials denied the claim. Evidence, however, points at Al-Ittihad 
Al-Islami (AIAI), the Somali-based radical Islamic group (Carson, 2005). There are 
similarities in the ways in which both the Nairobi and Kikambala attacks were executed, the 
first being the simultaneous nature of the attack and the second, their modus operandi 
whereby the terrorists attempted to force their way into the buildings in explosives’-loaded 
trucks (Schaefer, 2006; Mogire & Agade, 2011). The bombing of the Kikambala tourist 
hotel
23
 and the firing of shoulder-launched grenades against an Israeli private jet taking off 
from Moi International Airport Mombasa, were done at the same time just as in the previous 
twin attack of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam United States embassies. Implicit, therefore, is 
the target having been America but in this case through their Israeli allies. The hotel bombing 
killed 16 people (11 Kenyans, 3 Israelis and the 3 bombers); again, the majority of those 
killed were Kenyans. The missiles, however, missed their target and failed to detonate. 
 
The collapse of the Somali government in 1991 and the instability in the Sudan provided a 
suitable environment through which a terrorism cell, linked to the Al-Qaeda, operated in 
eastern Africa with minimal detection. The large Islamic community in the region and 
Kenya’s strategic location to the interests of the U.S. in fighting the war on terrorism 
provided those targeting America with the ‘perfect’ ground to launch retaliatory attacks; 
hence the Nairobi terror attack. A renewed spate of terrorism has continued to afflict the 
region post the 1998 Nairobi terror attack and is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
In this section, I discussed the security situation prevailing in Kenya and within the wider 
eastern Africa region prior to the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. I also described the bombing of 
the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, the damage it caused, the rescue mission in its aftermath and the 
                                                            
23 Paradise Hotel in Kikambala was owned by Israeli nationals. 
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reactions engendered in Kenya. In the next section, I give a historical background to 
memorial monuments in Kenya focussing on three specific ones, namely: the Nairobi War 
Memorial, Kolowa Massacre Memorial and the Nyeri Memorial. 
 
Part II: Monuments and Memorials – A Historical Background 
  
No evidence from the recent past suggests that traditional Kenyan communities built 
monuments to commemorate tragic events, especially where those events culminated in the 
death of many people. Instead, such commemoration was achieved through the performance 
of a variety of rituals and ceremonies that ensured that the spirits of the departed were 
pacified and remembered in their journey into the graded world of the spirits. This journey 
started at the disposal of the body and continued for up to five generations when the departed 
were no longer part of living memory and had become the ghosts of unknown persons taking 
no continuing interest in the lives of the living (Mbiti, 1991). 
 
It is not until after the First World War that we start seeing a new practice of commemoration 
in built form taking root in the country. The erection of the Nairobi War Memorial in 
remembrance of the Kings African Rifles' (KAR) Carrier Corps in 1927 was among the first 
permanent memorials to be dedicated to a collective group. 
 
During the Second World War, the theatre of war extended to eastern Africa. Many casualties 
were recorded necessitating the need to have them remembered by way of built memorials 
though not necessarily to Kenyan victims. One such is the construction in 1952 of the Italian 
War Memorial Church in Nyeri to house the tomb of the Viceroy of Italian East Africa, 
Amedio di Savoia and vaults containing the bodies of the 676 Italian soldiers captured by the 
British soldiers between 1940 and 1941 during the fight over control of eastern Africa.  
 
The bodies of Somali soldiers who fought alongside the Italians are interred in a separate 
vault outside the main church in line with their Islamic faith (Fig.2.3). Unlike other Catholic 
churches where mass is celebrated every Sunday, in this particular one, a ceremonial 
remembrance mass for the fallen Italian soldiers is held annually on the 4
th
 of November and 
is attended by families and any remaining friends of the fallen soldiers. 
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Fig.2.2: Memorial devoted to the memory of Amedio di Savoia, the Viceroy of Italian East 
Africa inside the Italian War Memorial Church, Nyeri 
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat, 2012). 
 
 
Fig.2.3: Memorial to the Muslims fighting on the Italian side. 
 (Photo: Kiprop Lagat, 2012) 
 
Besides the World War memorial monuments, there are other memorials devoted to different 
types of events in Kenya such as those to the independence struggle. Many of these latter 
ones are found in Central Kenya, the epicentre of the struggle, especially during the 
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emergency period between 1952 and 1960 (Anderson, 2005). However, there are not many 
memorials built during the post-independence period in spite of subsequent tragic events 
potentially necessitating their commemoration.
24
 Arising out of political circumstances with a 
possible involvement of government, those in leadership showed no interest in having them 
remembered. 
 
In recent years, however, new memorial monuments have been built, one such is the 
Sachang’wan memorial in Nakuru District, devoted to the memory of all those killed during 
the 2009 oil tanker fire tragedy burning 130 people beyond recognition. Seventy-eight of the 
dead were interred in a mass grave in Sachang’wan and a memorial wall built inscribing all 
the 130 names of the dead.  
 
Fig.2.4: The Sachang’wan memorial, 2010. 
 (Photo: Kiprop Lagat). 
 
I chose three memorial monuments in this section, namely: the Nairobi War Memorial, 
Kolowa Massacre Memorial and the Nyeri Memorial to provide a historical background to 
memorialization in Kenya because these are some of the earliest built memorial monuments 
in the country.  
                                                            
24 The 1969 killings in Kisumu during the opening of the New Nyanza Hospital, the 1st August coup of 1982, the 
Wagalla massacre of 1984, the election-related violence of 1992 in Molo, Likoni and Enoosupukia. At the time 
of writing, a memorial monument for the victims of the Wagalla massacre was under construction in Wajir 
town. 
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2.2.1 The Nairobi War Memorial 
 
The First World War has gone down in the annals of history as one of the greatest military 
endeavours of the 20
th
 century. Due to manpower shortages in Europe, as these wars required 
millions of people, Africans were not spared. In East Africa, for instance, over one million 
people were forcibly conscripted into the Carrier Corps, a military organization created in 
Kenya during the First World War to provide military labour to support the British Campaign 
against the German forces in East Africa between 1914 and 1918 (Killingray, 2001). Its 
formation was necessitated by the need to feed a large body of foreign soldiers in the interior 
without road or rail transport. They were also engaged in the military campaigns of 1939 to 
1945 fighting against Italians in Somaliland and later used as front line combat troops in 
Burma against the Japanese in 1942. The mortality rate among the African porters due to 
disease, malnutrition or neglect was equally high and has been estimated at between 10% and 
20% of the total casualties. The Nairobi War Memorial pays tribute to the memory of 
thousands of African porters-cum-soldiers who died during the First World War and serves as 
an acknowledgement of the contribution they made towards the war. 
  
In keeping with the trend established in the aftermath of the First World War in continental 
Europe - of commemorating their dead, the known and the unknown - the colonial powers 
extended the same idea to their colonies which had provided fighters. In Nairobi, a three-man 
bronze statue was erected along the now Kenyatta Avenue in 1927. Williams (2007:3) 
describes the common styles that these World War commemorative monuments in Europe 
and the colonies generally took stating that, “while they varied in style and splendour, they 
typically featured one or several sculpted soldier-figures raised on a plinth, onto which a 
shorter passage is inscribed praising their heroism”. In addition to that, these sculptures were 
often set within a backing archway or in front of an obelisk on which the names of the 
‘nation’s’ battles were inscribed. True to this description, the Nairobi War Memorial has the 
figurative element raised on a plinth: the carrier man holds a stick in one hand while the two 
King African Rifle’s riflemen, one African and one Arab side by side, bear rifles.  
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Fig. 2.5: The Nairobi War Memorial,2011 
(Photo: James Waihenya). 
Next to this statue is a three-metre high obelisk with the inscription of the 1914 to 1918 War 
with the following words: “the feet and hands of the army.” It does not, however, contain the 
names of those who died in the wars, perhaps either because of the magnitude of the numbers 
involved, or due to the fact that it was a war devoid of any nationalistic heroic deeds as the  
Africans were merely fighting a war they knew very little about and beyond their countries of 
origin; it was not, therefore, a case of self-sacrifice for the sake of the nation-state. Given the 
level of literacy in Africa at that time, it is obvious that a majority of those recruited were 
illiterate. Implicit, therefore, is that there are few first-hand written records of their war 
experiences; their war is largely locked in oral memory. The stories that have been told and 
retold by many of those who joined the Kings African Rifles revolve around their 
recruitment, military training and discipline, the exposure to new people, strange lands and 
new ideas, the battle, the process of demobilization and the final homecoming. The 
importance of emphasising this perspective is that it contributes to discussions on orality and 
the functioning of memory, especially on how narratives of history are transmitted in non-
literate societies as articulated by Goody and Walter (1968). In my later discussion of 
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Fig. 2.6: The Nairobi War Memorial obelisk, 2011 
 (Photo: James Waihenya) 
 
postmemory, especially as it may relate to the August 7
th
 Memorial Park, this will serve as an 
illustration of how these stories are important for those who did not experience the actual 
events or had not been born. However, they are now witnessing them in the Documentation 
Centre where there are displays and film shows depicting this event.  
 
While this monument is located within one of Nairobi's busiest streets, to many Kenyans, it 
evokes no memories, as there is little awareness of what it commemorates. However, during 
the colonial period, this memorial was used as a site of ritual performances, especially on 
Remembrance Day, which is observed on the 11
th
 November, to recall the end of hostilities of 
World War I on that date in 1918. The Hull Daily Mail (12
th
 November, 1928), for instance, 
reports that in 1928, “the Prince of Wales headed a gathering, representative of all races in 
the Kenya Colony, which gathered round the Cenotaph to commemorate Armistice Day.” In 
the years following Kenya’s independence, it was rarely used to commemorate these 
activities, a possible indication of its lack of appreciation by the Kenyan public in general. In 
the more recent past, however, this memorial has been made to function as a part of a 
network of urban relations in Nairobi, including the events at the Nairobi War Cemetery 
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hence becoming part of the network of other Commonwealth and World War Grave 
Memorials in other parts of the world (Benton, 2010; Nelson & Olin, 2003).  
 
2.2.2 The Kolowa Massacre Memorial 
 
Another memorial that will further shed light on how historical narratives and memories are 
encoded and transmitted is the Pokot Massacre Memorial in Kolowa, Pokot East District. In 
the early 1930s a political-religious movement, Dini ya Msambwa, was formed in the 
northern parts of western Province. Its leadership and bedrock support was drawn from the 
Bukusu people under the stewardship of Elijah Masinde. The main tenets of this movement 
were to agitate for the departure of the white settlers to pave way for the settlement of local 
people who had been disenfranchised through colonialism. It advocated a return to the way of 
the ancestors in order to overcome the white man. This movement soon got support from 
other neighbouring communities – the Nandi, Sabaot, Iteso and Banyala whose lands had 
similarly been taken away to form part of the white highlands in areas such as Cherangany, 
Trans Nzioa, Kitale and Nandi Hills. The original occupants were effectively rendered 
squatters on land that previously belonged to them. An important branch to the Dini ya 
Msambwa is said to have sprung up among the Pokot in the 1940s (Vermouth, 1980). Though 
its leader did not have any direct communicative links with their headquarters in western 
Kenya, it is possible that they were influenced by the Bukusu labourers living in their midst. 
The version of preaching adopted by Lucas Pkech, the leader of the Pokot branch, promised 
its adherents vitality, increased livestock and freedom from European control. He taught them 
that they could reclaim their land through singing and prayer because in doing so, they would 
be filled with the spirit. His songs depicted the white people as the enemy and mainly 
beseeched God to guide them in their journey towards Zion, a divine earthly abode outside 
the boundaries of West Pokot, somewhere in Mt Elgon where their livestock would be 
multiplied.  
 
It was while on pilgrimage to this earthly Zion on the 24
th
 of April 1950, in the company of 
about 300 of his disciples, that Pkech was confronted by the colonial administrators at 
Kolowa. Their singing was misconstrued to be a mobilization to attack, hence the decision by 
the colonial administrators to shoot them. According to Kipkorir (1972:114), the aftermath of 
this confrontation was the killing of Pkech and 33 of his followers while many others were 
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injured while 48 were arrested, 14 of whom were subsequently hanged. On the government 
side, four officers were killed: a Mr Alan Stevens who was a local District Officer; George 
Taylor, the Assistant Superintendent of Police; Robert Cameron, an Assistant Inspector of 
Police; and an unidentified African tribal policeman. The colonial government commissioned 
a memorial to be erected at the site with the names of the three white colonial officers 
inscribed on it but with no record of any of the Pokot men or the man serving in the tribal 
police. The inscription written on the colonial memorial read ‘to those who were killed 
during the gallant mission’. This reference was exclusively to the colonial officers. 
 
In 2003, a proposal for the erection of a new memorial in memory of all those who were 
killed during the affray was put forth by a religious sect that regarded Lucas Pkech as their 
prophet. This was intended to counter the colonial memorial, which the locals had long 
complained about because of its selective memorialisation. This proposal was positively 
received by the local government administration, which also set aside land for its 
construction. The memorial, a triangular shaped concrete structure that is approximately two 
metres in height, has a cross at its pinnacle with a white dove perched on it. Upon its 
completion in 2005, a big commemorative event was held at the site. Names and clans of 
those involved, including the four who had been part of the colonial government were 
inscribed. In addition, the names of the 14 people hanged after their arrest in 1950 were 
included. A small booklet titled ‘The Pokot Massacre of 1950’ was published for the 
occasion. Again, this had all the names of those who died recorded in it and an objective 
narrative. A twin brother to Allan Stevens, the local District Officer killed in the affray, 
travelled from England for the commemoration and his contribution was the carved dove 
erected on the memorial. The community gave him a tuft of green grass as a gesture of good 
will. It is noted that a white dove in European context is symbolic of peace while to the Pokot 
the green grass serves the same purpose. Acknowledgement of the clans of those who were 
killed signifies the intention to atone the collective loss that was still present in the memory 
of the community. 
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Fig. 2.7: The new Kolowa massacre memorial 
(http://www.kerioview.com/valleykolowa.html) 
 
 
2.2.3. The Nyeri Memorial 
 
The third of the early memorial monuments to be cited are the Central Kenya memorials to be 
found in Central Province's district headquarters, specifically created as memorials for the 
colonial loyalists killed during the emergency period in Kenya between 1952 and 1960. It is 
worth mentioning that some of the most protracted independence struggles were largely 
fought in the Central Kenya highland forests around Mt Kenya and the Aberdare ranges. It is 
in these regions that the colonists also seized large tracts of land from the local population for 
farming purposes. Discontent over loss of their land to the colonizers eventually led to 
guerrilla warfare. Though this was a nationalist guerrilla struggle pitting locals against 
colonialists, the colonial administration also enlisted the support of a few local Africans, to 
whom they extended favours, often appointing them either as chiefs or ‘home-guards’ to 
perpetuate the colonial rule. There was much violence of African against African, with the 
‘home-guards’ becoming a target for the Mau Mau freedom fighters due to their loyalism to 
the British. Whilst a large number of Mau Mau freedom fighters were killed by the British 
forces, their African loyalists were equally eliminated. Mazrui and Tidy (1984), quoting the 
official records, report that during the emergency period (1952-1960) 11,503 Mau Mau 
fighters were killed; 1,920 Africans loyal to the British; 66 European soldiers; 29 European 
civilians; and 29 Asian civilians.  
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In order to commemorate those who fought on the British side, the colonial government 
representatives in Central Kenya decided to set up a memorial for those who died in the 
emergency. While the initial idea was to put up headstones on the graves of all those forces 
that had fought on the colonial side, the Nyeri District Commissioner, M.J. Roberts, felt that a 
collective memorial would be more useful as most of the individual graves would have been 
difficult to trace. In addition, the government records might not have been complete and 
would end up omitting some people; hence the decision to set up a single memorial. This has 
resonance with World War tombs of the ‘unknown soldier’ where those missing in action 
were memorialized in a tomb for the ‘unknown soldier’ (Laqueur, 1994). The Treasury was 
approached for funding, which it provided in the 1956/57 financial year, giving discretion to 
the District Commissioners in the province to decide on whether to do headstones or erect 
memorials in their respective districts as long as the budget did not exceed 120 pounds. Other 
districts within Central Province, such as Nanyuki and Nyandarua, also erected a central 
memorial in Nanyuki Township and Nyahururu respectively. I will, however, only discuss the 
Nyeri Memorial monument to give a historical perspective on development of memorials in 
Kenya and show how the meanings ascribed to the memorials have changed over time. 
 
In Nyeri, the Urban District Council appointed a committee of six consisting of the District 
Commissioner and the Town Superintendent among others to choose a suitable site for the 
memorial. A location near the market was selected by the committee; it is at this same site 
near the old market in Nyeri town where this monument currently stands. In a letter written to 
the Treasury by Mr Roberts on the 17th September 1956, the memorial was described thus: “a 
fifteen- feet- tall, thick, tapering concrete obelisk set on a pedestal that resembles the war 
memorials of Europe, something in the nature of ‘Cleopatra’s –needle, in rough stone.”  
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Fig.2.8: Nyeri  memorial  
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat, 2012) 
Inscribed on this memorial are the words: 
South Nyeri District 
In memory of members 
Of the tribal police force, the Kikuyu guards, 
Other security forces and all loyal subjects of the queen 
Who died in the fight against terrorism 
1951-1957 
 
Anderson (2005) confirms that this original inscription on the memorial was in honour of the 
loyalists and soldiers of Nyeri who died in the struggle to defeat the Mau Mau. While this 
memorial was specifically installed in memory of those who died during the emergency 
fighting for the colonial government forces, in recent times, the then so-called terrorists have 
re-appropriated it and assigned it new meaning as a memorial to their freedom struggle. The 
Mau Mau war veterans, therefore, gather here on each Independence Day marked on the 12
th
 
of December, to commemorate their war. They also gather here again each February 18
th
 for 
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the anniversary of the Dedan Kimathi’s execution, one of the icons of the freedom struggle 
who was executed and buried by the colonialists without any trace to date.
25
  
 
In presenting the Mau Mau narrative, (Ogot 1975; Anderson 2005; Branch 2009) point out 
that the role of the ‘loyalists’ in the struggle is more complex than the simplistic 
interpretation previously offered by some historians, political scientists and  writers of 
memoirs. Because of the rapid impact of colonialism in central Kenya, the political 
leadership devised various ways to manage the social impact it engendered. Anderson 
(2005:13) identifies three political blocks that emerged in their response to the colonial state: 
the conservatives, mainly represented by chiefs, headmen and Christian elders who 
associated with the colonists in their pursuit of land, wealth and power. They became the 
gatekeepers of the colonial state and used its instruments to wield power. Moderate 
nationalists emerged from the first batch of educated “mission boys” who also had a desire 
for material gains and sought to displace the conservatives from political leadership. 
Anderson (ibid) suggests, that just like the conservatives, this group was equally interested in 
personal wealth and power. A third category consisted of the militant nationalists which 
emerged in the 1930s and whose brand of politics would give shape to the emergence of the 
Mau Mau in the 1950s. “Their strategy was to mobilize cultural nationalism in defence of the 
interests of those being excluded by the social and economic changes within the Kikuyu 
society” (ibid: 12).  Having adopted different strategies, those that favoured cooperation have 
been referred to as the “loyalists” while those adopting militancy, the “freedom fighters.” 
Branch (2009) notes that the “loyalists” and the “freedom fighters” often came from the same 
families, clans and ethnic communities and were, therefore, generally agreed on the 
objectives of the latter group: to achieve political freedom and to reform the oppressive 
British land policies that had driven them out of their ancestral lands in the highlands of 
central Kenya. While the “freedom fighters” advocated the use of violence, the “loyalists” 
supported the colonial government with a view to suppress the violence of the Mau Mau so 
that practical reforms could be achieved in an atmosphere of order and stability. Against this 
view, Ogot (1972:16) suggests that “loyalism” was partly a revolt of the elders who abhorred 
the activities of the young people, which they regarded as a violation of their traditions and 
customs but not necessarily for their loyalty to the government. He gives the example of the 
                                                            
25 A public memorial statue to the memory of Dedan Kimathi was unveiled by President Mwai Kibaki on 18th 
February 2007, on a street named after him, Kimathi Street, in Nairobi.  
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Njuri Ncheke
26
 which opposed the violence that had come to characterise the Mau Mau, 
especially that directed against women and children. To the Njuri Ncheke, the Mau Mau 
symbolised lawlessness and chaos and, therefore, felt it their duty to suppress it.  
 
The benefits accruing from “loyalism”, such as land and wealth, enhanced the loyalists’ 
social standing earning them the right to speak on behalf of the community. This notion, 
Branch (2009) argues, was rooted in Kikuyu cultural conceptions of “self-mastery”, the idea 
that an individual’s ability to harness the productive power of the household was a measure 
of virtue and leadership. Since the Mau Mau rebels did not believe in this principle, those 
who believed in social order often regarded them as idlers and rebels. Eventually, “loyalism” 
became a safer and more attractive position for the Kikuyu and it continued to gain 
momentum until its triumph over the Mau Mau in 1956. As the British colonialists prepared 
for Kenya’s independence, the loyalists assumed position of power and became the chief 
architects of Kenya’s post-colonial state. It is, thus, arguable that Kenya’s independence was 
achieved through the adoption of different strategies that involved both the “loyalists” and the 
Mau Mau “freedom fighters.”  
 
Considering that both groups fought for independence, albeit using different strategies, it is 
understandable that the Mau Mau “freedom fighters” could stake a claim to the Nyeri 
Memorial by re-appropriating and assigning it new meaning as a memorial to their freedom 
struggle. This does not invalidate the original reasons for its creation: as a memorial to those 
who fought on the government site. In my view, it is one of the memorial monuments 
symbolizing Kenya’s struggle for independence. 
 
2.2.4. Conclusion 
 
In concluding this section on the history of the early memorial monuments in Kenya, I have 
brought up issues that are pertinent to my wider dissertation. Among these are the re-
interpretation of history, the politics of power and how these accord or conflict with issues of 
ethnicity, national identity, and their implications for the generation and transmission of 
memory.  
                                                            
26 The Meru Council of Elders. 
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The Nairobi War Memorial and the anonymity of the dead of the First World War it 
commemorates, led me to discuss how racial identity is a factor in the process of 
memorialization in Kenya. The exclusion of Africans in commemorative events at the 
Nairobi War Cemetery, the non-mention of the Pokot dead in the Kolowa Massacre 
Memorial and the actions of American Marines during the rescue mission after the 1998 
bomb blast supports this observation. Conversely, coverage in the Kenyan newspapers took a 
parallel approach and ignored the American dead, nor did they feature in the national 
remembrance prayers (Obwogo, 1999). The third anniversary of the terror attack saw parallel 
commemorations being held: one at the American Embassy and the other at the Memorial 
Park - arguably, a further proof of the segregation on racial lines. This racial perspective will 
also give us a window by which to discuss the Arab and Islamic connection, especially in 
regard to the appropriation of an Islamic identity in the perpetration of this terror. 
 
The ironical presence of a monument in praise of the valour of the Colonial Officers killed 
during the Kolowa affray constantly pricked the memories of the Pokot, reminding them of 
the massacre visited upon their people while on a religious mission. This biased 
representation of the massacre necessitated the construction of a new memorial monument 
that rectified the selective memorialisation. It was the report of the community research team 
that made it possible to gather an objective narrative of what transpired in the 1950, hence the 
corrective memorial that inscribes the names of all the dead in the aftermath of the massacre, 
including the officers. The booklet containing the names and their inscription on the 
monument itself was intended to provide closure to this massacre. While the Colonial 
government praised the action of their officers without any mention of the local community, 
this may be interpreted to have been in line with the colonists’ intention to obfuscate and 
quietly forget this part of history, completely concealing the reasons behind the confrontation. 
This selective portrayal of the history of the massacre accords with Connerton’s (1983) view 
that monuments encode selected memories and historical narratives. 
 
Unlike this scenario, the Nyeri Memorial gives us a different perspective of memory. Here 
the Mau Mau War Veterans Association has appropriated and ascribed new meanings to a 
monument. Their actions demonstrate a move towards the endorsement of certain collective 
liberation memories that justify the independence struggle and consign the role of the 
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loyalists, whose contribution to the colonizers’ was perceived to be more selfish and 
individualistic, to the periphery of nationalist narrative. Whilst this is the dominant view 
among the Mau Mau war veterans, other historians such as Ogot (1972) and Anderson (2005)  
have persuasively argued that “loyalism” was an approach chosen by those who abhorred the 
violence of the “freedom fighters.” They, however, shared in the objective to reclaim their 
land from the colonists and for political freedom. This memorial could therefore be revised to 
incorporate the “freedom fighters” as their intentions converged on attainment of 
independence. 
 
By the Association having its annual Dedan Kimathi commemorative ceremonies at the 
monument, I argue, they intend to win deserved sympathy and recognition on the part of 
government for the role they played in the struggle for independence in Kenya. However, the 
role and contributions of other Kenyans must not be forgotten. For many Kenyans, and more 
so, for the Kikuyu, the Dedan Kimathi arrest and execution provides the foundational myth 
for the establishment of the nation-state. It is for this reason that on ascendancy to the 
presidency in Kenya, the Kibaki government formally removed the ban on the Mau Mau 
movement and started an elaborate process towards recognition of their heroes through public 
sculptures and mausoleums. A Dedan Kimathi sculpture was erected in the last year of the 
first term of the Kibaki presidency on the 18
th
 February 2007 along Kimathi Street to further 
reinforce in our memory his contributions to the independence war.  
 
68 
 
 
Fig. 2.9: Dedan Kimathi’s sculpture on Kimathi Street, Nairobi. 
(Photo: NMK, 2013) 
This sculpture is a full-life-size, six-foot high statue, (Kimathi was approximately 6 feet tall) 
embedded on a nine-foot plinth base. The sculpture is cast out of molten bronze showing 
Kimathi draped in Mau Mau dreadlocks and bearing a homemade gun. Being Kikuyu, this 
may have been a well-calculated move towards his community’s legitimation to power; his 
controversial holding on to power in the aftermath of defeat in the 2007/8 elections in Kenya 
is enough proof of this claim. Mutahi Ngunyi (2007), a Kenyan political analyst predicted 
correctly in early 2007 that Kibaki would decline to hand over power if defeated during that 
year’s elections, instead clinging to the reins of power at all costs, even if it meant plunging 
the country into chaos. The post-election violence witnessed in Kenya after the 2007 
elections proved Ngunyi’s predictions. Ngunyi alleges that Kibaki chaired meetings of his 
inner-circle advisors consisting only of the Kikuyu where elaborate plans were developed for 
the retention of the presidency in the ‘House of Mumbi’ 27  beyond 2022. In the new 
constitution unveiled in 2010, a Heroes Day to be celebrated every 20
th
 of October is 
                                                            
27 Kikuyu legend has it that they all descended from the nine daughters of Gikuyu and Mumbi.  
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recognized. During the first Heroes Day commemorations of 2010, the President ordered for 
the expedient establishment of a National Heroes Corner. 
The following section describes and discusses the processes in the establishment and 
inauguration of the August 7
th
 Memorial Park in Nairobi interpreting the key elements in the 
Park, namely, the memorial fountain, the memorial wall of names, indigenous trees and the 
sculpture ‘Mind, Body and Spirit’. 
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Part III: Towards the Establishment of the August 7
th
 Memorial Park and 
Documentation Centre 
 
2.3.1. Towards the Inscription of the Memories 
 
The need to build a monument as a permanent tribute to commemorate those who lost their 
lives in the Nairobi terror attack started to take root in the first few weeks after the tragic 
event. Similar discussions ensued in the United States after the September 11 2001. Soon 
after the traumatic shock of the bombing of the twin-towers in downtown Manhattan, 
discussions on how to set up a permanent memorial to the tragic loss of life that traumatized 
New York had already started. In these discussions, what stood out was the importance of 
such a memorial as the terror attack was a major event that marked a turning point in World 
History. The challenge as Huyyssen (2003) points out was on ‘... how to represent and 
memorialize traumatic events in built space, especially if the space is a death zone in living 
memory’. The challenges alluded to must also have been at the centre of the deliberations of 
the August 7
th
 Memorial Trustees on the importance of setting up a Memorial Park. What did 
they expect it to achieve, given the similarity in nature though difference in magnitude? 
 
Among the very first efforts towards capturing the memory of the Nairobi terror attack was in 
the work of three artists, Rene Klarenbeek, Patrick Mukabi, and Thom Ogonga, a Dutch 
visiting artist and Kuona Trust-based Kenyan artists respectively, in their Daily Billboard 
project. What they did was to erect a large canvass along Aga Khan Walk, a busy walkway in 
central Nairobi, to solicit comments from members of the public on a wide range of issues 
touching directly on society based on what had appeared in the newspaper headlines. At the 
end of the day, the artists recorded these comments and painted a new screen over the 
previous one to await the next day's comments. While their project had started on the 1
st
 
August 1998, a few days before the bomb attack, its occurrence diverted their focus to 
documenting the thoughts and feelings of ‘Nairobians’- indeed any passer-by - towards the 
attack. It occupied the newspaper headlines for over three weeks giving the artists a platform 
to record the raw feelings as felt by Kenyans on ‘black Friday’ and in the days that followed 
including those relating to the retaliatory attack initiated by the United States government in 
Sudan and Afghanistan.  
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During this period, about 1400 people wrote down their thoughts and feelings on pieces of 
paper provided and had them posted on the billboard, making it the first work of inscription 
regarding this terror attack. One Peter Ngugi, for instance, in a statement had the following to 
say: 
“It was as if the world was on a run, I thought for a minute. I ran, I walked, I stopped, I 
smoked. No! A cloud of death, No! The devil was in control, then, I said a prayer. A 
memory I will hold forever.”  
 
Maina Wanjigi’s posting read:  
“I was walking towards KENCOM to catch a bus and somewhere along Aga Khan 
Walk, I suddenly heard a big blast, got tossed upwards but on getting to my feet, I ran 
towards nowhere. It was after a few hours that I regained my sense and went towards 
the railways where I could see a big cloud of dust. The site there was like a scene 
from a horror movie. I will, forever, live to remember how lucky I was to have 
survived”. 
 
One Jane Vihenda had this to write,  
“Is the God we worship the same one with that of the Muslims? I doubt it! No caring 
God can allow the killing of innocent people.” 
 
Since at this stage I consider the processes leading to the establishment of the Memorial Park, 
I limit myself to characterizing the many postings in the following headlines: Bravery and 
heroism; Innocence of victims; Dying for the war of others; Blame the Americans; Islamic 
intolerance; Disaster; and Triumph over evil.
28
  
 
A more detailed analysis of these inscriptions is offered in chapter three where I compare 
what was inscribed then with what is being said now. In the Documentation Centre, visitors 
are provided with paper and encouraged to write their experiences pertaining to the visit. In 
my research, I analyse the comments inscribed in the Klarenbeek-Thom-Mukabi billboard 
and those in the Documentation Centre to establish how time shapes memory. 
 
                                                            
28 This work has not been published but was exhibited at the Nairobi National Museum in October 1998
. 
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In a memorial and prayer service two weeks after the terror attack, President Daniel arap 
Moi, who was in attendance, stated that the 7
th
 August, 1998 had left an indelible mark and 
would remain one of the darkest days in Kenya's history. He expressed the government's wish 
to have a monument of remembrance built near the site of the terror attack. In making this 
statement, the President seemed to be responding to similar calls made during other memorial 
services held in the weeks following the attack.
29
 August is regarded in Kenya as an unlucky 
and tragic month as most catastrophes have occurred during the month. The mention by the 
President that this would remain one of the darkest days in Kenya’s history must have jogged 
the memories of previous calamities occurring in August, a notion that is embedded in the 
collective psyche of the nation.
30
 
 
The need for a memorial monument dedicated to this tragedy seems to have been in the 
interest of many of those affected, including the American Ambassador, Ms Prudence 
Bushnell, who promised to consult her government regarding the request by Martin Barnard
31
 
to donate the plot of the former U.S. embassy building for a Memorial Park. In a 
remembrance and recognition ceremony held at her residence on the 21
st
 January 1999, she 
dedicated a small remembrance garden to the American embassy staff that lost their lives in 
the terror attack. The memorial consisted of a fountain built of bricks, each of which was 
inscribed with the name of a victim who had died in the American embassy building 
(Bushnell 2000). This memorial was, however, only dedicated to the staff who worked at the 
American Embassy. According to Bushnell, this ceremony “was a symbol that I had gathered 
back the community that exploded on August 7
th
.” It was a ritual of healing that was attended 
by bereaved family members, some of whom had travelled all the way from the U.S. 
 
The quest for a memorial dedicated to all the victims remained undone. The U.S. embassy 
function above and the personal initiative of Martin Barnard, among other events, could have 
given urgency to the donation of the plot of its former embassy location to the Kenyan 
                                                            
29 East African Standard, 21.08.1998. 
30 The death of founding President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, the attempted coup of 1982, Bishop Muge’s 
and Masinde Muliro’s deaths in 1990 and 1992 respectively, Ngai Ndethya train disaster in 1993, the demise of 
Vice President Michael Wamalwa in 2003 and the 2013 fire tragedy that gutted the arrivals terminal at the Jomo 
Kenyatta International Airport. 
31 A Kenyan resident of British descent, engineer and director of Humphrey Howards engineering firm, who 
besides proposing the idea of a memorial park, was instrumental in identifying people from the private sector 
that would raise funds for its implementation. He was the advisor to the trustees throughout the implementation 
period.  
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government, for the sake of an all-inclusive memorial, once it was cleared of the rubble. This 
enabled the government to set up a committee to implement its previous intent of a memorial 
monument to the tragedy. The presence of an empty space in a site associated with death 
reminds the mourning that their beloved ones are no longer physically present. The 
construction of the Memorial Park and the Documentation Centre in the former location of 
the U.S. embassy and the Ufundi Cooperative House minimizes the negative impact of 
stigma attached to the empty plots. The East African Standard (13.07.2000) reports that as 
soon as the plot was handed over, the government appointed a board of trustees headed by 
Justice Richard Kwach, an appellate judge, to oversee its development.
32
 This team, 
constituted of professionals mainly drawn from the private sector, immediately embarked on 
seeking legal constitution through the registration of the August 7
th
 Memorial Park Trust as a 
charitable organization. The trust's immediate task was to initiate fundraising activities to 
support the planned Memorial Park and its activities, an endeavour that succeeded as they 
soon received generous donations from institutions and individuals. The United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) donated about three quarters of the funding 
required, while the rest came from Kenyan and Kenyan-based institutions. During the 
ground-breaking ceremony for the Memorial Park, the President also conducted an 
impromptu fundraising towards the memorial. The Documentation Centre was, however, 
built later from another grant from USAID on the recommendation of the Ambassador, while 
the Ford Foundation, an American institution, offered a ten-year grant to the trust for the 
park’s maintenance (Driscoll, 2001). 
 
With almost all the funding in place, the trustees embarked on meetings to thrash out the 
modalities for implementing their mandate and ensuring that this was delivered within a 
period of 18 months. Melanie Richards and George Kagiri, a designer and architect 
respectively were approached by the trustees and requested to develop the conceptual 
designs. Once the trustees adopted the proposed designs, the contract for its implementation 
was awarded to Lalji Meghji Construction Limited after a competitive bidding process 
overseen by the trustees. 
                                                            
32 The other trustees were: Bill Lay, chairman Coopers Motors Corporation; Hosea Kiplagat, chairman 
Cooperative Bank of Kenya; Dr Nazim Mitha, a United Nations Children’s s Education Fund (UNICEF) 
specialist; Dr. Sally Kosgey, Head of the Public Service; Chris Kirubi, a city business mogul and chairman of 
the American Business Association; Janet Angira, a lawyer representing Mathews and Harrison law firm that 
was already working with the U.S. Embassy; and George Kagiri, a Nairobi-based architect.  
74 
 
 
Fig.2.10: Preliminary designs for the August 7
th
 Memorial Park.  
Developed by Melanie Richards. 
 
It was held that this design would give the Memorial Park the sombre and reflective mood the 
trustees had envisaged. This design incorporated elements of uniqueness and memorability, 
and it contained some metaphorical visual symbolism in accordance with what has come to 
appear as the standard qualities that such a memorial must espouse (Williams, 2007). “It is 
established to serve as a memorial to the innocent people who lost their lives as a result of the 
1998 bombing and become a garden of solace, offering comfort, strength and hope in an 
environment of relative peace and serenity both to the victims’ families, those who survived 
and also the general public or those directly affected by the tragedy. The Park pays tribute to 
the courage of those who have coped with injuries sustained and or the loss of a loved one 
while condemning acts of terrorism. Its presence makes a statement of the futility of terrorism 
and endurance of the virtues of humanity.” 
 
In this part of the thesis, I describe four key elements, which stand out in the Memorial Park 
as representing what the trustees had wanted the Memorial Park to contain. They entail the 
memorial fountain, the memorial wall of names, the sculpture, and the indigenous trees in a 
well-landscaped garden. 
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2.3.2. The Memorial Fountain  
 
The centrepiece of the park is a fountain whose design is derived from the Chinese 
philosophy of taiji and contains diagrams of taijitu, which literally translates as the Diagram 
of the Supreme Ultimate. According to accepted traditions, a standard taijitu diagram should 
be circular with two fishes, the Yin and Yang embracing each other (Gu, 2003). In their 
philosophy, taiji as a concept explains the self-generating nature of the universe. It describes 
how polar or seemingly polarized forces are interconnected and interdependent in the natural 
world and how they give rise to each other in turn. These two complementary opposites, the 
Yin and the Yang, have an endless series of associations, notably light and darkness, the 
known and the unknown, among many others.  
 
 
Fig.2.11: The memorial fountain, 2010. 
 (Photo: Kiprop Lagat). 
 
Its centrality in the Memorial Park symbolically represents the continuity of life after death, 
and bad deeds followed by good deeds. In this respect therefore, there is resonance with the 
tenets of the African Traditional Religion’s belief in life after death as advanced by Mbiti 
(1991). Though many died during the bomb blast, that did not signify the end of life, as life is 
in itself a self-generating process and death is best understood as a necessary step towards the 
next life. In interviews conducted during my first fieldwork in August 2010, about 15% of 
those interviewed mentioned the water fountain being the most interesting thing in the 
Memorial Park. While they did not understand the philosophical concept behind it, they, 
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nevertheless, connected well with the water symbolism it represented. As in many of their 
cultures, flowing water symbolizes purity and life. 
 
2.3.3. The Memorial Wall of Names 
 
Adjacent to the memorial fountain stands a six-metre-long by two-metre-high concrete wall, 
with black granite marble in which 218 names of all those who died in the terror attack are 
inscribed. 
 
 
Fig. 2.12: The memorial wall, 2010. 
 (Photo: Kiprop Lagat). 
 
Inscription of names just as naming is an age-old way of remembering the dead and helping 
the living come to term with bereavement. Mack (2003) notes that in ancient Egypt, for 
instance, the act of inscribing names in a written form so they could always be read aloud and 
thereby repeated ensured that the names (and by implication the person commemorated) 
endured for eternity. In Freudian analysis, as elaborated in his essay of 1917 on 'Mourning 
and Melancholia' (Freud, 1950), two types of reactions to loss occasioned by death are 
envisioned; some people accommodate bereavement; others are devastated by it. The latter he 
terms 'melancholic', an inability to come to terms; while the former he calls 'non-
melancholic', the ability to more easily disengage from the loss. Mediating agencies like a 
memorial, assist the former group go through the mourning process and to accept the loss. 
Inscription of names in a memorial becomes the mediating agency that helps the melancholic 
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accept; and this they can achieve by either touching the names or by merely reading them 
(Winter, 1995: 115; Benton, 2010). Observations I made at August 7
th
 Memorial Park, 
especially during the 12
th
 commemorative anniversary showed people coming either 
individually, in a group or with family and friends and heading directly to the wall to point to 
the names of those whom they knew. Having names of loved ones or colleagues has, thus, 
acknowledged and given some form of closure to this tragedy to some people, the 
'melancholic', to use Freud's words. The wall provides a space of mourning that is personal, 
familial as well as social. 
 
The Maya Lin Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington DC, built in 1982 is the other 
memorial that utilizes this form of inscription of names on a black granite wall to locate the 
dead of Vietnam in American history and reality. Lin describes her design as “a rift in the 
earth...a long, polished black stone wall, emerging from and receding into the earth”. She 
asserts that the mass of names and scale it encompasses is intended to aid an individual in 
his/her journey of self-reflection and private reckoning leading towards a destination that 
makes one come to term with the loss. It has become a site of pilgrimage to many individuals 
and families (Leigh, 2000; Winter, 1995). 
 
 
Fig. 2.13: Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Washington DC. 
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat: 2013). 
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Other memorials in the Mall, America's national commemoration ground, in Washington DC, 
are vertically imposing, valedictory and intended to glorify the wars' shared national ideals of 
common denial and self-sacrifice. Maya Lin's structure, by contrast, is horizontal, a non-
obtrusive monument embedded into the ground as if in communion with mother earth. Its 
portrayal as something cut into the earth is reminiscent of the counter-monuments established 
by the German anti-monument movement, which challenge the ethics and aesthetics of the 
very notion of building an artifice to represent violence that led to the extermination of many 
lives.  
 
The simplicity of design in Maya Lin's monument is widely praised as having achieved its 
desired effect of offering individuals with a contemplative site, one suitable for healing 
without taking the assertive form of those criticised by the anti-monuments movement (Leigh 
2000). The wall of names in the August 7th Memorial Park seems to have borrowed from the 
concepts utilized in Lin's memorial. Its simplicity and appearance as 'a wall emergent from 
the ground' are things that I emphasise: in offering a contemplative space, they provide 
healing to their visitors without diminishing the memories of the terror attack. 
 
2.3.4. Indigenous Trees 
 
Another feature of the Memorial Park are the indigenous trees and plants brought from each 
of Kenya’s former eight provinces. Traditionally, many Kenyan ethnic communities did not 
build monuments to remember a tragic event; instead they planted sacred plants and trees to 
symbolize hope and rebirth; others selected sites where these trees already grow for the 
performance of rituals to appease the spirits. The decision by the trustees to include sacred 
plants in the park has borrowed from traditional practices amongst Kenyan communities such 
as the Kikuyu, Maasai, Bukusu, the Luo and the Kalenjin where such plants occupy an 
important place in ritual performance. In his unpublished report on ‘Peace and Sacred Trees’, 
Owuor (2000) posits that these trees were selected because they provided good shade, are 
always evergreen or yielded a milky sap which was considered to be of good omen. Trees 
planted at the Memorial Park and utilized for ritual and ceremonial purposes of various types 
include the fig tree (ficus natalensis) which is referred to as simotwe by the Kalenjin, ngow 
by the Luo and khumukuyu by Bukusu and is central in supplication rituals. Other tree species 
in the park is the African olive (olea chrysophylla) which is used by the Kalenjin to erect an 
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altar for ceremonial rituals while to the Maasai it is used to light ceremonial fire and in peace-
making ceremonies. 
 
I believe that the decision to highlight the former provinces was for the purpose of making 
the Memorial Park communicate its identity and national remit in securing the memories of 
the terror attack. While the attack claimed victims from all of Kenya’s eight provinces, some 
provinces like Central suffered higher casualties because their population in Nairobi is higher 
than that of the other Kenyan communities. This has, however, not negatively influenced the 
Memorial Park’s role as a national monument. The tragedy was generally viewed as an attack 
on Kenyans as a people. This aspect appropriately positions the park to run programmes on 
conflict mediation without being seen to be partisan. A ‘Peace Builder’s Kids Club’ with a 
national outreach programme already operates at the site. 
 
 
2.3.5. The Sculpture: ‘Mind, Body and Spirit’ 
 
In one corner of the Park is a triangular-shaped sculpture titled ' Mind, Body and Spirit' made 
out of debris and containing construction materials collected from the embassy building - 
pipes, plastics, electric wires, and metal rods. Mary Collis, a second-generation Kenyan born 
artist with American roots was commissioned by the trustees to do an art piece for installation 
in the Park on the recommendation of Martin Barnard.
33
 
 
                                                            
33 See footnote 31 above. 
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Fig.2.14: ‘Mind Body and Spirit’ sculpture by Mary Collis. 
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat, 2011). 
 
The use of the partially-twisted and burnt debris from the bombed embassy building in the 
sculpture is intended to confirm the force of the bombing to anyone who might in future fail 
to recognize it. This is applicable in postmemory since later generations are more likely to 
acknowledge its psychological and physical impact when confronted with its artful 
materiality. The sculpture as an artefact enables visitors to get a deeper understanding of the 
effects of the terror attack on built landscape. 
 
In the trustees’ discussions about the Documentation Centre, one of its envisaged roles was to 
host works of Kenyan artists whose lives were affected by the blast. Mary Collis was 
assigned the task of vetting the Kenyan artists’ contributions to be represented in the centre. It 
could be argued that the selection of a Kenyan-American artist to do the sculpture, together 
with her envisaged role in the selection of Kenyan artists work for the Documentation Centre, 
was calculated to ensure that the memories evoked in visual form do not dwell on the biased 
treatment of non-Americans during the recovery period. Managing visual representations in 
this way ensured that the Americans could manipulate the memories created and transmitted 
through such artworks. 
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2.3.6. The Inauguration 
 
The trustees besides supervising the development of the Memorial Park and ensuring its 
completion on time also had the responsibility for organizing its timely inauguration on the 
7
th
 of August 2001 coinciding with the third anniversary of the terror attack. The then-
President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi officially inaugurated the park while the American 
Ambassador, Prudence Bushnel, and Kenya's Minister for Trade, Hon. Joseph Kamotho, 
planted trees during the ceremony. The symbolism of having the two plant trees signified the 
value of life to both parties. At the time of the blast, both the Ambassador and the Minister 
were in a meeting in the latter's office located in the Cooperative Bank building but both 
managed to come out of it alive, albeit with some minor injuries. It may also be interpreted to 
have been intended to give a new impetus to the bilateral relations between the two countries, 
which had been shaken by the terror attack. 
 
The official inauguration ceremony started at 10.a.m with the singing of the national anthem 
by the Kenyan army followed with speeches by the American Ambassador and the Trust's 
chairman. A minute of silence was observed in remembrance of the dead and, thereafter, 
doves and balloons were released to the air. The climax of the ceremony was the President's 
speech and the unveiling of the memorial monument. Earlier in the morning, members of the 
bereaved families had conducted prayers at the All Saints Cathedral before holding a 
procession to the Memorial Park. These members were not to enter the park during the 
official ceremony but had been asked to keep vigil outside.  
 
The plaque unveiled had the following words:  
“May the innocent victims of this tragic event rest in the knowledge that it has strengthened 
our resolve to work for a world in which man is able to live alongside his brother in 
peace.”34  
The unveiling ceremony, whilst sombre in nature, contained all the necessary elements that 
have come to characterize many memorialization ceremonies. Its key ingredients consist of a 
procession, the expression of grief for the loss of loved ones, indebtedness and either personal 
                                                            
34 While the use of the words ‘man’ and ‘brother’ in this sentence is highly gendered, I am unaware of any 
serious comments  it has generated regarding the exclusion of women. It is, however, my understanding that this 
could have been derived from an Old English construct in which ‘man’ means ‘person’. In this context, the word 
‘brother’ could have also been used in a blanket way to cover both genders.     
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or group commitment to remember the dead by continuing the good work they did while 
alive, and a declaration of support for the bereaved families. 
 
I draw out the following observations arising from this Memorial Park inauguration 
ceremony. Having the President officiate at the event imbued the memorial with the 
collective memory of the nation as he symbolizes the national collective. Secondly, while this 
was a monument to the memory of those who lost their lives and their descendants, the 
tragedy had repercussions across the nation, as it did not select the ethnicity of the victims. 
By playing the national anthem, ‘nationalistic’ implications of the values of peace, love and 
unity are highlighted. In conclusion, and borrowing from De Jong and Rowlands (2007), this 
ceremony presented the state with a stage to reinvent and frame its myth of national identity.  
 
2.3.7. The Documentation Centre 
 
Following the completion and inauguration of the Memorial Park, the trustees embarked on 
work towards the establishment of a documentation centre to be located next to the Memorial 
Park at the site where Ufundi Cooperative House stood before the terror attack. Funding for 
the project was mobilized by the trustees through fund-raising initiatives, with the USAID 
and the Ford Foundation making significant contributions. As mentioned, the latter 
committed to fund the operations of the Centre for a ten-year period.  
 
During the ground-breaking ceremony presided over by the Nairobi Mayor, he formally 
announced the commencement of a seven-million Kenyan shillings construction project to 
build a Documentation Centre. The objectives of the centre as set out by the trustees were to 
assist in providing visitors to the Park with an in-depth understanding of the scale of the 
tragedy that befell Nairobi on that fateful day, and through its displays, make a statement 
condemning the act of terror itself. This was, however, later revised and given an expanded 
role of, not only condemning acts of terror and promoting bilateral relations between Kenya 
and the United States, but also included propagating an amicable approach towards the 
resolution of conflict at the regional and international levels. The trustees, however, agreed to 
move forward with the first component of the Documentation Centre and deferred the 
conflict research and resolution phase to a later time.  
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The trustees further saw the Centre providing a focal meeting point and venue to the various 
survivor groups and their members. It is worth mentioning that six survivor-groups were 
independently formed based on how the bombing affected them. I will not go into the details 
of these groups for now, as they will be dealt with in chapter four. However, it may suffice to 
mention that there were, and still are, groups that were blinded, crippled, widowed, orphaned, 
or economically deprived through loss of business, among others offering support to their 
members in helping them cope with the bombing tragedy. By forming such affliction-specific 
groups is reflective of the different sorts of memories that are associated with the site. To 
these groups, the Memorial Park and Documentation Centre rekindles different types of 
memories that transcend the individual/collective divide. The membership to these groups is 
not ethnically inclined because what they commonly share is the nature of injuries sustained, 
hence the possibility to address their challenges with understanding. 
 
Since its establishment in 2001, the Memorial Park has become one of the social landmarks 
in the City of Nairobi. It is a quiet and serene corner that provides its visitors with a chance to 
learn more about the tragedy and to reflect on it while remembering the tragic events of that 
fateful day on the 7
th
 of August 1998. It conjures up individual and collective memories as 
each person has a way of remembering what happened, being in a group facilitates the 
collective memories engendered in the Park’s conception. 
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a preliminary description of the detail whose significance and 
implications are explored in depth in the body of the thesis, together with an indication of its 
general theoretical setting. It examined the historical background to the development of 
memorial monuments in Kenya, picking out a representative sample starting with the Nairobi 
War Memorial to the August 7th Memorial Park. It, thereafter, presented the process leading 
to the establishment of the Memorial Park and highlighting the issues that have bearing on 
the subject of memory dealt with more substantively in the subsequent chapters. Those 
foreshadowed here include the entwined relation between memory and history, individual and 
collective memory, appropriation and re-inscription of monuments and the dichotomy 
between ethnic and national identity. 
Chapter 3: The August 7
th
 Memorial Park:  
Memories and Commemorations 
 
3.0. Introduction 
 
This chapter builds on the materials described in chapter two by analysing a series of visual 
and commemorative rituals associated with the August 7
th
 Memorial Park to demonstrate 
their contribution in providing closure to the trauma experienced by the survivors and the 
victims’ families. The chapter is divided into two parts: Part I, Heritageization of Memory 
and; Part II, Commemorations. The first part mainly focuses on the creation and transmission 
of the bomb blast memories while in part II the commemorative events discussed aims at 
providing healing and closure to the trauma engendered by the Nairobi terror attack. 
 
In Part I, I discuss the processes by which the memories of the Nairobi terror attack were 
created, in what I refer to as heritageization of memory. This part begins with a description of 
what constitutes ‘grassroots’ or ‘spontaneous’ memorials, referring to: temporary memorials 
created on impulse by either individuals or a group of people to mark sites of untimely death. 
This section then proceeds to discuss two exhibitions, the ‘Daily Bill Board’ and, ‘The Bomb 
Terror’ curated at the Nairobi Museum and Goethe Institute respectively. The former 
documents expressions of grief in A-4 flipcharts from a diversity of people on what they 
thought of the Nairobi terror attack, while the latter is based on the varied ways the bombing 
was experienced by the artists. 
 
The exhibition in the Documentation Centre of the August 7
th
 Memorial Park is also 
presented in this part; this exhibition tells the story of the bombing and its aftermath in five 
sections using a mix of media and styles: written texts, photographs, artefacts and video 
documentaries. It is the only museum and archive dedicated to this bombing tragedy. The last 
section of Part I, explores the construction and transmission of the bomb blast memories by 
comparing messages inscribed in the Daily Billboard in 1998 with the testimonials registered 
in the Documentation Centre with a view to examining how memory is shaped through time. 
The three exhibitions discussed in this chapter: the Daily Billboard, the Bomb Terror, and the 
one in the Documentation Centre are perhaps the only public exhibitions that were curated in 
response to the Nairobi terror attach hence their inclusion in this study. 
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The second part of this chapter, Commemorations, focuses on the commemorative events 
held in memory of the victims of the Nairobi terror attack. The first section of this part offers 
a description of the events marking the thirteenth anniversary of the bombing and the role 
these activities play in mediating the trauma experienced. Other than this official public 
annual commemorative event dedicated to all the victims, the last section of this part 
discusses how one family in Maragwa safeguards and transmit the memory of their son, who 
was a victim of the same bombing, in a ‘family memorialisation’. Lastly, a comparative 
analysis of the national commemorative events held at the August 7
th
 Memorial Park and the 
‘family memorialisation’ in Maragwa are discussed. Finally, a brief discussion of new ways 
of commemorating besides these two is presented. Part III, ‘Conclusion’, summarises the 
main arguments, comparisons and the observations drawn in this chapter. 
 
Part I: Heritageization of Memory 
 
In 2002, the National Museums of Kenya requested me to join a team of researchers working 
on a collaborative project between Meru Museum, Kenya and Bohuslans Museum, Sweden. 
The research sought to investigate how museums in both countries handled ‘sensitive and 
emotional things’ in their collecting programmes. While Meru Museum chose Female Genital 
Mutilation (FGM) as its focus, Bohuslans Museum’s theme was the spontaneous roadside 
memorials set up by family and friends for victims of fatal road accidents. In Sweden, we 
researched in the VastraGotaland region documenting the materials placed in such memorials 
and interviewed family members and friends on how such memorials help them in coping 
with trauma emanating from such tragedies.35 
 
This research phenomenon constitutes what is variously referred to as ‘grassroots’, 
‘spontaneous’, ‘ephemeral’, or ‘makeshift’ memorials defined by Santino (2011:98) as “… 
temporary memorials that people construct, on their own initiative to mark the site of 
untimely deaths. These memorial assemblages are usually made up of flowers, personal 
memorabilia, written notes as well as religious icons.” To qualify as a spontaneous memorial, 
any one or all of the above may be present. Margry and Sanchez-Carretero (2011) observe 
                                                            
35A research report titled ‘Sensitive Telling and Secret Things in the Collections of Museums’ I co-authored 
with Christine Fredriksen was published in the Bohuslans Year Book (2005) 
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that the phenomenon of ‘grassroots memorials’ has since the 1980s become a ‘mentally 
inscribed’ and practically ‘instrumentalized’ ritual providing a template for public reaction to 
traumatic action or crisis culminating in death, especially in Western Europe and the United 
States of America. This impulse to create a memorial accords with Connerton’s (1989) 
theories of incorporating practices while the writings on the memorial cards and artworks 
devoted to the dead is a record of the events, which will serve to remind those who will 
access it long after the tragedy that occurred. Cooper & Sciorra (1994) suggest that mass-
scale paramilitary attacks are commonly reacted to with written messages to the deceased and 
the public. Zeitlin (2006) observes that written objects have recently been considered in 
studies of catastrophe shrines where they are treated as part of the creative response to 
tragedy. 
 
Immediately prior to the Nairobi terrorist attack, Renee Klarenbeek,36 Thom Ogonga and 
Patrick Mukabi37 had, without knowing what significance it would attain, set out to do a 
socio–political commentary project to document what ordinary Kenyans thought of their 
newspapers’ headline news. They erected a one-square-metre canvas – referred to in this 
study as the Daily Billboard – on Aga Khan Walk, Nairobi, to solicit comments from the 
public. At the end of the day, the artists recorded these comments and painted a new screen 
over the previous one to await the next day's comments. When the terrorists struck, it 
provided them with a new subject of focus; in a period of three weeks after the attack over 
1400 people had commented. The Daily Billboard was among the first efforts to document 
the memory of the Nairobi terror attack. Writing on the board became part of communal 
action in the creative expression of grief; and it was spontaneous on the part of the individual 
writers considering that they were stimulated to comment on encountering the board while 
passing by the site. 
 
The messages contained in the postings are consistent with the objectives of spontaneous 
memorials: they are responses to tragic events by individuals and non-organized groups 
desirous of expressing their personal utterances of grief, social and/or political disaffection 
with a view to influencing change to avert recurrence of similar events (Castells, 1983). They 
                                                            
36A visiting Dutch artist on an exchange programme with Kuona Trust, a privately-funded organization 
promoting the development of Kenyan art and artists. 
37Kenyan artists affiliated to Kuona Trust. 
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are temporary in nature and target an immediate audience to provoke social action by seeking 
answers to why death occurred while challenging somebody to take responsibility (Margry & 
Sanchez-Carretero, 2011). The writings and drawings posted on the Daily Billboard were 
particularly meant to realize social action and express protest. Messages such as, “You made 
my city cry, lots of tears have been shed, untold pain experienced. Why?” and “The 
Americans came and locked the stable after the horse had bolted” by Caleb Omondi and an 
anonymous person respectively ask for action from both American and Kenyan governments.  
Nairobi residents and any passers-by indeed, were free to inscribe their reactions and 
experiences on the board. The process of inscribing the horrors of the attack in messages 
condemning the terrorists, expressing grief, compassion and patriotism were externalized 
through the board becoming the collective narratives of the nation. Arguably, the Daily 
Billboard became the ‘shrine’ for expressing the collective grief afflicting the nation. 
 
In Nairobi, the collective act mirroring the creation of spontaneous memorials was the 
immediate donation of food, clothing, medicine, water and services by various organized 
groups and individuals to the rescue centres set up in hospitals to attend to the injured. This 
spontaneity could be described as a collective response by Kenyans to the tragedy with a 
view to seeking association with the injured – not the dead – and a way of condemning the 
terrorists. It was also a demonstration of ‘national unity’ hitherto unseen in the aftermath of 
tragedies with high fatalities such as the ethnic clashes of 1992. This could be explained by 
the fact that Kenyans saw the attack as directed at them as a nation. 
 
The Nairobi Daily Billboard and the spontaneous roadside memorials in VastraGotaland, 
Sweden, briefly mentioned above, meet the three objectives that personal expressions left at 
memorials aim to accomplish. They are expressions of personal grief in response to a tragedy; 
in this case the bombing tragedy and the loss of a dear one through a road accident 
respectively. The expression of either social or political disaffection is discernible in both 
instances. The messages in response to the Nairobi bombing are heavily-laden with 
condemnations of both the terrorists and the Americans (especially the American Marines) for 
the attack and the response to the terror respectively. Whereas in VastraGotaland, the 
expression of disaffection is of a social kind, which disapproves of the speeding, carelessness, 
and the poor state of the roads – in some instances. In both instances, those affected and the 
public through such messages aim to avoid a recurrence. 
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Consistent with its abstract role as the trusted memory of the nation, Nairobi Museum 
working with Kuona Trust arranged to exhibit these messages in the museum. The Nairobi 
Museum is a public institution whose exhibitions target the general public and is visited by 
people of all walks of life ranging from school parties, international tourists, residents and 
non- resident clientele. It receives an average of 400,000 visitors per year with about 60% 
being school groups. 
 
 
Fig.3.1: The Daily Billboard exhibition at the Nairobi Museum, 1998 
 (Photo: NMK). 
 
The exhibition contained all 1400 messages, each on a white A-1 flipcharts written in blue, 
black and red colours. These flipcharts were not framed but just glued to the walls 
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maintaining the character and experience of makeshift memorials. They looked temporary 
with the hand-written messages contributing to the impression they were written in a hurry. 
Notwithstanding this appearance, the texts turned out as one big wall-to-wall art piece. 
 
Upon its de-installation, the Kuona Trust retrieved the exhibition but it eventually 
disintegrated. By the time of undertaking this study, I was unable to access the exhibition in 
its entirety but only parts recorded photographically either by the artists at the original site on 
Aga Khan Walk or by museum photographers 38  during the exhibition. The fact that the 
exhibition was not stored or accessed into any museum collection thereafter accords with the 
purposes of spontaneous memorials: they aim to convey evocative messages commanding a 
high level of attention and visibility for a short period after which they disappear as 
spontaneously as they came into being (Margry & Sanchez-Carretero,2011). Purity Senewa,39 
one of the exhibition curators, stated that they had not intended to keep the A-1 sheets of 
paper exhibited; these were to be photographed and stored in the NMK and Kuona Trust 
databases. However, this did not happen and the exhibition ended up meeting the fate that 
many temporary exhibitions in African museums that are curated without an accompanying 
catalogue, their records vanish. In this study, therefore, I am only able to analyse 92 legible 
texts accessed and use them as my representative sample. While these messages appeared to 
be repetitive, there were minor variations, which enabled their categorization into six 
message-types to obtain the results provided in table 3a. 
Table 3a: Categorization of Messages by Type 
No Message type No of entries %  
1 God Bless Kenya and exhortation for National Unity 25 27 
2 Sharing the pain and grief of loss 16 17 
3 Condemnation of acts of terrorism and/or its 
perpetrators 
7 8 
4 United States of America’s culpability 15 16 
5 Personal experience of the tragedy and the desire never 
to forget 
23 25 
6 Others 6 7 
Total  92 100 
 
                                                            
38The Audio Visual department of the Nairobi Museum documents all temporary exhibitions in the museum 
through either photography or video. 
39 Ms Senewa is a colleague of mine and we have on various occasions discussed matters regarding this 
exhibition. 
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A visitors’ comment-book was provided in the NMK exhibition. Though the number of 
visitors to this exhibition is estimated at 18,00040, very few of them commented. In order to 
make meaningful use of these comments, I did not deviate from the message-type framework 
used in the analysis in table 3a above, though this was not without challenge. It was difficult 
to wholly fit some messages into these categories without becoming subjective. I must at this 
juncture, point out that I only selected for analysis messages that were spot-on on the topic of 
the exhibition and excluded those that dwelt on several topics, some of which had no 
relevance to my subject matter. Table 3b below summarizes the visitors’ comments: 
 
Table3b: Visitor’s Comments by % 
No Message type No of entries %  
1 God Bless Kenya and exhortation for 
National Unity 
33 14 
2 Sharing the pain and grief of loss 44 20 
3 Condemnation of acts of terrorism 
and its perpetrators 
17 7.5 
4 United States of America’s 
culpability 
13 6 
5 Personal experience of the tragedy 
and the desire never to forget 
28 12.5 
7 Others 89 40 
Total  224 100 
 
Of the 224 visitors, 40% made comments regarding other aspects of the museum which were 
irrelevant to the exhibition; a normal occurrence in the Nairobi Museum. However, an 
examination of the addresses indicates that a majority in this category are students from 
upcountry schools. Implicitly, the effect of the tragedy was never an issue of major concern to 
people from outside Nairobi, especially schoolchildren. They could have heard of the 
bombing without directly experiencing an aspect of it, hence their lack of interest in the 
exhibition. See 5.3.3. for a comparative perspective with members of the Peace Builder’s 
Kids Club visits to the Documentation Centre. 
 
                                                            
40This figure is based on Nairobi Museum monthly statistics for October 1998 but the records are not gallery- 
specific. It is assumed that they visit all the galleries.  
 
91 
 
The second and third highest number of those visiting the exhibition stated that they shared 
the pain and grief of loss; and narrated their personal experience of the tragedy and the desire 
never to forget it. I argue that the messages in this exhibition provided its visitors with a 
context for reflection and remembrance evoking the emotions of what transpired, hence 
inspiring memory and healing. Wycliff Nyamanga’s41 comment that;  
‘Until today, I had not come to terms with whatever happened on that day. Today, I 
bear witness to the grief that engulfed our nation; violence, destruction and terrorism 
do no good to humanity. Today, I am stronger in the knowledge that together we 
triumphed’.  
This statement is comparable to Gardner’s (2011:299) view regarding the exhibition 
organized by the National Museum of American History in the aftermath of September 11, 
which “provided the public a space for commemoration and memorialization, acknowledging 
the many voices and perspectives of the day giving visitors opportunities to contribute, not 
simply to observe”. In other words, it provided a shared space for civic healing.  The 
interpretation of other aspects captured in tables 3a & b will be explored in a subsequent 
chapter. 
 
A second exhibition in response to this tragedy was “The Bomb Terror”, organized by Shine 
Tani at Goethe Institute, Nairobi. Artists from Banana Hill Arts Studio formed the core of the 
exhibition, with several others from Kuona Trust participating. The narratives constituted by 
the artworks were derived from the varied ways the artists experienced the bombing: there are 
those who were in town and went to the site to see what happened; others experienced it 
through television and newspaper reportage; while others were vicarious, based on the 
narrations of those who were present. It is through these frames that they responded by 
producing works of visual art based on their own subjectivities, which nonetheless inscribed 
the bomb blast tragedy in narrative form. The exhibition was partly supported by 
Organization Recovery (OR) and some donor agencies to help people manage the collective 
trauma emanating from the bombing tragedy. 
 
All the 46 paintings on exhibition gave different perspectives to the tragedy. This study 
elected to examine only four of the 46 paintings for they encapsulated the narratives of 
                                                            
41 A visitor to the exhibition. 
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traumatic memory depicting the whole gamut beginning with the capture of the event as it 
unfolded, its transmission as news, the creation of memory and trauma-memory healing. 
Representation of the chaotic scenes of crowded streets, burnt and collapsing buildings, the 
injured strewn about the place, and damaged vehicles around the U.S. embassy building and 
its environs in the aftermath of the bombing, are the moments characteristically captured by 
many artists included in this exhibition. Cartoon Joseph, for instance, in his work ‘Is it the 
End of the Earth’ uses a montage of newspaper cuttings of photographs depicting the tragedy 
against a background of crowded scenes of traumatized people and the buildings in the 
vicinity. The superimposed photographs capture the actuality of the event and the role of the 
media in disseminating it. 
 
 
Fig.3.2: Is it the End of the Earth? Cartoon Joseph, Mixed media. 
Reproduced from African Arts, Vol. 38, No 3, pp.71. 
 
It should be remembered that some of them learnt of the tragedy through the media hence the 
presentation of the tragedy as a media event. Wanjohi Nyamu’s ‘Airwaves’ further 
exemplifies this category of works. His formulation is that of a howling dog, triggered 
perhaps by the collapsing building in the background with a transistor radio transmitting the 
event to the world (Kasfir, 2005). 
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Fig.3.3: Airwaves. Wanjohi Nyamu, Oil on Canvass. 
Reproduced from African Arts, Vol. 38, No 3, pp. 70. 
 
Against this understanding, the exhibition itself is also seen as a medium through which the 
bombing tragedy is communicated. This body of work argues for the place of visual art as an 
important medium in the production of memories of tragedy. While all the works exhibited 
are illustrative of this view, I pick on James Mbuthia’s ‘I can Remember’ to illustrate this 
point. 
 
Fig.3.4: I Can Remember. James Mbuthia. Oil on Canvass.  
Reproduced from African Arts, Vol. 38, No 3, pp. 67. 
 
The centre of the painting focuses on rescue efforts and shows a bleeding woman being lifted 
from the scene towards an ambulance in the background. Another victim is on a doctor’s bed 
undergoing examination. In the middle part of the painting too is a wrecked vehicle bearing 
the registration, KENYA, perhaps symbolising the damage inflicted upon the nation as a 
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whole through this bombing. The lower left corner of the painting has the President visiting 
the scene while in the lower middle part is an American Marine with his gun firmly held with 
a bandana tied around his head depicting a Rambo42-like image of the US Marines. This 
depiction is perhaps a reminder of the ruthlessness of the marines in their quest to not only 
secure but also rescue anything American that remained in the collapsed U.S. embassy 
building. The lower right side depicts a man on a wheelchair in a pose suggestive of 
mourning - his palm holds his cheek as he gazes at a body. The Cooperative Bank Building 
provides the general background to this depiction. 
 
This picture encapsulates the main events that happened on that tragic day that are 
remembered by many of the survivors, and corroborated by first-hand narrative accounts. 
This includes the injuries sustained and loss of life, the rescue efforts, insensitivity of the 
American Marines and the show of unity demonstrated by Kenyans during the rescue period. 
As previously stated, the purpose of the exhibition at the Goethe Institute was to help the 
survivors manage the traumatic memory occasioned by the bombing; I examine Donald 
Maingi’s43 work titled ‘Chokora’44 against this objective. In an interview (Personal interview, 
London, 09.03.2012), he had this to say: 
 “I never thought that I could suffer such an emotional scare, it was my first time to 
see Kenyans being patriotic in helping their brothers and sisters. However what made 
me suffer even more was the way street children did not receive the needed attention. 
I saw this chokora who was lying down next to the embassy building, injured and 
unable to move, as he tried to wake up, people were stepping on him as they reached 
out to save other victims who looked dignified. I never thought that the class issue 
would arise at that moment. I was speechless and devastated. The image of the child 
haunted me until I made that painting. My most excitable moment was the moment I 
                                                            
42Rambo is an American action film -series starring Sylvester Stallone, a troubled Vietnam War veteran who is 
skilled in many aspects of combat, survival, and guerrilla warfare. He often ruthlessly employs these skills in the 
rescue missions he is assigned. 
43 Donald Maingi started painting since childhood on walls in their house using mud as a way of expressing 
himself. He had a difficult childhood devoid of love and appreciation and it was perhaps as a result of this that 
he was interested in painting life in the streets as experienced by the street children. At the time of the bombing, 
he had been commissioned by Gallery Watatu to produce 100 works of art focusing on their life. 
44Swahili for children who live and eke out a livelihood in the streets in Kenya. 
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saw a street child looking at this painting and weeping uncontrollably; I realised that it 
was the beginning of self- searching for the young one”. 
 
 
Fig. 3.5: Chokora. Donald Maingi. 1999. Oil on Canvas. 
(Photo: Artist’s own collection). 
 
I identify two readings of Mr Maingi’s work. The first is the traumatic healing he personally 
experienced after completing the work. He says that this image kept on recurring in his mind 
and it was only after he painted it that he felt relieved and fulfilled. Arguably, his own 
traumatic memory as a child found an expression in this work: he found a platform that 
enabled him to narrate some of the emotional suffering he himself experienced as a child. The 
street child weeping on seeing this painting is the other moment of healing triggered by this 
painting. The self-discovery Mr Maingi refers to implicates; other street children visiting the 
exhibition who are enabled to emotionally connect with it by seeing that their pain as human 
beings had been recognised. 
 
Having discussed the temporary exhibitions at both the Nairobi Museum and Goethe Institute 
curated in response to the bombing, I now turn to describe the Documentation Centre’s 
display dedicated to remembering the bombing tragedy. In one of its sections, visitors are 
encouraged to share their stories of what they recall of the 7th August 1998, their personal 
experiences and how it impacted on them. I then compare these testimonials with what was 
documented in the Daily Billboard in the aftermath of the tragedy. 
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3.1.1. The Documentation Centre 
 
The Documentation Centre, funded by a donation from the U.S. Government, opened in 2004 
as a museum and historical archive of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. The centre is open to 
members of the public; anyone can walk in upon payment of the requisite admission fees. It 
tells the story of the bombing and its aftermath in an exhibition organized into five sections 
using a mix of media and styles: written texts, photographs, artefacts and video 
documentaries. Implicitly, the exhibition communicates different messages to its visitors, it 
starts with a brief historical background and development of Nairobi as Kenya’s capital city 
then takes the visitors through a time- line of activities of the day of the bombing beginning 
with the calm prevailing on the morning of 7th August 1998. It was a day like any other with 
people engaged in ordinary activities: going to the bank, being at work, waiting for a friend, 
applying for a visa, having tea, reading a newspaper, and so on. This is told through personal 
narratives such as: 
 
“My name is Patrick. I am a businessman and was in my office on the fifth floor of Solar 
House, opposite the former US embassy. I was reading a newspaper”, another reads “...it was 
a normal day; I was waiting to enter Co-operative Bank with my wife.” 
 
These narratives show the people affected as innocent, going about the daily activities of life 
oblivious of any hatred by the perpetrators against the US or what the day had in store for 
them. 
 
This section is followed with an overview of terrorism activities in Kenya 45  prior and 
subsequent to the 1998 US embassy attack; specific mention is made of the attacks in 1980 of 
the Norfolk Hotel Nairobi and in 2002 on the Kikambala Paradise Hotel in Mombasa. Here, 
the irony is recalled that in all these terrorist acts, Kenyans suffered most, yet they were not 
the primary targets. 
 
The ‘Blast Moment’ or ‘Black Friday’, - as the 1998 embassy attack is remembered, captures 
the chaotic scenes in and around the embassy building with photographs of burnt buildings, 
                                                            
45See Chapter 1 
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strewn bodies, and mangled vehicle-wrecks displayed. These photos evoke the chaotic scenes 
prevailing in the aftermath of the attack and are intended to create an experience of the 
bombing to engender empathy and shock in visitors. The photograph of a mangled-burning 
Kenya Bus No 126, which was over 100 metres away from the embassy, for instance, evokes 
the power of the bomb. This chaotic scene is captured aptly in this section’s exhibition text: 
“We were injured, we stumbled on pavements bleeding, and wailing sirens of the ambulances 
and the enormous mass of rubble marked the site”. 
 
A display of objects donated to the exhibition by the bereaved is next. Among these are: a 
necktie donated by a widow whose husband had worn it; a document wallet with blood 
stained papers belonging to Mr Madegwa who died in the blast; and a glass case containing 
bottles with foreign bodies removed from some survivors. The last one is accompanied with 
the message: ‘I was at the Kenya Railways when the bomb exploded. I sustained head injury 
and was in a coma for six weeks. Pieces of glass were removed from my left cheek on 3rd 
December 1999’.  
 
 
Fig. 3.6: Glass shards removed from the survivors’ body, Nairobi, 2010, 
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat). 
 
Having them in their damaged, dusty and blood-stained forms, these objects stand in for the 
bodies of the injured and dead. De Becker (2012: 153) discusses the powerful role of personal 
possessions, such as clothes, in representing victims of tragedies such as the genocide in 
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Rwanda. She argues that such clothing serves as a kind of memory due to the imprint that 
their owners have left on them; they are “projections of the human body that re-animate, a 
now absent people” (Scarry, 1985:281). Personal belongings, Auslander (2003:244) suggests, 
also “constitute a particular metonymic situation – the inanimate objects document and mark 
the ‘gonennes’ and the loss instead of simply substituting for them through representation”. It 
is against this context that the handbag and necktie (Fig. 3.7) displayed in the Documentation 
Centre ought to be understood. 
 
 
Fig.3.7: Handbag and necktie retrieved from the site and donated for exhibition. 
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat, 2010). 
 
The stories attached and the confidence imparted to these objects by survivors, widows and 
widowers, family members and their descendants convert the exhibition space into one of 
private mourning and public ceremony. In accepting the donation of objects of the August 7th 
1998 bombing, they are conferred with special status in telling the narrative of that day to the 
public, and hence become part of the collective memory of the tragedy (William, 2007; 
Margry & Sanchez-Carretero, 2011). Nora (1989) posits that moments of rupture are 
important in the generation of collective memory. These ‘rupture moments’ transform the 
everyday, vernacular, contemporary objects into heritage (Samuel, 1994). It is against this 
background that some of the objects on display in the Documentation Centre that were 
retrieved from their context of rupture but previously used as ordinary functional objects 
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(neckties, handbag, and notebooks) are imbued with new meanings qualifying them as aide 
de memoire for they bear testimony to the Nairobi terror attack. 
 
The exhibition Curator, Ms. Amunga states, “the purpose of building the collection is to 
inform and educate the general public on the August 7 1998 bomb blast and to assist in the 
efforts towards peace and reconciliation, memory and healing.46” 
 
The material culture of grief represented by objects in the Documentation Centre could be 
seen as repositories of feelings and emotions. They constitute a relationship between the 
donor and the Memorial Park allowing the former to accept that traumatic death occurred. 
The presence of objects embodies a public grief that binds the living and the dead (Doss, 
2008, Hallam & Hockey, 2001). 
 
Commemorating the first anniversary is the next focus of the exhibition. This part utilizes 
photography as a medium and shows what happened during the first anniversary. Prudence 
Bushnell, then US Ambassador to Kenya, lays a wreath of commemoration as does the 
Principal of Blanes Secretarial College47 and the families of the bereaved. Images depicting 
the large numbers in attendance, including survivors, some still on crutches, are displayed. 
The significance of the numbers, as will be discussed later in this chapter, underscores the 
level of trauma being experienced then. 
 
A ‘Share Your Story’ section follows. Here, visitors are provided with writing materials and 
are encouraged to share their stories, their experiences and the impact this tragedy had on 
them. The encouragement to write is arguably intended to generate diverse narratives of 
cultural memory representing the tragedy. Pinning and frequently changing the messages on 
the wall is for the purpose of sharing the diverse experiences, which could lead to a better 
understanding of the tragedy and lessening its trauma.  
 
                                                            
46Emphases are mine. 
4713 of its students died when the building housing their college collapsed. 
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3.1.2. Construction and Transmission of Bomb-blast Memories 
 
In this section, I compare messages inscribed in the Daily Billboard in 1998 with the 
testimonials registered in the Documentation Centre since its opening in 2004. This 
comparison allows us to examine how memory is shaped through time. 
 
As a tragedy of this nature and magnitude had not previously been experienced in Kenya, its 
impact reverberated far and wide. It got extensive coverage in the media for more than a 
month becoming a commonly discussed subject in work places, pubs, churches, markets, and 
so on. The discussions, narrations and commemorations are processes to enable people to 
deal actively with the disorienting event and to convert disorder into order (Balandier, 1998). 
Exhibiting memories of the bombing as captured in the documented messages is born of the 
intention to ensure that such a historical experience is remembered. The messages analysed 
reveal a general wish by the visitors to have this tragedy remembered.  
This analysis further reveals that with the passage of time the details of what is remembered 
diminishes. In the messages posted on the Daily Billboard immediately after the tragedy, 
people wrote of the exact places they were, what they were doing and with whom, on hearing 
the first blast and what they thought it was before the second blast came as well as their 
reactions to it. Those near the scene remembered the details of what they saw. However, the 
later testimonials in the Documentation Centre are lacking in accuracy though they recall the 
events of the tragedy and what they did at the time. The lack of accuracy suggests that some 
of the facts could have been learnt from the media. This study also found out that the 
messages written during the annual commemorations on the 7th of August contain details 
echoing the ones in the Daily Billboard. While the details of these messages are more or less 
the same, there are significant differences. The ones in the Daily Billboard were spontaneous 
and hence accurately capture the events as they unfolded, those in the Documentation Centre 
lack the accuracy – as memories of tragedies weaken with time – requiring collective acts of 
commemoration to be reinforced.  
 
The records in the Documentation Centre reveal that a high number of school-groups from 
within Nairobi visit the centre, with many of them writing their testimonies. I found it 
necessary to analyse what those in primary school had to say since none of them had been 
born by 1998. Their messages are characterised by expressions of sorrow for the life lost, 
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wishes of peace to Kenyans and their shock to learn that an event this tragic happened in their 
country. Their experiences are mediated through representation, projection and creation 
(Williams, 2007:167) in the Centre’s display of objects, photographs and screening of 
documentary films. The content of their messages demonstrates their experience of memory 
as retold in the Centre in a powerful and evocative manner forming what Marrianne Hirsch 
(2008) has called ‘postmemory’. Though they did not have a first-hand experience of the 
bombing, the photographs and documentary films in the exhibition recount it to them in a 
way that makes them experience it as though they were physically present at the time. 
Arguably, the memories mediated through first-account recollection as narrated in the Daily 
Billboard and the post-memory are both powerful means of memory creation and 
transmission that continue to shape how the terror attack is remembered. 
 
The messages in the Daily Billboard covered an array of subjects ranging from condemnation 
of terrorism, America’s culpability, praise of heroic acts, the recovery, national unity, pain and 
suffering, and the shared personal experiences of the tragedy. The tone and language of the 
condemnatory messages was tinged with elements of anger and bitterness expressing the raw 
emotions of the period. The feelings of many other Kenyans at the time are encapsulated in 
messages such as: 
“Terrorists should never be given a chance to live, terrorism is barbaric, demonic and 
death-based;”48 and  
“…Kenyans just like Americans are human beings, we suffer pain and shed blood just 
as Americans, why discriminate against our people like animals?”49 
 
Some of these subjects are repeated in the testimonial messages in the Documentation Centre, 
albeit differently. Messages written out ten-to-eleven years50 later, are pacifying and advocate 
tolerance, peace, justice and forgiveness. The following are typical: 
 
“To all persons in general, may you find love in your hearts that has no bounds so that 
you love persons from every tribe and race equally (including terrorists). Let us stop 
prejudice in all aspects of our lives and let peace prevail over violence.”51 
                                                            
48Ben Mule. 23.08.1998. 
49Isaiah Kangogo, 23.08.1998. 
50The testimonials analysed in the Documentation Centre only cover the period 2009-2011. 
51David Ogaki.14.09.2009. 
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“In this world we do not live by chaos neither by violence but by truth and justice. 
One day truth and justice will come to pass.”52 
 
The bitterness elicited by the American Marines’ treatment of Kenyans during the rescue 
process is now moderated. Gikenyi Ombonyo, for instance, in an undated message states: 
“….Kenyans and Americans have travelled a long journey together, and that is not about to 
end regardless of whatever threats thrust along the way. God Bless Kenya, God Bless USA”. 
 
It is also possible that the Obama-effect could have contributed to this positive change of 
attitude towards the Americans by those commenting in this exhibition on the 1998 Nairobi 
terror attack. This is for the reason that with Barack Obama’s election as President of the 
USA in 2009, many Kenyans warmed up to America for in him they saw a ‘Kenyan’ in the 
White House owing to his father’s Kenyan ancestry. 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed the terror attack and the various responses offered by the Kenyan 
government, the public, the American Marines and all other teams, such as the Israeli and 
British experts that were called in to offer rescue efforts. While there was overwhelming 
support for these teams, the Kenyan public singled out the American Marines for 
condemnation for their determination to block ordinary Kenyans from participating in the 
rescue efforts. This was demonstrated in the newspaper editorials, televised talk shows and in 
letters to the editors of the Kenyan press. Messages in the Daily Billboard were equally 
critical of the perceived insensitivity of the American Marines at a time when their 
understanding was most needed. The perpetrators of this heinous crime were not equally 
spared condemnation. 
 
While one would have expected these sentiments to be carried through to the Documentation 
Centre, the messages therein are moderate in their condemnation, especially of the American 
Marines and their government. Considering that the Documentation Centre was built five 
years after the terror attack, it is arguable that those commenting on this tragedy have with 
time revised their attitudes towards the perpetrators and the Americans. Implicitly, the 
memories of the tragedy have diminished with the passage of time, as has the bitterness it 
                                                            
52Andrew Chege.10.10.2010. 
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engendered. Many of the survivors have also been healed of their physical injuries and 
psychological trauma and have integrated memories of the tragedy into their personal 
narratives of life, therefore leading to forgiveness and understanding. 
 
The other point to emphasise in concluding this section is the important role played by 
museums in transacting traumatic memories and helping the public manage grief. Applying 
Assmann’s (1995) conception of the constitution of collective memory illustrates the 
amelioration of active grief through its transaction through memory and history. 
 
Transforming contemporary memories of the bomb blast from the day-to-day verbal 
discussions and converting them into a museum collection, as happened in this case, is a 
temporal movement from ‘communicative memory’ through ‘cultural memory’ to ‘history’. 
In the context of the Nairobi terror attack, it means that the memories of the attack have 
moved from being discussed and performed when the 'communicators' are physically present, 
such as during the annual commemorative rituals, before they are transformed to a 
representation of the past in the form of the Memorial Park and the Documentation Centre 
where they are given new meaning in a different social and historical context. The fact that 
this happened within a very short time-span of five years unlike the temporal time-periods of 
between 80 and 100 years as referred to by Assmann,53 (ibid) suggests the Documentation 
Centre is fulfilling its purpose in mediating the traumatic effects of the tragedy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
53 This does not, however, mean that its existence as part of the everyday ‘communication memory’ ceased. Its 
objectivation transforms it to cultural memory (monuments, film documentary and objects) enabling it to last for 
another hundreds if not thousands of years.  
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Part II: The Commemorations 
 
3.2.1. Introduction 
 
I move now to describe events marking the thirteenth anniversary of the tragedy and discuss 
the role these activities played in mediating trauma suffered as a result of the bombing. The 
first section of this part mainly describes and analyses the activities and performances during 
this annual national commemoration of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. The section that 
follows describes a different form of memorialisation of this same event but one that takes 
place within the confines of a family, and is dedicated to remembering an individual who died 
during this tragedy. This leads to a comparative discussion of how these two forms are 
enacted and concludes by mentioning other ways by which some families have opted to 
commemorate this event. 
 
3.2.2. A Description of the Commemoration 
 
Events commemorating the August 7th 1998 Nairobi terror attacks have been held annually 
since 1999. While the shape the commemoration takes has differed from one year to another, 
the objectives and basic structures of the event have remained the same, “to remember all the 
218 people that lost their lives in the bomb attack of 1998 and pay tribute to the over 5,000 
others coping with permanent injuries or the loss of a loved one” as contained in the speech 
of Mr Mwadama, the Chairman of the August Seventh Bomb-blast Victims Association 
(ASBVA)54 on 7th August 2011. 
 
I participated in the 13th anniversary commemorations as an observer. I arrived at the 
Memorial Park - armed with a camera and notebook - at around 8.30 am and proceeded to a 
vantage point in one of the tents that would enable a good observation of all the activities. I 
                                                            
54The association is a registered umbrella body that brings together all those who suffered injuries during the 
bomb-blast and family members of those who lost loved ones to advocate for their welfare including their quest 
for compensation.  
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was soon joined by the survivors, the victims’ relatives and perhaps their family members and 
friends, and journalists from both the local and international media. By the time the event was 
formally started at around 10.00 am, there were slightly more than 200 people in the park. 
Though a majority of those in attendance were the victims and their relatives, there were 
other participants who had just walked in from the streets to participate in this event. As the 
programme unfolded, I occasionally stood to take photographs, just as other attendees were 
doing. While the chair of the victims association knew me in person, I did not want to be 
introduced as this would have probably influenced some participants into playing for the 
camera or even altering their speeches. 55  Those who saw me take photographs would 
probably have thought that I was part of the media fraternity. 
 
The venue for the annual commemoration has always been the August Seventh Memorial 
Park, in downtown Nairobi. The survivors and their relatives are given white ribbons and tags 
as marks of identification separating them from the rest of the participants. Their status 
mirrors that of initiates in liminal states with markers of signification that symbolically 
indicate their status (Turner, 1982): they are initiates in a ceremony to heal them of the 
traumatic memories of the bombing. Other attendees start arriving at the venue from around 
9.00 am and begin either by interacting among themselves or by engaging with the Memorial 
Park monuments in varied ways. 
 
There are those who go to the wall of names and kneel down in silent reflection; others sit 
under the trees to pray. Monuments as observed by Benton (2010) enable the grieving to 
replace the deceased loved ones with a new object - in this case the Wall of Names. This, for 
instance, was best demonstrated at the park on the 1st May 2011 when news of Osama Bin 
Laden’s killing was received in Kenya. According to Sidialo,56 a couple of survivors and 
families of the bereaved congregated at the Memorial Park to commemorate their tragedy 
while expressing their satisfaction that justice had at last been delivered. Some did not have 
                                                            
55 I had been warned by the chairman that should they know that I was a government employee, they would 
have addressed their grievances to me hoping that I would be in a position to help advocate for their plight in 
government circles.  
56Personal interview, Nairobi, 10th January 2012. 
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Fig.3.8: Survivors engage with Wall of Names, Nairobi, 2011.  
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat). 
 
words to express their feelings; they thoughtfully gazed at the names on the wall, others 
bowed their heads in contemplation and prayer. Debatably, they were there to ‘inform’ the 
departed of the killing of Osama therefore atoning for their death. 
 
The singing of the national anthem at 10.00 am signals the start of the formal event. This is 
followed with a Christian sermon and prayers that end at 10.30 am when the gathering is 
asked to stand up and observe a minute of silence in memory of the departed. In their 
deference, heads are bowed in silent prayer and contemplation; those wearing hats remove 
them. Edkins (2003) posits that in observance of a minute of silence, the memories of the past 
are brought to the present ‘time’ and that ‘time’ is only ‘now’. Bringing the past to the present 
in the observance of a minute of silence allows the participants to pause for reflection and 
remember what transpired. 
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The other observation I made during the thirteenth anniversary was the launch of a peace 
symbol. The symbol itself is the map of Kenya on a blue woven mat with a dove carrying a 
twig, presumably an olive branch.57 
 
 
Fig.3.9: Peace Symbol, Nairobi, 2011. 
(Photo: Kiprop Lagat). 
 
This piece was created by Rahab Kamau whose husband survived the attack and has since 
established a cottage industry specializing in knitting. Survivors of the bombing willing to 
learn new skills, which could enable them to earn a living are taught free of any fees. This 
knitting involving the survivors is also helpful in reducing their trauma; it provides them with 
a platform to come together to engage in a meaningful act while sharing their memories of 
the tragedy. The map and the dove are white with the word ‘peace’ written below it. The 
official logo of the Memorial Park also has the map of Kenya and a dove in green and white 
                                                            
57Use of olive branch as a peace symbol dates back to at least 5th Century BCE. In Greek antiquity the olive 
represented plenty and was believed to chase away evil spirits. Early Christians portrayed baptism by a bird 
holding an olive branch in its beak and used the image on their sepulchres as a peace allegory. 
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colours respectively. The symbols are imbued with messages of peace in accordance with the 
objectives of the Memorial Park. 
 
The next phase in the ceremony was the lighting of candles, thirteen in number with each 
representing a year since the bombing tragedy. Wreaths and flowers were laid by family, 
survivors and friends at the foot of the memorial wall in tribute to the dead, whose names are 
inscribed on the wall. I made several observations of the participants’ behaviour at this point; 
there were those who laid the flowers and left, others searched the names of those they knew 
from the wall, touched and caressed them as they uttered words to them, while others knelt 
down in prayer - some with rosaries - for a couple of minutes. Unlike other memorials or 
commemorative events elsewhere, flowers seemed the dominant ‘things’ brought by relatives 
and friends to remember their dead. One exception, however, was a note left at the site 
addressed to ‘Brother Paul’ and signed Githinji: 
 
“Brother, I today can say kwaheri,58 my heart will tonight rest. Perhaps I won’t see 
you again in my dreams as we struggle down the stairs of Ufundi House, glass, blood 
and fire killing us. We almost reached the ground, then I lost you….Tears welled up 
in my eyes when I touched your name, I remember that day, fare thee well, brother, 
we will meet again”. 
 
The wording of the note demonstrates a desire by Githinji to give a narrative closure to his 
trauma through revelation of his inner feelings addressed to his departed colleague. These 
actions demonstrate that the wall provides the participants with a place to mourn in 
remembrance of their dead hence legitimizing their individual and family grief (Hayden, 
1987; Winter, 1995). 
 
The event also featured drama, poetry and choral song performances by different groups. The 
play entitled ‘Mahangaiko59 centred on how the bomb blast survivors and their families have 
struggled for thirteen years without any concrete support from either the Kenyan or American 
governments. The play begins with a scene showing a jovial Ngugi and Alice in an office 
                                                            
58Swahili for Bye- bye. 
59Swahili for tribulations. 
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environment discussing work-related matters, the bombing occurs, they are both rescued but 
do not see each other again until one year later in a meeting for the bomb blast survivors 
convened by their employer. Ngugi, who now uses crutches, had resumed work but Alice 
who was blinded had been obliged to retire on medical grounds. They meet other colleagues 
with whom they worked in Ufundi Cooperative House, each one of them suffering from one 
ailment or another. They meet again during the thirteenth commemorative anniversary on the 
7
th
 of August at the Memorial Park. Ngugi who is an active member and official of ASBVA 
is delighted to see Alice. He invites Alice to share her experiences of the life after the blast. 
She narrates her tribulations starting with the bombing that rendered her blind and dependent 
on other people’s support to do everything, her hurt following her husband’s marrying of a 
second wife, her relocation to her parents’ home in Nyakach in 2005, her challenges in 
getting money to continue with medication and to pay her son’s college fees. These 
tribulations have made her lose hope in life. She breaks down emotionally and is assisted off 
the stage. Four more people take the platform to share their experiences. Alice connects with 
these confessions and asks for another chance to speak where she states that listening to the 
other survivors’ problems lifted a burden off her heart as she learns that her tribulations were 
not unique to her. At the conclusion of the play, she joins the association and promises never 
to miss another commemorative event as this provided a healing balm to her heart. 
 
The recital of the poem ‘Farewell to August 7th 1998 Nairobi Bomb-blast Victims’ by Kioko 
Musau had the survivors keenly listening to the words reminding them of that fateful day. 
It started as another day 
Like so many gone before 
Life getting another dawn 
To mark a distance between you and us. 
Familiar voices, shouts and cries 
Sounds of a Friday kind 
Will never cease in our lives 
You paid for the price 
For a cause you never knew 
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God drew you nearer 
And Nairobi let you go. 
But although you've left us  
Know that you did not go alone 
For a part of us went with you 
The day you dissolved in our eyes 
Our wound still bleeds 
Our tears still flow 
For you are silent and gone. 
But that look of hope in you 
Gives us strength and drives us on 
You'll always be beside us 
In all we say and do 
You were a great treasure. 
In communicating the loss through the poem’s soothing words, the survivors’ experience of 
the trauma is kindled. They respond to the recital by occasional nodding of their heads in 
agreement with the wording, though otherwise remaining silent throughout its recital. By 
emotionally engaging with the recital, their traumas are brought into conscious life and 
released through the murmured discussions (of personal narrative) that ensue after the poem’s 
narration facilitating both individual and collective healing. (Antz & Lambek, 1996:125-126). 
 
This is followed with a performance by Safari Sounds Choir under the stewardship of Ken 
Indiasi. Their highlight is the song, ‘Luwere’,60 a popular rendition adapted from a traditional 
Abaluhya
61
 funeral dirge exhorting the relatives to accept that the deceased has transited to 
another life.62 
 
Luwere khulanga baba....! luwere......! luwere.....! 
                                                            
60An Afro-fusion version by Valentine Kasa adapted from a traditional Abaluhya dirge. 
61 A Bantu-speaking ethnic group constituting about 16% of Kenya’s population and the second-largest 
community in Kenya. 
62Explanation of meaning provided by Ray Balongo, an Abaluhya member of several choir groups in Nairobi. 
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Luwere khulanga baba.....! luwere, luwere Nyasaye akhulinde...!  
Luwere khulanga khocha....! luwere......! luwere.....! 
Luwere khulanga khocha..... luwere, luwere Nyasaye akhulinde...!  
The words of the song are repetitive; the only change is that a new kinship relation of the 
living to the deceased is introduced in every stanza. 
Mr Indiasi, the soloist, is a good singer and dancer who can manipulate the emotions of the 
singers taking them through a variety of singing and emotional landscapes. This song created 
a cheerful and danceable environment for the participants, and more so the survivors, who 
join the choir in dancing and chanting notwithstanding some of their disabilities.  
 
Fig.3.10: The survivors join Safari Sounds Choir in dance, Nairobi, 2011 
 (Photo: Kiprop Lagat). 
 
Being cheerful in the context of mourning is consistent with the Abaluhya belief that the dead 
person has been born in the world of the spirits, emakhombe (Alembi, 2002). 
 
The final item in the programme is the Chairman’s speech. Mr Mwadama started by 
reminding everyone that the event commemorates all the 218
63
 people that died during the 
bomb blast and pays tribute to the over 5,000 others that suffered permanent injuries or lost 
                                                            
63 The names of the suicide bombers were not included in the memorial. It would have perhaps been awkward to 
memorialize them in the same monument yet their actions led to the death of  218 people. It would have 
complicated the healing by constantly  reminding the survivors of those responsible for their suffering. 
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loved ones. He appreciates all those in attendance while castigating the Kenyan government 
for neglecting them, as demonstrated by their absence from the event. He states that such 
events in other countries are given importance by the government, as it is the state’s citizens 
that died. He summarizes the challenges encountered by the survivors: their ill health, an 
inability to educate their children, unemployment, poverty and the failure to get any form of 
compensation. He expresses their hope that with the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 
2011, victims of the Nairobi terror attack would be compensated from his vast wealth as had 
been ruled by Justice Bates.64 He reminds the attendees that while Osama was a Muslim, he 
did not perpetrate the act on behalf of Islam but as a murderer. He hopes that the government 
will change its mind and pursue compensation on behalf of her citizens. Stating that they will 
never forget what happened in 1998, he exhorts the survivors to continue united in 
demanding justice and compensation. 
 
The performances enacted during the annual commemorations in the form of songs, poems, 
speeches and drama help survivors confront traumatic memory. Repeating these 
performances annually - albeit with different performers and narrations of personal 
experiences of the tragedy - enables the survivors to ‘process and master the trauma’ by 
integrating the repeatedly told story of the bombing and its effects with their own personal 
narratives. They gain greater control over their memories by retrieving them from their 
repressed status in the sub-conscious mind to consciousness and then get integrated and 
adapted to their present social circumstances. Each survivor is able to recount how he/she 
was individually affected by the bombing; as they share their experiences, the trauma gets a 
social context and meaning making sense of the loss. This way, the survivors construct 
narrative memories that become part of their history (Sturken, 2007; Antz & Lambek, 
1996:123). I suggest that the monuments in the park reinforce this integration of traumatic 
memory into narrative; their mere presence reminds the survivors of the tragic event. Pillemer 
(2004) posits that to be reminded about something painful - just like talking about it - 
although painful at first, produces long-term improvements in mood and indicators of well-
being. It is against this understanding that the commemorative events have facilitated healing 
of the traumatic effects of the Nairobi terror attack. 
                                                            
64See footnote 99. 
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3.2.3. Commemorating the Tragedy within the Family 
 
Having described the official annual public commemoration of the Nairobi terror attack, I 
now focus on commemoration of a different nature, one mainly organized at family level and 
attended only by family members and friends of the deceased; this, I refer to as ‘family 
memorialisation’. A few other families who lost relatives in this tragedy organize similar 
memorials but it would be hard to ascertain the number, as some are localized events that are 
not broadcast or advertised in the newspapers. While a majority of those who died in this 
tragedy worked in Nairobi, they were not buried in the city; their bodies were taken back to 
their rural homes where they originated. 
This Part describes one such memorial event held in memory of Mwangi Njuguna 65  in 
Maragwa on Saturday 6th August 2011, a day before the thirteenth anniversary of the bomb 
blast. 
 
I was informed of this event by one of the survivors of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack who 
worked with Mr Njuguna in Ufundi House and had earlier granted me an interview during 
this research. He accompanied me to Maragwa where he only introduced me as a friend. 
 
Mwangi Njuguna, a Kikuyu, then thirty-seven years old, worked in Ufundi House as an 
accountant. On August 7th 1998 he was in his office when the terror attack occurred. His body 
was identified by his family three days later in the City Mortuary and he was buried five days 
later. On discovery of his body, meetings to arrange for his funeral were held by his family, 
friends and colleagues both in Nairobi and in his Maragwa home. These meetings were 
mainly for arranging funeral logistics including the raising of funds to meet the funeral costs. 
A key component of these logistics was the obituary in the daily newspapers announcing the 
passing on of Mr Njuguna. In the obituary, the picture of the deceased, looking his best, was 
centrally placed in the advert followed by a statement of what caused the death – in this case, 
the bomb blast – and his close kinship relations are named. The date, time and place of the 
funeral are included. Obituaries, Davies (1994) asserts, are acts about memorialisation 
                                                            
65All names have been changed. 
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intended to constitute and project the identity of the deceased in public memory. Memory, 
individual and collective, is important for the constitution and maintenance of social identity 
(Anderson, 1991; Connerton, 1989). In Kenya, for instance, it is only close family members 
who write the obituary through a careful selection of what to include, especially the 
circumstances of death and a decision on kinship relations to be mentioned. In this way, they 
define the identity by which they wish to have the deceased remembered. The importance of 
this identity is underscored by the fact that the obituary is in many cases the final public 
notice of an individual’s existence. 
 
The family of Mr Njuguna does not attend the annual public commemorations of the 
bombing in Nairobi but organize their own at home for the family, friends and neighbours. 
The family members interviewed attributed their non-attendance at the Nairobi event to both 
the distance66 to be travelled and especially their family’s wish to have an event that brings 
them together in a kinship context. The commemoration in this case, therefore, serves to keep 
the memory of Njuguna in the family while strengthening the family bond and reinforcing 
their clan’s identity. 
 
The function started at 11.30 am; a prayer was said by a family member and was followed 
with a small self-introductory session. A few speeches are made by a family member, a friend 
to the departed and two neighbours before the sermon by the local priest. In his sermon, the 
priest exhorted the gathering to do good deeds and be at peace with others since no one 
knows their day and time of death. He reminded them to celebrate and continue remembering 
Mr Njuguna as a loved member of the family who initiated projects67 that were beneficial to 
his family and their neighbours. He reminds the family members of their collective 
responsibility in caring for Mr Njuguna’s family, as he would have done. 
 
Those with wreaths are then led to the graveside to place them there while others scatter 
flowers. On the gravesite is an assemblage constituting of a Christian cross that has pinned 
onto it a memorial plaque indicating the deceased’s dates of birth and death and bearing the 
words ‘though you’ve physically gone from our midst you shall forever live in our hearts’. 
                                                            
66 It takes about one and a half hours of travel from Maragwa to travel to Nairobi. 
67He was the treasurer of the Mai Maitu water project that enabled his villagers access piped water. 
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The cross is generally regarded as a Christian symbol for resurrection and after-life and a 
universal symbol signifying death, a common Western visual memory (Margry & Sanchez-
Carretero, 2011). Only sixty-one people attended the event. In this particular event, the 
speeches and sermon and the material culture presented at the graveside, such as the cross, 
will safeguard the transmission of Njuguna's memory into the future. 
 
3.2.4. Commemorations: A Comparative Perspective 
 
As mentioned earlier, the numbers of those attending the annual commemorations at the 
Memorial Park have been on a downward path, an indication that many of the survivors and 
families of the bereaved have either healed or the focus is shifting towards commemoration 
of individual deaths in events held at the family level. This study suggests that both could be 
happening. It may be obvious, though true, stating that with time many of the survivors that 
sustained minor injuries have physically healed hence no longer see the need to attend these 
ceremonies. On the other hand, others have accepted that they indeed were victims of a 
terrorist bombing but have incorporated the trauma into their personal narrative of life and 
need not frequently attend the commemorations. It is also arguable that with the pursuit of 
compensation continuing as a central and dominant theme of the commemorations a decade 
and more on, many of the survivors no longer find it relevant to attend and have opted for 
more family-oriented events for remembrance to heal their own personal trauma. This view is 
supported by statements made during Mr Njuguna’s 13th commemoration and an interview 
with Pamela Githaiga.68 
 
Notwithstanding the emerging preference for ‘family memorialization’ by families of victims 
of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack, the national commemorative events held on the 7th August 
at the Memorial Park remain important – more so because the bombing was a national 
tragedy affecting people from different backgrounds. This underscores the appropriateness of 
consecrating a national memorial through the creation of lieu de mémoire (Nora, 1998). The 
Memorial Park will continue to represent the national memory of the bombing tragedy. 
 
                                                            
68 See page 132-134 
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Mr Njuguna’s memorial event, apart from bringing the family and close friends together, also 
had an impact on the community. By participating in the event, the Maragwa community 
contributed towards the creation of localized narratives of the tragedy; the speeches, 
performances and the assemblage of notes, flowers and memorabilia laid on his grave on this 
day, helps heal this community where Njuguna had integrated. 
 
This study also noted that on the 7th August, some Kenyans, survivors and families of the 
bereaved, engage in several activities to commemorate this day ranging from attending 
church service, visiting the sick, and having family memorials. Gillis (1994: 14) observes 
that, “… people now prefer to dedicate more time to the local, ethnic, and family memory, 
often using the national calendars and spaces including new ones69 for these new purposes”. 
 
Part III: Conclusion 
 
In this chapter on 'The August 7th Memorial Park: Memories and Commemorations', I argued 
for the place of visual and performing art as an important medium in the production and 
transmission of memories of the August 7
th
 Nairobi terror attack. The chapter further 
discussed the role of these forms of art and the annual commemorations in providing the 
survivors with a platform to share their personal experiences and to be reminded of what 
transpired on that fateful day. Purposeful remembrance, as happens during the annual 
commemoration, enable the survivors to 'work through' the tragedy which eventually paves 
the way to the production of more socially aware and integrated accounts, a state in which 
healing is made possible. 
 
I first discussed the production of memories of the tragedy through the work of three artists 
namely, Renee Klarenbeek, Patrick Mukabi and Thom Ogonga who had set out to document 
what Kenyans thought of their newspapers' headline news by encouraging them to put down 
their reactions in a billboard they had erected along Aga Khan Walk, one of Nairobi's busiest 
walkways. The bombing provided these artists with a new subject of focus, the terror attack. 
This indeed became among the first effort to document the memories of the Nairobi terror 
                                                            
69Emphasis is mine. 
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attack. Messages in the 'Daily Billboard, were later curated as an exhibition at the Nairobi 
Museum in a collaborative effort of the three artists, Kuona Trust and the museum itself. 
Here again, for a period of one month, the exhibition provided its visitors with a context for 
reflection and remembrance facilitating the production of further memories of this tragedy. A 
second exhibition titled, the 'Bomb Terror' organized by artist Shine Tani at the Goethe 
Institute, Nairobi, was yet another endeavour by the artists to create narratives of the tragedy 
based on their own experiences of the bombing. While this was intended to produce a 
narrative of the tragedy, the exhibition was also aimed at helping the people manage the 
collective trauma resulting from the bombing tragedy. 
 
The creation of the Documentation Centre in the August 7
th
 Memorial Park builds on the 
efforts of previous exhibitions on this subject by providing its visitors with an in-depth 
understanding of the scale of the tragedy that befell Nairobi on that fateful day. The 
exhibition here takes us through a journey that starts with a serene Nairobi prior to the attack, 
then the chaotic scenes arising thereafter, the physical effects of the bomb - on the buildings 
and individuals-, the survivor-stories, the commemorations, and finally a record of the 
visitors' stories. By taking the visitors through such a journey, the Documentation Centre 
becomes an important venue for the production and transmission of the collective memories 
of August 7
th
 1998 bombing. 
 
Of what importance is the production and transmission of collective memories of the 
tragedy? In the second part of this chapter, I demonstrated how the commemorations at the 
Memorial Park, to quote Williams (2007: 6), have “continued to provide a socially supportive 
context for private grieving, reminding people that their loved ones did not die alone and that 
neither are they alone in their grieving state”. This study noted that the performances enacted 
during the annual commemoration in the form of songs, poems, speeches and drama help the 
survivors in confronting traumatic memory. The narrations of personal experience of the 
tragedy have further enabled the survivors to ‘process and master the trauma’ by integrating 
the repeatedly told story of the bombing and its effects with their own personal narratives 
hence facilitating the healing process. While narrations of personal experience have not been 
treated as performances in this body of work, they nevertheless constitute helpful practices 
that complement visual and performing art in the production and mediation of traumatic 
memory.  
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The discussions in this chapter, on the role of visual and performing art in creating and 
transmitting the memories of the tragedy, foreshadows the discussions of my next chapter. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the traumatic memories experienced by the survivors by 
demonstrating through examples how other forms of visual and performing art have 
supported the efforts towards provision of closure, hence supporting one of my central 
arguments in this body of work. 
Chapter 4: Trauma Memory and Healing 
 
4.0. Introduction 
 
In my previous chapter, I discussed the various forms of visual art that contributed to help the 
survivors of the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi to come to terms with the 
trauma induced by this tragedy. I focussed not only on the visual art programmes including 
exhibitions that were curated to document the bombing, but also on the annual 
commemorations and their importance in enabling the survivors convert their ‘traumatic 
memories’ to ‘narrative memory’ through their testimonies and interactions. 
 
This chapter builds on the discussions in chapter 3, first by considering the understanding of 
trauma memory as adopted in this study, then looking at the specific methods employed in 
trauma healing. While the survivors were offered medical rehabilitation, it is noted that 
priority was given to those requiring surgical interventions, those who lost limbs, the blind 
and the deaf to restart their lives again; less attention was paid to processes geared towards 
making the survivors understand and manage the traumatic effects of the bombing. 
 
In Part I of this chapter, I discuss the approaches used in managing the traumatic effects of 
the tragedy. I begin with a description of trauma experience as narrated to me by Peterson 
Ngije
70
 and then a first-person account narration of Michael Kamau in their search for 
healing. I elected to use survivors’ personal narratives in this chapter because by allowing 
them to recount their own experiences of the tragedy, “….it validates the idea advanced by 
Janet
71
 that the goal of therapy is to convert ‘traumatic memory’ into ‘narrative memory’ by 
getting the patient to recount her history” (Antz & Lambek, 1996: 120). Turning ‘narrative 
memory’ into stories is one of the prerequisites for trauma memory healing as will be 
discussed in what is to follow. 
 
Part II of the chapter discusses the role of social support networks such as those provided by 
family and friends, victims’ associations and religion that were used to manage the traumatic 
                                                            
70 Personal interview, Nairobi, 22.11. 2011 
71 A Psychologist hailed by recent theorists of trauma as a pioneer in developing a fully-formulated mnemo-
technology for the treatment of the trauma victim. 
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effects of the bombing. Here, I again, allow a narration of how the victims’ association works 
with a view to revealing the nature of support it offers its members. 
 
Lastly, Part III focuses on the role of performance and visual art in the healing process. The 
use of music for memory and healing in the aftermath of the tragedy is discussed, as is the 
role of film.  
 
Part I: Trauma Memory and Psychotherapy 
  
There exist various versions of what constitutes trauma memory. 72  Whilst its precise 
definition is in contest, Caruth (1995:4) suggests that it is part of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) and identifies key elements that have been generally agreed upon. That is, 
“there is a response, sometimes delayed, to an overwhelming event or events, which takes a 
form of repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts, or behaviours stemming from 
the event, along with numbing that may have begun during or after the experience, and 
possibly also increased arousal to (and avoidance of) stimuli recalling the event”. The victims 
of trauma memory are ordinarily unable to remember the incident but are haunted by dreams 
and nightmares during which the event replays itself and is perpetually re-experienced in a 
painful traumatic present. Additionally, the victims “suffer strange behaviours, unremitting 
pain, extraordinary physical sensations, and irrational fears as the consequence of the 
pathological-brain-mind-behaviour-body connections caused by traumatisation” (Ruden, 
2011:1; Herman, 1992:37).  
 
While there are limited studies in Africa of PTSD following terrorist attacks, findings of a 
study conducted by Operation Recovery (OR)
73
 between the first and third months after the 
Nairobi terror attack, accords with the key characteristics discussed by Caruth (ibid). Their 
findings reveal that PTSD in Nairobi occurred in 35% of the victims whose symptoms 
altogether satisfied the criteria of PTSD. The characteristics included experiencing dreams of 
the bombing, sleeplessness, re-experiencing of the bombing, hyper-arousal, numbing, fear of 
                                                            
72. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) considers 
‘traumatic memory’ as part of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that is characterised by a varied number 
of symptoms that could include obsessive reliving of the traumatic experience, in others the inability to 
remember it at all. Other symptoms they list include: depression, eating disorders, mood swings, voices in the 
head, sleep difficulties, sexual problems and so on. 
73 Operation Recovery was part of the consortium offered the consultancy by USAID. 
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tall buildings and helplessness (Njenga et. al., 2004). Their findings further revealed that the 
factors predisposing victims to PTSD in this particular tragedy included - but were not 
limited to - female gender, unmarried status, seeing the blast, injury and delayed recovery, 
not confiding in a friend or family, bereavement and financial difficulties since the blast.  
The two case studies I present in this chapter include the victims constituting the 35% 
affected by trauma in the study undertaken by Operation Recovery in 1998. The two, 
Peterson Ngije and Joseph Kamau, indeed attended the OR Mental Health Crisis clinic that 
was devoted to victims of the blast. The symptoms of trauma affecting them accord with what 
is described by Njenga et al (ibid). I first report the survivors’ personal experience of trauma 
below, then consider the manner in which counsellors help a patient work towards healing.  
 
4.1.1. Survivors’ Perspectives  
 
Peterson Ngije:
74
 A Personal Experience of Trauma 
 
Peterson Ngije, then aged 49, had just alighted from a bus outside the Cooperative Bank 
Building on Haile Selassie Avenue and was on Aga Khan Walk heading towards Harambee 
Avenue when he heard something akin to a gun-shot. He thought there were robbers trying to 
raid the Cooperative Bank, or any other bank in the area and continued minding his own 
business, but within seconds, his world turned upside down. Suddenly, everything was 
engulfed in darkness; he only regained his consciousness later that day in a hospital ward at 
the Kenyatta National Hospital with cuts all over his body and a fractured leg. He also 
suffered neck, head and scrotal injuries that required corrective surgery. The surgery 
worsened his condition as it led to partial paralysis of the left side of his body; it also 
interfered with his manhood. The latter creates a lot of anxiety in him; he fears that his wife 
might run away or become unfaithful. This has occasionally made him beat her for coming 
home late. His nights are also traumatizing, many involving dreams in which he sees the 
bombing replay as if it were happening in real-time. He talks of waking up relieved to realize 
it was nothing but just another bad dream. Mr Ngije also suffers from nasal congestions and 
has to frequently step aside to blow his nose, a habit he finds discomfiting75 and has made 
him avoid meetings. He has a phobia too, for any loud noise reminds him of the bombing, 
                                                            
74. Story used with permission; identities changed to respect confidentiality. 
75. As I interviewed him, he requested to step aside several times to clear his nasal passages.  
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thus, a tyre burst or the banging of doors especially while in a matatu76 still scares him, 
making travelling in them torturous.  
 
Prior to this incident, Mr Ngije was a businessman in Nairobi operating a hotel and 
supplementing his income working as a freelance audio-visual technologist. The income 
derived from these ventures enabled him to cater for his family. However, because of the 
injuries and ensuing medication costs, all his businesses collapsed. He was unable to educate 
his children through university. He faced the dilemma of whether to pay school fees and 
forego medication and vice versa; but his need for continued medical attention took 
precedence.  
 
Ngije initially found it very hard to accept that he was indeed a victim of the bombing and 
kept on questioning why it happened. He resorted to alcohol to forget what happened but also 
as a way of coping with the trauma, this however made life more difficult for his health 
continued to deteriorate. He once fell into a ditch in his drunken state and sustained multiple 
injuries, including of his already ‘broken leg’ and was admitted to hospital again. This 
marked the turning point of his life; he stopped drinking, found religion and henceforth 
preoccupied himself with church activities. He realized that he was lucky to survive the 
tragedy; others died.  
 
Mr Ngije attended the USAID-funded counselling sessions at the Amani Counselling Centre 
and Training Institute (ACCTI) but did not find the healing he sought as he was unable to 
afford bus fares to attend regular counselling sessions. He also considered the scheme unfair 
since counsellors were paid professional fees for their services yet the traumatized struggled 
on their own to make it to the venue.  
 
He appreciates the importance of the Memorial Park in reminding victims and others of the 
tragedy and for providing them a venue to meet. In his view its presence will continue 
reminding generations to come of this tragedy and probably deter others from committing 
acts of terrorism. His only regret is that the survivors do not get any financial support from 
the Memorial Park management yet it generates income recounting their tragedy.  
                                                            
76. Small mini-vans used as public transport vehicles in Kenya that are characterized by the conductor hitting its 
roof or door to beckon the driver to stop and let passengers on or off.  
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He forgave the terrorists believing they were misled by Osama bin Laden, the proclaimed 
leader of Al Qaeda, to target the wrong people. He traces the origins of terrorism - manifest 
in the current geopolitical and religious polarisation pitting Islam against Judaism, and 
Christianity – to the biblical story of Abraham.77 Ngije avers that in order to understand 
terrorism one must be aware of its historical origins since its awareness absolves the present 
terrorists from their actions. Aspects relating to terrorism will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Joseph Chege Kamau: A Personal Experience
78
 
 
This is the story of Joseph Chege Kamau, then 49 years old, who worked at a restaurant 
located in Development House, a building opposite the then U.S. embassy.  
“On 7th of August I998, I reported to my place of work as usual at 9.00 am. I changed 
into my uniform and started my work in the dining at Mukawa Cafe, where I worked 
as a head waiter. I was serving a customer breakfast when I heard a big sound. The 
tray I carried flew out of my hands. The whole cafe was shaking, the building was 
shaking so violently, for a moment I thought it was an earthquake. Everything was in 
total confusion, pieces of glass were falling down. I fell down and could hear and feel 
people stumbling and stepping on me as they ran out of the cafe. I became 
unconscious and passed out. I do not know who took me out of the building,  
When I came to consciousness, I was all in shock and trembling. I was treated for 
shock but did not know my ears, head and stomach were affected at the time. But 
when my condition worsened I kept on going to the hospital and I am still under 
medication. My head problems are more painful than all the others. I attended 
                                                            
77. Jews are believed to be descendants of Abraham through Isaac with whom God made a covenant while the 
Arabs descended from Ishmael born of Abraham’s relation with Hagar, a slave serving Sarai, Abraham’s first 
wife. Ishmael was thrown into the desert in order not to inherit Abraham. Some people, like Peterson Ngije 
offers his own interpretation of this biblical story to trace terrorism to the hatred generated in the differences 
between the descendants of the two sons. 
78.The story is not edited to avoid any misrepresentation of the feelings and the experience of the trauma it 
embeds. It is adopted from a real-life experience story told by Mr Kamau during one of the evaluation 
workshops to assess the success of the 'Crisis Mental Health Programme' offered to survivors by ACCTI. 
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Kenyatta National Hospital and Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) clinic before being 
referred to Amani and AMREF79 where we are still receiving medical assistance.  
When AMREF took me in, I was a battered man with no future ahead of him. The 
scenes, the pictures, the wailing, the memory of 7th of August was still fresh. I started 
the long road to recovery, which is still incomplete due to the present state of my 
mind, though, I am in better shape.... 
Allow me to thank Amani Counselling Centre who have also been of great help to us 
and especially in psychiatric cases. Like said earlier ...dizziness has never left me in 
peace ever since 7th of August, 98. Along with it comes 'head attacks', I call them 
'head attacks' because they are not headaches that require Panadol, 80  but more 
sophisticated attention. When this arises, to my surprise they sometimes last up to ten 
days. ….. It is in Amani that I found a counsellor who really understood the problems 
I have been facing in social life, at home and when I am lonely. I do not know what 
will happen to such problems when the programme is phased out because I have not 
had enough counselling sessions. It is my prayer here that it will extend. Surely, even 
if the programme is phasing out you cannot afford to leave people with no heads. I 
mean we have psychiatric problems and cannot do counselling to ourselves. This 
creates room for fear in me, uncertainty, frustration and anger.  
Let me also thank ADRA81 for the rehabilitation they have given to us ….in the form 
of the business workshop at Wida Hotel. These taught us how to depend on ourselves. 
Here I would like to state that sick people do not take care of themselves. They need 
attention. While I agree that most people can go about their daily lives, there are 
others who are still traumatised by the horrific scenes of the bomb, I being one. I am 
scared of loud voices, trains, aeroplanes and trucks.  
Turning back to Amani, I would like to request them to allow me to have access to 
their counsellor in future because the time I am writing this letter, my home is not all 
well as my wife left me on Thursday 6th of June 200I and is not yet back. We have 
                                                            
79 African Medical Research Foundation. 
80 A common pain killer that is sold off the counter and requires no prescription.  
81 Adventist Development Relief Agency. They provided support in training and micro-enterprises development 
and granted small business loans to survivors. 
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been having misunderstandings since I started working after the bomb blast. When 
this happens, I always get back to sickness, head attacks, ulcers, my whole body gets 
sick. I then start feeling that I am backsliding.  
In order to say a job well done, the United States should complete healing the 
victims and then “pull out" of the project. Most people I included have not fully 
recovered and still require medication. When they phase out in September they will 
still leave many scars not healed. The silent suffering Kenyans will be left 
hopelessly sick by a Government that came in like a good Samaritan to help the 
victims.  
A disaster can befall anybody or any society, and people should be taught to 
sympathise instead of side-lining the affected, making them feel unwanted in society. 
Those of us who are here are members of one family joined together by a national 
disaster that affected us all Kenyans."  
 
Before I return to elaborate on the effects of 'trauma memory' and their therapies, some of 
which were employed in addressing symptoms of PTSD in the victims of the Nairobi tragedy, 
I wish to reflect on Linenthal's (Sturken, 2002: 1143-1144) discussion of the effects of the 
1995 terrorist bombing of Oklahoma City, USA. He “tells the story of the bombing aftermath 
as a tension of three conflicting narratives: the progressive narrative, in which the response to 
the bombing is characterized in terms of local pride and the American heartland; the 
redemptive narrative, through which religious concepts are deployed to evoke a 
transcendence and in which the bombing allowed people to find the best in themselves; and a 
toxic narrative, about the on-going and painful effects of the bombing that remain within the 
community.” 
 
The categorization of trauma narratives by Linenthal offers a framework for understanding 
the effects of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack on its survivors. In this particular chapter, I find 
resonance in the 'toxic narrative' and 'redemptive narrative'; the former echoing the 
experiences of alcoholism, family separation and violence while the latter, with the attempts 
to find religion and adopting positive attitudes in life as narrated by the two survivors in our 
case study. The stories of many other victims of the bombing tragedy strikes resonance with 
what happened in Oklahoma City. 
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The stories of Ngije and Kamau recounted above resonate with other stories and experiences 
that are told across the city by many of the over 5,000 affected people. It is a story that tells 
of the suffering experienced by the survivors and their struggles to come to terms with it. The 
most traumatized of the Nairobi terror attack survivors are those who were directly exposed 
to the tragic event. Interviews with the survivors, including Messrs Ngije and Kamau, reveal 
that they were among hundreds of those who were physically rendered immobile and helpless 
– coming back to consciousness at the Kenyatta National Hospital - while trying to escape 
from the disaster. They have first-hand experiences of its sound, smells and images. They 
directly witnessed death and the disembowelling of persons, and their lives have been 
permanently altered by the dead or by injury of a loved one. 
 
These narrative accounts present the common manifestations of traumatic memory 
experiences, including the following: anxiety, dreams reliving the bombing, phobia for tall 
buildings and noise, exploding blast especially unexpected, fear of breaking glass, loneliness, 
prolonged bouts of headache, feelings of hopelessness, unexplained anger, and lamentations. 
Besides these are cases of family instability, substance abuse and violence. It is indeed those 
who were affected in this significant way who experienced trauma memory with the 
repetitive reliving of the encounter reportedly common.  
 
4.1.2. Trauma Healing 
 
The repetitive reliving of the bomb attack, including the inherent trauma, can only be dealt 
with if the event from which it derives is interpreted and retold as a narrative. The process 
involves bringing traumatic memory back from their repressed storage – where they are often 
experienced as dreams, phobias, flashbacks or pain – to the conscious life in order to recreate 
the ‘narrative flow of history’. This is achieved through a reinterpretation of the traumatic 
past conjoined to the present to tell a meaningful story; “heretofore meaningless and 
troubling behaviours and experiences are stitched together to memories …, and so one 
acquires a new past. Symptoms are regarded as symbols or encapsulated representations of 
actual events, and as time goes on they become the basis of fully discursive memories in 
which their meaning is at last made clear” (Antze & Lambek, 1996:161). In discussing 
trauma memory victims of the Nairobi terror attack, it is acknowledged that the performances 
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at the Memorial Park, the experiences the survivors share, the music and films performed and 
watched respectively, are all efforts towards narration of the tragedy. Caruth (ibid: 153) 
warns … “the transformation of trauma into a narrative memory that allows the story to be 
verbalized and communicated, to be integrated into one’s own, and others’, knowledge of the 
past, may lose both the precision and the force that characterises traumatic recall.” 
Converting a traumatic event into narrative memory carries the risk of distortion or forgetting 
certain elements since the victims are likely to tell only that which they find comfortable. 
Ruden (2011) offers an alternative way, suggesting that the traumatic memories encoded 
already in the brain – with a perceived impossibility of processing the emotion-generating 
event – can be made possible through decoding. He steers away from commonly applied 
trauma therapies like psychotherapy82 and psycho-pharmacology;83 instead he articulates a 
psycho-sensory84 approach based on havening85 as a means of decoding traumatic memory, 
and for therapy. While it is not appropriate in this study to delve into the detailed workings of 
these approaches, I note that a mix of approaches is being used in attending to the traumatic 
victims of the bombing tragedy experience. My discussion of the healing power provided by 
performing and visual arts, a central aspect of this study, mirrors some aspects of Ruden’s 
psycho-sensory approaches.  
 
A disaster of the magnitude of the terror attack psychologically traumatizes far and wide, 
hence calling for concerted efforts of institutions and individuals qualified in mental health 
management programmes. An initial effort at trauma management took the form of religious 
comfort and counselling offered by a loose coalition of religious counsellors bringing 
together the All Saints Cathedral, Holy Family Basilica, Nairobi Baptist Church and St 
Andrews Church under its ‘Beyond the Disaster Counselling Programme’. This study did not 
find any documentation showing the efficacy of this programme, though many of those who 
attended the prayer and counselling sessions affirmed their healing nature. Meanwhile, the 
Kenya Medical Association (KMA) took control of the coordination of professional services 
under the banner of ‘Operation Recovery’ (OR). They engaged in an awareness campaign to 
highlight the psychological effects of the bomb on the population and debriefed them. 
                                                            
82Using language or conversation to engender and alter certain responses to memory in traumatized people. 
83The use of chemicals (drugs) to change mood, sensation, thinking and behaviour of a traumatized person. 
84. An approach that utilizes the various forms of sensory triggers to alter brain response. The five sensory 
senses are implied. 
85. Trauma-treatment focused on ‘touching’ as a means to activate the emotional components of an emotional 
event. 
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Debriefing, documentation, counselling, and psychological treatment were commenced with 
each component coordinated by a different organization.86 Various local institutions provided 
financial support for these programmes before USAID stepped in by way of a five-year 
package of assistance totalling $42.3 million allocated by the U.S. Congress between 1998 
and 2003. A small proportion totalling $2.8 million87 was allocated for medical treatment and 
care for those who sustained injuries and to rehabilitate small business ventures directly 
destroyed by the bombing; an amount not available to provide for the survivors’ post-
hospitalization medication. By this time, the survivors were in the process of recovery.  
To offer long-term recovery support in a more coordinated way, USAID solicited proposals 
from leading mental health agencies in Nairobi for the completion of this programme. In 
2000, ACCTI was awarded a two-year contract to sustain its implementation.  
 
The goal of this programme as set out by ACCTI was “to provide mental health assistance to 
people affected by the bomb on 7
th
 August 1998 and to enable them to cope with the effects 
of the disaster” (ACCTI, 2002). To realize this goal, four objectives were set: to ensure 
people affected by the bomb have access to mental health services; to provide knowledge, 
skills and attitude change regarding the psychological management of disaster trauma; to 
reach out to survivors and their families to create awareness and sensitivity about Crisis 
Mental Health; and to develop a comprehensive research and documentation programme for 
all internal and external documents with statistical reporting. The programme identified four 
target groups: primary victims - people directly hit by the bomb blast; the bereaved – people 
whose relatives died in the blast; rescue workers – people who participated in rescuing the 
injured and recovering the bodies; and community members – people who lived or worked 
near the bomb blast site. 
 
This study identified objectives one and three that aimed at - ensuring people affected by the 
bombing have access to mental health services; and reaching out to survivors and their 
families to create awareness and sensitivity about Crisis Mental Health - most applicable to 
its research goals. These are relevant to my analysis of traumatic memory healing emanating 
                                                            
86. Kenya Red Cross sub contracted the components to implementing partners such as Neema Counselling and 
Training Centre, Oasis Counselling and Training Centre, Lifespring Counselling and Training Centre, and 
Nairobi Psychotherapy Services and Institute. 
87. A U.S. response factsheet to a special report in the Sunday Nation, March 21st 1999 regarding U.S. 
government response to the August 7th bombing. 
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from the bombing for they deal directly with the survivors and their families while objectives 
two and four pertain to training of mental health providers, documentation and publishing of 
the Crisis Mental Health Programme respectively. 
 
The success achieved under objective one indicates that 1,937 bereaved and rescue workers 
were counselled against a target of 900 persons; psychiatric treatment was provided to 212 
affected adult-survivors with severe psychological disorders against a target of 142; 1687 
child-survivors were counselled against a target of 300; and 38 clinical supervisory meetings 
held against a target of 48. Betty Munge,
88
 a therapist at ACCTI explained that their 
intervention entailed having one-on-one personal therapy sessions with the ‘patients’ or by 
putting them in smaller groups, of between four and six persons, in which the ‘patients’ are 
provided with an environment that encourages them to dialogue, cultivate trust and open up 
in sharing their experiences of traumatic memory. Oral narratives, drawing and writing are 
also encouraged. Therapists guide them to become positive in their thinking by accepting the 
reality of the bombing and learn to accommodate some of its effects – loss of sight, physical 
disability, loss of income, and so on – in their life. 
 
The achievements realized under ACCTI’s objective three focussed on outreach programmes. 
Statistics indicate that 1349 child-survivors, 1123 adult-survivors living in Nairobi and the 
surrounding environs, 529 families living upcountry, and 209 permanently or seriously 
injured survivors were helped against a target of 1500, 1260, 300 and 300 respectively. In 
addition, 8 family- cum-children’s events and 10 community meetings were conducted as 
planned. Sixty-one audio-visual programmes each lasting between 30 and 45 minutes were 
broadcast by radio and television stations with national outreach, while 7950 posters and 
8000 pamphlets were printed and distributed meeting the set targets. Most of the targets were 
not just successfully met but exceeded. 
 
Of interest to this study is the form taken by these psychotherapy programmes, particularly as 
concerns community and children’s events as well as the audio-visual media outreach. They 
employed dance performance, recital of poetry, puppetry, and story-telling that helped the 
survivors reconnect their emotions to the tragedy leading to a recounting of their trauma. 
Sharing of traumatic memories enables the survivors to integrate the trauma in their personal 
                                                            
88. Personal interview, Nairobi, 10.10.2011. 
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lives making it more present and more real. This supports the argument in this study that 
performance and visual art are important in helping the bereaved come to terms with tragic 
loss (Winter 1995). This position is further supported by Van der Kolk's (2002: 8) 
observation that until the advent of modern psychological treatments and psycho-
pharmaceuticals, many societies made use of theatre and ritual, and visual art
89
 to deal with 
communal trauma.  
 
In view of the large numbers of people affected by this tragedy, it is difficult to accurately 
state the impact of the Crisis Mental Health Programme, though anecdotal reports during 
ACCTI workshops indicated positive changes of attitude. There were both short-term gains 
with immediate results and more gradual recovery. The success of the ACCTI programme is 
corroborated by the testimonies of Messrs Ngije and Kamau in the preceding pages, both 
mention the positive therapy received from ACCTI. 
 
Part II: Social Support Networks 
 
Noting that hundreds, if not thousands of others, were not able to attend the counselling and 
psychotherapy sessions offered by ACCTI on a regular basis, what alternatives did this group 
have? I cite an argument advanced by Alfred Kibunja
90
 which suggests that in a context 
where a mass of individuals and communities have experienced trauma – such as in the case 
of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack – and where one-on-one counselling is practically 
impossible, traditional forms of healing are applied. He argues that there exist traditions and 
cultures of healing in traditional African societies that are based on an extensive network of 
kinship and social relations which have been passed on from generation to generation. This 
observation is supported by Watters (2010), an American psychologist who develops an 
argument that help us understand what constitutes African understanding of trauma. He posits 
that the biomedical model of trauma-healing – that we seem quick at adapting – is embedded 
in assumptions of Western culture and, therefore, not culturally neutral as its proponents 
would want the world to believe as it fails to understand other cultural contexts of managing 
mental health. In a comparative study of schizophrenia, Watters (ibid) and his team were 
                                                            
89. Emphasis is mine. 
90. Chairman of the Kenya Counsellors Association. 
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curious to find out why people in non-Western societies seemed to recover better. His 
findings
91
 validated a widely held belief that besides the strong bonds of family and kinship, 
access to a variety of socially accepted interventions aided the healing process. This finding 
supports my proposition that it is critical that trauma memory victims are assisted to re-
establish contact with their existing social support systems that are not only found in bonds of 
kinship relations, but victims associations and religious affiliations. I now turn to discuss the 
latter two in the context of the victims of the bombing tragedy.  
Religion is the other network that this study identified as being vital in providing closure to 
traumatic memory. Testimonies of those interviewed in this study revealed a number of 
people who claim to have managed the pain and trauma effected by the bombing through 
God's grace and fellowship of the church. Others like Ngije decided to find religion to justify 
the tragedy as having been willed by God to prepare him for a better life in the future; the 
thirteenth commemorative event, which I described in Chapter 3, witnessed testimonies by 
some survivors like Rahab Kamau (see page 89) of what God had done for them, and so on, 
and on. Many survivors subscribed to this therapeutic benefit derived from religion, in this 
case Christianity.
92
 This observation is supported by findings of a study undertaken by Zang 
et al (2013:202) on the post-disaster psychiatric disorders in the aftermath of the Nairobi U.S. 
embassy bombing. The study revealed that, “while religion does not necessarily play an 
important role in post disaster coping in every population, in Nairobi, however, even though 
religious coping was not the most common method of coping, it was rated as the most helpful 
method in this population that characterized itself as Christian and frequently church-going”. 
Seeking solace in religion, as discussed above, accords with the ‘redemptive narratives’ of 
trauma-healing referred to by Linenthal (Sturken, 2002) as it assists the traumatized to find 
meaning in an event that threatened the foundations of their belief. As a predominantly 
Christian nation, the death of many innocent Kenyan victims through the bombing indeed 
made some survivors question the existence of ‘an all-caring God’ who could allow such a 
terrible incident to be visited upon his faithful. 
 
Interviews with survivors of the bombing tragedy discussed in this chapter support the 
important role played by kinship and other social networks in providing healing to the 
                                                            
91. Findings published in 'The Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche. Published online by 
the Free Press. Http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10psyche-htm?. 
92 Njenga et al (2004) study found out that 96% of those he interviewed professed Christianity. 
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traumatized. In my previous chapter, I described what I termed as 'family memorialisation' 
and their importance in bringing family together in a kinship context reinforcing memory and 
healing. The speeches and performances, especially the drama, during the thirteenth 
commemoration also make references to the supportive roles of the family and other social 
relations in trauma. The formation of an association for the survivors, as discussed below, 
provides further elaboration of how such social networks contribute to the management of 
traumatic events. 
 
The survivors found it necessary to form an association to advocate for continued assistance 
and care of those who still needed long-term treatment beyond the funded period. This 
association would not only cater for mental health cases but address wider issues affecting the 
survivors and families of the bereaved. One such association is the August Seventh Bomb-
blast Victims Association (ASBVA), formed as an umbrella-body to represent all the 
survivors and families of the bereaved. Has the association been of assistance to the 
survivors? What role does it play in helping its members cope with the tragedy? The 
following section examines the role of this association in the context of these questions. 
 
4.2.1. The August Seventh Bomb-blast Victims Association (ASBVA) 
 
The events of August 7
th
 1998 bombing are vividly remembered by survivors of the Nairobi 
terror attack and the same could be said of many other Kenyans. Being remembered by many 
people implies that shared collective memories, as observed by Halbwachs (1992), have a 
remarkable capacity to create a sense of unity or ‘oneness’ among people who would 
otherwise have no meaningful sense of kinship. This fittingly applies to the atrocious attacks 
of August 7
th
 1998. It brought together otherwise unconnected persons sharing the traumatic 
experience to seek one another out and develop a fellowship on the strength of this common 
tie that is akin to ‘spiritual kinship’ (Erikson, 1995). This unity enables them to exchange and 
share experiences, including suffering, in ways that help them to heal together as family and 
lessens their individual trauma. This is best illustrated by Pamela Githaiga’s experience here 
below. 
 
‘On Friday August 7th 1998, I was expecting to be discharged from Matter Hospital 
after successfully delivering my baby. My husband, Lawrence Githaiga, who worked 
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as a Clerical Officer in Ufundi Cooperative Society visited me at around 10 .00 am 
but could not discharge me from hospital as he did not have enough money due to an 
on-going bankers strike. He left for his office promising to come back as soon as he 
succeeded since the bankers strike was expected to end that day. About half an hour 
after he left, I heard a blast but did not pay any particular attention immediately until 
it was televised on news shortly afterwards. Other than the U.S. embassy building, the 
bomb affected other buildings within its precincts with fatalities and injuries being 
reported. I then felt a cold chill go up my spine as I knew my husband, who worked in 
Ufundi Cooperative Building - sandwiched between the embassy and Cooperative 
Bank - must have reached town, and could have become a victim. No sooner than this 
realization hit me, everything went blank and mute. I could not even construct an 
image of him until four days later when we found his body in the City Mortuary. 
 
I was overwhelmed by shock and grief; it took me a while to accept that I indeed had 
lost my husband. Friends and relatives assisted in making the burial arrangements as I 
was still too weak. Even before the funeral, my in-laws started making demands of 
one nature or another. They came to my house and demanded anything that belonged 
to him including furniture and any money I could have received from the Njonjo 
Commission
93
 to assist in the funeral arrangement. Six months after my husband’s 
death and funeral, this relationship deteriorated further to the extent that I abandoned 
my matrimonial home. 
 
I lost my casual job with an Asian Factory in the Industrial Area and started life anew 
without any support from my in-laws. I enrolled for driving lessons under the 
vocational training programme funded by USAID with hopes that I would get 
employment as a driver upon completion. This was, however, not to be since most 
employers could only engage experienced drivers. I thereafter enrolled for 
hairdressing lessons and on completion opened a salon whose income I currently 
depend on. 
 
                                                            
93 A national commission was set up by the President to coordinate the management of the disaster and its 
aftermath including assisting the victims’ families and survivors. 
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Though my kids were young when their father died, I explained to them the 
circumstances of his death and occasionally took them to the Memorial Park when 
they were young. The first time they went, it is the kids who went to the memorial 
wall in search of his name and on identifying it stood there gazing at it before 
kneeling down to pray for his soul. The kids are now teenagers and have made it a 
routine to visit the park during the annual commemoration for they find solace in so 
doing. The Memorial Park affords me and my children the opportunity to remember 
their father. I find it important for the names to remain in the Memorial Park to 
remind future generations of those who died as a result of the bombing. My faith in 
Christ assures me that we will reunite in heaven. 
 
I always felt lonely, isolated and depressed in the years following Lawrence’s death 
and more so after the disagreements with my brothers - and sisters- in- law. I therefore 
decided to join both the Association for Widows and the Injured (AWI) and ASBVA. 
AWI has particularly been very helpful in helping us cope with the trauma of losing 
our dear ones. We initially met on a monthly basis but the span of meetings has 
widened. Our meetings made us forget the pain and suffering we were going through 
as we sang, joked, danced and visited each other for encouragement. Singing and 
dancing made me feel happy. We also used these meetings to share skills and 
experiences that helped us start money-generating enterprises. I have, for instance, 
successfully taught hair-plaiting to two fellow widows in my group who now operate 
a hair salon in the same vicinity. 
 
My participation in ASBVA has however become infrequent since its hope for getting 
compensation for its members from the US government continues to fade by the day. 
These meetings have become mere talk-shops with no tangible results to show.’ 
 
In the aftermath of the 1998 bombing, many associations were formed to represent the 
interest of the Kenyan victims and help their families cope with multiple hardships - physical, 
emotional, mental, and financial – manifested differently. One such is the August Seventh 
Bomb-blast Victims Association formed in 2001 to collectively address the interests of all the 
survivors. The initiative to form the association was first mooted by the survivors on 
realization that the five-year funding period offered to them by the U.S. Congress for 
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medication, and social rehabilitation was fast approaching its end. Many beneficiaries were, 
however, still sick and required continuous medical attention; others had already lost their 
means of livelihood. In addition, compensation for the injuries sustained was not 
forthcoming. This scenario forced them to form an association to pressure the U.S. and 
Kenyan governments for renewed funding for this programme and to be compensated. It also 
aimed at approaching other organizations with altruistic intent to come to their aid. However, 
the U.S. government was emphatic that no additional funding would be granted and instead 
suggested that the victims seek support from their own government.94 Though the Kenyan 
government has been full of promises to assist the victims to get compensation from the U.S. 
government through diplomatic channels, this has only been rhetorical, as no demonstrable 
efforts have been witnessed. 
 
The association has, however, been instrumental in keeping the memory of the tragedy alive 
and in providing a platform for collective healing. The annual commemorations at the 
Memorial Park have since 2002 been organized and supported by members of the association 
with occasional help from well-wishers. It is only during the first, fifth, 95  and tenth 96 
anniversaries that the government was involved because President Moi and Prime Minister 
Raila Odinga presided over these particular annual commemorations. The speeches they 
made on these occasions reinforced the government’s view that the tragedy was a national 
tragedy to be remembered and commuted to national collective memory. 
 
The significance of the tenth anniversary is underscored by the fact that 2008 is the year that 
Kenya almost descended into a civil war, following the disputed presidential election results 
of December 2007. The performances through dance, song and poetry, extolling the virtues of 
peace and unity at a time the country was still recovering from the effects of the post-election 
violence was timely, if ironic. It is through collective acts of commemoration of tragedies, 
such as the 1998 bombing, that the country is stimulated to reflect on its other recent 
tragedies. To paraphrase Halbwachs (1992), it is the failure to remember such collective acts 
                                                            
94. See letter from U.S. Ambassador in Appendix 3. 
95. The fifth anniversary was deemed important because it coincided with the official opening of the Memorial 
Park’s Documentation Centre that President Moi had supported through a public-fundraising event. 
96. The American government was drawing a curtain over its support and involvement in anything to do with 
the tragedy on its tenth anniversary. They invited the Right Hon. Prime Minister with a view to informing the 
Kenyan government to continue from where they had reached. This was reflected in the statements they made 
and in later communication to his office.  
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through performances that tragedies easily get forgotten, especially if it pertains to violence 
such as the one experienced in 2008. 
 
The first few years following the formation of the association, its members met every 
Saturday at the Memorial Park to discuss ways to alleviate the physical, emotional and 
financial challenges they faced. In these meetings, they shared their tribulations and 
encouraged each other to remain strong and hopeful for the future. These meetings identified 
corporate organizations and individuals in Kenya to be approached for assistance regarding 
their medication, school fees needs, counselling and sources to be approached for loans for 
business ventures. No significant positive responses have been received from the identified 
organizations because they assumed many of them had already benefitted from the much 
acclaimed financial support from the U.S. government through USAID. Notwithstanding 
these deficiencies, the association plays a vital role in aiding the healing process through 
these weekly meetings. The frequency of these meetings has since decreased but a few active 
members continue to meet. The choice of the Memorial Park as their meeting venue is 
significant because it enables them to express their collective and shared knowledge of the 
bombing on which their sense of unity and individuality is based (Winter, 1995). 
 
The association, registered in 2001 with over 1000 members, has witnessed a decline in 
membership to 358, most of them now not active. Arguably, at the time of its formation many 
survivors were recuperating and needed emotional, social and financial support, which the 
association sought to offer. However, with psychotherapy, spiritual counselling and other 
social programmes offered by ACCTI and other organizations97 impacting positively, many 
opted out. This decline is also partly attributable to leadership wrangles in the association 
taking an ethnic dimension98 and hence disillusioning its membership. While membership of 
the association transcends ethnic categorization, ethnic identity remains a divisive issue in its 
leadership. The association is currently preoccupied pursuing reparations from the U.S. 
government’s Department of Justice; the recent ruling by Judge John Bates,99 a Washington 
Federal Judge, rekindled their hopes for compensation. He directed that families of those who 
                                                            
97. Among these was Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA), which provided support in training and 
micro-enterprises development and granted small business loans to survivors.  
98. Issues of ethnicity and national identity is the subject of discussion in chapter 5.  
99. ‘US Court Ruling Links Iran to Al Qaeda’. The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, Dec. 13, 2011.  
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died in the embassy bombing be compensated by Iran and Sudan for their culpability in 
supporting the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. 
 
The association solicited support of the government of Kenya in this quest for compensation 
without any success. Their hopes of getting compensation, in my view, is the only glue 
holding the association together, without which its operations are likely to cease.  
 
Part III: Performance and Visual Art 
4.3.1. Music as Therapy 
 
“Music connected me to the emotions of the day. It did in a way that no other art form can do 
(for me). It didn’t create the emotion, but it seemed to act as a conduit; a way to process fact 
and funnel it into feelings. Somehow, as a passionate music lover, I’d forgotten how powerful 
music can be”.  
 
The above statement by Bolen
100
 (2011) reminiscing on the music selection he played in the 
aftermath of September 11 on NP Radio in the US, supports the widely-held notion of the 
therapeutic power of music in ameliorating trauma experiences after a tragic event. In Kenya 
too, music was used to promote healing after the 1998 bomb blast tragedy.  
 
In the aftermath of August 7
th
 1998, music played an important role in the healing process as 
was demonstrated by the number of musical events that were organized with a view to 
helping people deal with some of the difficult emotions that arose at the time. From the 
singing of the national anthem – with its emphasis on peace, unity and patriotism – to special 
compositions dedicated to the victims of the tragedy, and fundraising concerts to help 
families of the victims and the survivors, music became one of the important therapies being 
employed to manage trauma. In the numerous ceremonies and services held to honour people 
who were killed or injured in the bombing, both individually and collectively, music was 
always played.  
 
                                                            
100 Bob Bolen, one of the persons responsible for National Public Radio (U.S.) programmes reflecting on his 
considerations for selection of music he used in his programme on the day of the September 11 bombing in the 
United States.  
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There were many musical compositions by Kenyan artists paying tribute to the victims and 
survivors, including: Mary Wambui’s gospel number ‘Lazima tuwe kama watoto’ offering 
encouragement to the survivors; Glamour Girls’ ‘Rose Wanjiku Mwangi’ dedicated to Rose’s 
fortitude for holding on for 40 hours although eventually dying before getting rescued; ‘Them 
Mushrooms’ ‘Twalia Bomb Blast’, Masinga Boys Bands ‘Bomu ya Nairobi’, Epha Maina’s 
‘Bomb tragedy’ decrying the loss of life emanated by the terrorist attack; and David Jomeli’s 
‘Sometimes I wonder’ questioning the reasons for the bombing. The songs reflect the 
collective narratives generated by the tragedy as then held by many Kenyans. 
Notwithstanding their musical categorization, these songs encouraged tolerance, empathy and 
recovery, perhaps in recognition of the therapeutic power of music.  
 
The ‘Pamoja101 Concert’ of 1999 was the culmination of efforts by different musicians to 
bring healing to the tragedy through music. OR in conjunction with Kenyan and international 
music promoters organized a concert to commemorate the first anniversary of the 1998 
bombing. The concert brought together all leading Kenyan musicians, local and foreign-
based,102 for a celebration of solidarity and unity to heal the nation after the tragedy. The 
highlight of the concert was the joint performance of the concert theme-song ‘Pamoja as 
One’ composed, arranged and produced by Pete Odera103 for the occasion. Its lyrics and 
arrangement follow:  
 
Mungu Baba, twakuomba/ Iangalie Kenya tena, utuponye mioyoni / Our Father, hear our cry once more / 
Help us heal as we pray, as we knock on heaven’s door 
Help us see a brighter day, helps us see a better way/ teach us not to be divided, heal our hearts make us 
united  
//Chorus// 
Pamoja as one, we stand hand in hand together / Pamoja as one, you and I, if we try, we can build a better 
land /We can build a better land 
//Verse// 
                                                            
101. Swahili word for ‘togetherness’. 
102. Leading foreign-based musicians in attendance included Sweden-based Swahili Nation, Eric Wanaina, 
Harrison Ngunjiri aka ‘Roughtone’, and Jabali Africa. 
103. Reproduced with the artist’s permission. Pete is one of Kenya’s leading gospel musicians; he was assisted 
by Susan Onyungu in writing this song. 
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Ndugu yangu, damu yakonami yangu /Rangi yake ni nyekundu, kulaumu kwanini?/ 
Oh my brother, why let anger grow and grow? / Forgive the past and let go, it will bring healing, don’t 
you know? 
//Channel// 
Help us see a brighter day/ help us see a better way / we have got to stop this fighting/ heal our hearts 
make us united  
//Chorus// 
Pamoja, pamoja, pamoja weh….// 
 
The song encapsulates Kenya’s disposition one year into the tragic bombing. Unity, 
forgiveness, healing and hope for a bright future are what all yearned for. The wordings 
repeated in the chorus throughout the song in a powerful way, evokes John Austin’s (1975) 
theory of speech acts where language has the efficacy of performing an action. Those who 
attended indeed found healing in the musical performances.  
 
According to Paul Okumu, Operations Recovery Communications Manager, 104 the Pamoja 
team brought together music cutting across family, hip-hop, benga, reggae, chakacha and rap 
as a reflection of the unity and compassion shown after the tragic August 7
th
 terrorist bomb 
blast. The selection of music and groups was intended to go beyond any tribal and political 
connotations, as demonstrated during the rescue itself.  
 
More than 10,000 people attended the concert at the Kenyatta International Conference 
Centre grounds in Nairobi, the bomb blast survivors included. Music, it can be asserted, 
helped people deal with the difficult emotions pertaining to this tragedy, it ameliorates stress 
by allowing the participants (read survivors) to ventilate their inner feelings and pain hence 
coming to terms with their suffering. All the proceeds from the concert were committed to 
assist the survivors that were still in need of urgent medication.  
 
 
                                                            
104. Quoted in East African Standard 3rd July 1999. 
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4.3.2. Use of Film in Mediating Trauma 
 
In the last section of the Documentation Centre’s exhibition gallery is a small room devoted 
to screening of films and documentaries relating to the 1998 bombing. These documentaries 
complement what is on display illustrating other equally important dimensions of the tragedy 
not explored in the museum. The Park’s management informed me105 that only three films 
have been screened in the exhibition space since its opening in 2004.  
 
The film, ‘Seconds from Disaster’, is part of an American documentary television series 
produced by the National Geographic investigating historically relevant man-made and 
natural disasters in different parts of the world. The one focussed on Nairobi re-enacts the 
events of the bombing in 1998, presenting the events chronological order and analysing the 
causes and circumstances that ultimately affected the tragedy. The film uses re-enactments, 
interviews, testimonials and advanced computer simulations to recreate the sequence of 
events up to the last second of the disaster.  
 
The second documentary ‘True Terror’ mirrors ‘Seconds from Disaster’ in simulating the 
sombre mood of the event. This three-part chronicle film starts by painting a busy, chaotic, 
and crowded cityscape then followed by a simulation of the bombing and the chaotic scenes 
that followed. The second part focuses on the rescue efforts of both amateur Kenyan and 
professionals flown in to help before a presentation of emotionally-moving survivor-stories 
including that of Douglas Sidialo, an ambitious sales executive blinded by the blast. One 
denominator shared by these two films is their focus of the actual bombing itself.  
 
Wanuri Kahiu’s ‘From a Whisper’ shifts its focus from the terrorist bombing itself to a 
realistic story of families coping with trauma. The film is centred on Tamani, a young girl in 
pursuit of the truth regarding the fate of her mother, Joyce Kezio, whom she is told by her 
dad, Sam, went missing in the aftermath of the bombing. That particular morning, the trio of 
dad, mum and daughter were in town; Joyce leaves Tamani with her dad in the car waiting as 
she enters a building next to the American embassy shortly before the bomb explosion. While 
disembarking from the car, she draws a heart-shaped image on their car’s side window to 
express her love for Tamani; an image that remains etched in her memory. In her efforts to 
                                                            
105. Personal communication with Lydia Gatwiri, Nairobi, 12th April 2011. 
141 
 
come to terms with her mother’s disappearance, she deploys this image and starts spray-
painting heart-shaped artworks and graffiti on the walls of the Memorial Park whenever she 
sneaked in. She signs the pieces, JK, her mother’s initials. Meanwhile her father plans 
sending Tamani against her will to the US to stay with her auntie rather than continue her 
artwork, which he feels constitutes wasting her life doing nothing meaningful.106 
 
Complaints of graffiti paintings – here considered as dirt - in and around the Park are reported 
to Abu, a police officer responsible for this area. Incidentally, Abu was aware of the paintings 
and had introduced them to his wife who developed a liking for them and had christened the 
artworks ‘heart pieces’. Instead of confronting Tamani for littering the park with graffiti, Abu 
becomes interested in her story.  
 
 
Fig.4.1: One of Tamani’s Heart Pieces.  
Adopted from the film ‘From a Whisper’. 
 
                                                            
106. Art is considered an extra curriculum activity in Kenyan public schools. Many parents therefore discourage 
their children from it instead preferring science-based subjects. Sam’s view is probably informed by this 
perspective. 
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The bombing equally traumatized Abu; one of the main perpetrators, Fareed, was a family 
friend. Interested in Tamani’s story, Abu searches the police records to find out the names of 
those who were reported and confirmed missing after the bombing tragedy. To his dismay, in 
the obituaries of the period, Abu discovers JK or Joyce Kezia was indeed one of the victims 
whose body was rightfully identified and buried. Abu shares this news with Tamani who on 
learning the truth confronts her father. Remorseful for having lied, he confesses hiding this 
truth thinking Tamani was too young to understand. This revelation does not make him 
rescind plans of sending her to the U.S. She shares her imminent departure to the U.S with 
Abu who advises her to request the father that on the day of departure, they first go to the 
Memorial Park en route to the airport. On the relevant day, the Memorial Park grounds are 
filled with red ‘heart pieces’ and some of Tamani’s paintings.  
 
Tamani’s artworks and the Memorial Park monuments takes Sam on a roller-coaster ride of 
emotions conjuring up memories of the life he shared with Kezia, the tragic event, and the 
enduring lie he told his daughter. The truth that his wife is truly gone confronts him at the 
Memorial Park, enabling him to discuss the bombing for the first time with Tamani in a 
family context. The discussion provides them with a chance to construct a family narrative of 
the loss. Integrated into their personal lives, the narrative makes the amelioration of their 
traumatic memory possible. It is through the acceptance of this new narrative that Sam 
acquiesces in Tamani’s request to remain at home.  
 
As I conclude this section focusing on films and documentaries, I find it necessary to draw 
the following conclusions. In the first two films, ‘True Terror’ and ‘Seconds to Disaster’, 
emphasis is laid on re-enactment and simulation of what could have actually transpired 
during the bombing. These techniques enable the illustration of acts that would have 
otherwise gone unseen or be deemed unbelievable. As Walker (1997:809) asserts, “they aim 
to fill with pictures the void created by the real impossibility to resurrect memory as shared 
and validated history”. By watching these documentaries, those who lost relatives and friends 
to the bombing are able to reconstruct imaginatively what their loved ones could have gone 
through completing the narratives they had formed of the tragedy. In so doing, they are able 
to ‘work through’ their trauma by forming and relating an almost accurate scenario of what 
occurred. Repeatedly, these documentaries assist the traumatized to process the trauma into 
narrative form and hence provide a framework for healing. This view is corroborated by 
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Penina Syokau’s107 testament of deriving her healing from watching documentaries of the 
bombing.  
 
Observations made in the Documentation Centre and confirmed by the centre’s curator 
corroborate the popularity of the films. Rarely does one find the corner where these films are 
screened empty, implying the desire by its visitors to learn more about what transpired on that 
morning in 1998. The reactions of the visitors vary, while others seem totally unmoved; a 
number come out in a sombre mood or even shed mournful tears. On interrogating one of the 
visitors
108
 as to why she was crying, she informed me that she was then a student at the 
Blanes Secretarial College in Ufundi House, which collapsed as a result of the bombing 
killing some of her classmates. Watching the film ‘Seconds from Disaster’, provides her with 
a site of mourning as she is able to see the building in which they died. It brings back the 
memories in such a powerful way that that she is able to see her classmates in what would 
have been their usual sitting arrangements. Having interviewed her on the occasion of the 14
th
 
anniversary of the bombing, led me to the conclusion that besides the monuments of the 
Memorial Park and the commemorative ceremony itself, the film becomes a site of memory 
in as far as it permits mourning to take place. Completing the mourning process is a 
prerequisite to attaining healing.  
 
Part IV: Conclusion  
 
I started this chapter with narrations of personal experience of trauma as experienced by two 
of its survivors. Giving them a voice to narrate how they experienced the bombing and the 
effect it had - or is still having - on their lives enables us to appreciate the gravity of the 
matter at hand and, more so, the trauma it engendered. The victims with non-physical injuries 
are not normally put high in the list of those to be prioritized for treatment when tragedies of 
such a magnitude occur. This is perhaps explained by the lack of adequate research on the 
effects of disasters on mental health in Africa despite the frequency and severity of disasters 
in the continent (Zheng et.al, 2012). It is precisely for this reason that many of the survivors 
of the bombing were left to their own thus aggravating their suffering. The chapter then 
proceeded to describe the characteristics of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, one of the mental 
                                                            
107 Not real name. East African, August 2-8 1999.  
108 Personal Interview of Bernice Kechem, Nairobi 7th August, 2012. 
144 
 
health conditions experienced by the survivors before reverting to the therapies that were 
used in their management.  
 
 The key argument presented in this chapter is that performing and visual art have played a 
vital role in the management of trauma engendered by the bombing tragedy. Performances 
during commemorative anniversaries, against the backdrop of the Memorial Park 
monuments, help the victims to recall and relate their experiences in the group, leading to an 
acceptance of the implications of the tragedy that indeed happened. This is best illustrated in 
the way the survivors reacted to the dance and songs, poetry and drama performed during the 
annual commemorative events. In addition, musical compositions in the aftermath of the 
tragedy arguably provided therapy to a then-wounded nation. These compositions in different 
languages and genres of music – from Luo to Kikuyu, Giriama to Akamba, from reggae to 
rap, benga to hip-hop – indicate a healing desire for the nation. The formation of an 
association by the survivors and the holding of meetings on a regular basis - especially 
immediately after the tragedy - provided them with a platform to develop a fellowship based 
on the strength of this common tie. In their meetings, they narrate their stories, their 
experiences of trauma and coping strategies. Telling the story of trauma in depth and in 
detail, as was demonstrated in this chapter, transforms the ‘traumatic memory’ – which is 
wordless – into words, so that it can be integrated into the survivor’s life story (Herman, 
1992: 175). By remembering and telling the truth about the terrible events of this tragedy, 
they become prerequisites for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of 
individual victims. While narration and the sharing of experiences of trauma, referred to in 
this study, does not constitute the rubric of visual and performing art, it is nevertheless one of 
the processes that support the efforts towards the provision of closure. The passage of time 
since the event of the tragedy has seen a decline in the frequency of the meetings of the 
association, an indication that some of the traumatic effects experienced by the victims have 
by now healed or diminished.  
 
Caruth (1995) suggests that full recovery is achieved when survivors no longer suffer the 
appearance of traumatic memories in the form of flashbacks, hallucinations and behavioural 
re-enactments. Instead, those formerly afflicted are able to form a narrative of what happened 
placing their experience within an autobiographical history. The findings of this study 
indicate that considerable distance has been travelled in the journey towards recovery and 
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traumatic healing in the aftermath of the 1998 bombing tragedy. In summary, a multiplicity 
of tools such as psycho-sensory approaches, a survivor’s association, repeatedly watching of 
films and listening to music have contributed to making all those affected traverse significant 
distances in the journey towards recovery. The performances during the annual 
commemorative events, including those organized at the family level, and the Documentation 
Centre’s programmes, including the exhibition and the Memorial Park monuments have been 
equally helpful. And true to this, the testimonies by the survivors' support the argument of 
this thesis that visual and performing art have contributed towards the healing of trauma 
experienced in the aftermath of the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Ethnicity and Identity 
 
5.0: Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 takes the discussion of identity introduced in chapter 1 beyond the ‘fictive kin 
groups’ formed as a result of the terror attack to consider in detail the ethnic and national 
projections engendered by this event. Whilst the aftermath of the terror attack stimulated 
‘nationalistic’ feelings of unity, it is suggested that this was just a short-lived ‘spur of the 
moment’ feeling that any attack of similar magnitude would have provoked elsewhere, as it 
did in the United States immediately after the September 11 attacks (Sturken, 2007). Soon 
thereafter, the political aspects of ethnicity reared its ugly head as was expressed during the 
process of rescue. If ethnicity could be articulated in an event as tragic as this, then it is 
arguable that politically-motivated ethnicity pervades many facets of Kenyan life; hence the 
necessity to devote attention to it in this dissertation.  
 
This chapter is divided into three parts: Colonialism, Ethnicity and Independence; Challenges 
of Nationhood: Ethnicity, State Control and National Identity; and Peace, Reconciliation and 
projections of National Identity. This division enables a detailed examination, in Part I, of the 
origins of negative aspects of ethnicity in Kenya. I specifically look at the divide-and-rule 
tactics employed by the British colonists to subjugate their subjects as having played a 
significant part in raising consciousness of existing differences among the local communities. 
This becomes more manifest as the struggle for independence is presented as a Kikuyu-only 
affair to the exclusion of other communities that equally contributed in significant ways. Part 
II focuses on the development and entrenchment of politicised ethnicity by the three Kenyan 
post-independence leaders, namely: Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki. The 
ethnicisation of politics, especially with the advent of multi-party democracy in the early 
1990s, had a tremendous negative impact on ethnic relations resulting in inter-ethnic conflicts 
in each presidential election between 1992 and 2007, problematizing the quest for national 
unity. The violence witnessed in the aftermath of the 2007 elections saw Kenya perilously 
draw close to disintegration into civil war. This analysis provides a broad context for 
understanding the role the August 7
th
 Memorial Park’s Documentation Centre plays in peace 
building, reconciliation and fostering national identity in part III. The Part demonstrates that 
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through its ‘Peace Builder’s Kids Club’ and its other educational outreach programmes, the 
Documentation Centre has found a niche for peace-building, reconciliation and fostering of 
national identity. Recent activities of the Club have centred on some of these topics. First, 
however, a summary historical perspective of ethnicity in Kenya is given.  
 
Part I: Colonialism, Ethnicity and Independence 
 
5.1.1. Pre-colonial Kenya 
 
The formation of the Kenyan nation and that of her constituent ethnic communities started 
way before the advent of colonialism. The history of the pre-colonial period, therefore, 
provides us with a good starting point to understand how identities of previously disparate 
communities came into being in the forging of a Kenyan national identity. While the 
invention of Kenya in its current geopolitical space dates back to the 1884/5 European 
struggle and partition politics, the history relating to all the various ethnic communities had 
been in process from a much earlier period (Mbugua & Gona, 2010:58-62, Mudimbe, 1988).  
 
It is arguable that during the pre-colonial period there was neither a definitive ethnic group 
nor strong sentiments of ethnic affiliation but hybrid entities of various sorts. It is, however, 
from their interactions that ethnic consciousness starts to emerge. The import of giving this 
background in this section is to demonstrate that, whilst politicised ethnicity as a concept is 
widely identified as the reason for ethnic conflict in Kenya, historical records provide 
evidence of interaction among the various groups in pre-colonial times which have continued 
to the present times. As will be demonstrated in Part III of this chapter, the Memorial Park 
and Documentation Centre’s programmes on peace strives at contributing towards promoting 
a culture of peace and cohesion among the Kenyan people. If this is the situation that 
prevailed during this early time, from whence did ethnicity with its attendant negative 
attributes originate?  
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5.1.2. Colonialism: The Architecture of Ethnicity in Kenya 
 
Ideas of ethnicity and national identity in Kenya are best understood in the context of 
territorial distinctiveness and national consciousness whose history goes back to the treaties 
by select powerful European countries during the 1884/85 Berlin conference. The conference 
paved the way for the partition of Africa - where boundaries were drawn to divide the various 
African territories among themselves - and the establishment of colonial rule. Kenya was thus 
created and claimed by the British as a colony. Implicitly, diverse people who hitherto had 
never imagined themselves as a nation were now put together, often with very little regard to 
diversities within ethnic communities. What appears critical at this point was the need to 
create a national identity within a newly imposed national boundary. It is assumed that the 
communities inhabiting this bounded territory are sovereign and were imagined as having 
communion with the rest of the communities (Anderson, 1983: 6-7). Smith (1991:18) 
suggests, that transplanting the idea of the nation across the globe from its Western origins 
brought with it confusion, instability, strife and terror, particularly in places of mixed ethnic 
and religious character such as Kenya. It is indeed in this factor among others, as will be 
elaborated, that the root of ethnic strife in Kenya is to be contextualized.  
 
Ethnicity, it is arguable, is to some extent a creature of the colonists - but given impetus by a 
few conniving African traditional leaders and cultural brokers -  whose interest was in 
practice to divide the people in order to gain an upper hand in the exploitation of resources to 
their own benefit. Campbell (1997:109) asserts that for a long time the colonial powers 
believed that Africa seemed immune to the nationalist ‘virus’ and could therefore operate 
without due regard to the rights of their subjects. However, the tide of nationalistic fervour 
blowing elsewhere – in India and then Arab nationalism in Egypt – was sufficient for the 
British authorities to introduce political ‘tribal’ structures in Africa in an attempt to pre-empt 
the impact of nationalism by effecting divide-and-rule and indirect rule policies. Through 
such policies, the colonial state succeeded in the construction of ethnic identities, which they 
manipulated to entrench their rule (Berman, 1998). Notwithstanding these policies, the 
nationalist tide was so strong that when it eventually came that it swept aside the forces of 
ethnicalisation, forcing the imperialists to return to the drawing board. While the Western 
powers agreed to formally grant political independence to their African colonies, many of 
them in the early 1960s, they worked overtime to convert the new African leaders into ‘ethnic 
149 
 
chauvinists’ as a vital step towards dispensing with African independence. The colonists 
ensured that the African states remained linked with the West through the fusion of the new 
African elites with the old colonial state bureaucracy. Thus, the formulation of strategies to 
either buy off or flatter nationalist leaders – such as Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta and Malawi’s 
Kamuzu Banda – eventually isolating them from the ‘true freedom fighters’ and the masses 
(Campbell, 1997:150).  
 
One of the first instruments to encourage the idea of ethnic consciousness in the Kenya 
Colony was the establishment by 1920 of a system of administration based on the division of 
Kenya along ethnic lines (Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:121). Administrative boundaries were set to 
be coterminous with ethnic communities. In this regard, Kenya was divided into 47 districts 
and 8 provinces ensuring that people sharing a common language, and or espousing related 
cultural practices, were clustered together either in one district and, or, province. Thus the 
Nandi, Kiambu, Kisii, Turkana, Kitui districts were created for the Nandi, Kikuyu, Turkana 
and Akamba people respectively.
109
 As a consequence, of this division, movement from one 
ethnically bounded district to another and association among the indigenous people soon 
became limited. This ethnic consciousness had earlier been implanted with the passage of the 
Registration of Natives Ordinance (1915) laws, and was instituted from 1920, when African 
males over the age of 16 years had to wear an identity card encased in a metal box (kipande) 
around their necks wherever they went within the white man’s legally protected area. While 
its introduction was intended to regulate and ensure a steady flow of labour to the European 
farms, constant payment of taxes, and the arrest of those who refused to work, inadvertently 
entrenched ethnic awareness as it inscribed the name and ethnicity of the wearer (Anderson, 
2000: 464; Elkins, 2005:16; Kakai, 1993: 160). 
 
Another related aspect in support of this observation – that the ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy 
entrenched ethnicity – is provided by Ogot (2000:16), who notes that European settlements 
were planted in border areas in order to separate and isolate different African groups from 
one another. He supports his observation by indicating that buffer zones of European 
settlements were established in between the Kipsigis and the Gusii, the Kipsigis and the Luo, 
the Nandi and the Terik and the Kikuyu and the Maasai. Hence, the pre-colonial 
intermingling that had existed before was curtailed.  
                                                            
109 See Appendix 4 for the rest of the Kenyan districts. 
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This segregation of ethnic communities not only took place in the border areas, it also 
extended to some individual European-owned farms. Maathai (2003:22) explains that on 
settler Neylan’s farm, for instance, where the labour force was drawn from diverse 
communities, these communities could not be allowed to live in close proximity to each 
other. Each community kept to the category of jobs assigned to it; thus, the Kikuyu worked in 
the fields, the Luo around the homestead as domestic workers, and the Kipsigis took care of 
the livestock and milking. In addition, the workers’ quarters were separated from each other: 
hence, a Luo village was separate from a Kikuyu one as was the Kipsigis’ from the Kikuyu 
and Luo respectively. Wanyonyi (2010: 37) observes that, “this strategy also helped to 
intensify and fossilize ethnic consciousness amongst the different communities and ended up 
promoting the feeling of exclusiveness and eventually planted the seeds of ethnocentrism and 
the urge for ethnocracy.” It was, therefore, not by coincidence, I posit, that the ethnic 
violence of 1991, though politically instigated, pitted these communities against one another. 
(See table 5.1). 
 
In addition, in Nairobi itself, the urban layout separated residential areas on the basis of race 
and ethnicity to some extent. White et al (1948) notes that segregated residential quarters for 
railway staff were created in Nairobi in 1899 when the construction of the Uganda Railway 
reached there and its headquarters moved from Mombasa.
110
 Accommodation for the manual 
labourers and low-grade salaried employees, mainly of Indian descent, were developed next 
to the railway yards and depot but the higher-grade employees, most of them Europeans, 
were settled on the foothill of the Kikuyu escarpment. It was not until 1919 that the first 
African quarters were developed by the Town Council to provide decent accommodation to 
the Africans returning from the First World War in the Kariokor
111
 area within the eastern 
zone of the town. White et al (ibid) maintains that this old pattern was largely maintained in 
the subsequent urban development plans for the city. Thus, Pumwani, Majengo, Kaloleni, 
Jericho and Bahati became the other housing estates within this zone, commonly referred to 
as Eastlands, and conveniently situated close to employment offered by the railway and the 
industrial area, were soon developed for the African working class. Within these residential 
estates, specific ethnic communities further segregated themselves along ethnic lines, thus, 
                                                            
110 See section 1.1.1 for a brief history of the establishment of Nairobi. 
111 The name is a corruption of ‘Carrier Corps’. 
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Kaloleni became a predominantly Luo estate while Bahati was mainly occupied by the 
Kikuyu. By 1945, Nairobi had become the largest town in eastern Africa with a multi-racial 
population of over 100,000 inhabitants consisting of Africans, Asians and the Europeans who 
 
 
Fig. 5.1: Layout of Nairobi residential areas,  
(Map adopted from Morgan 1967 p.105). 
 
were characterised by marked differences of religion, race, language and customs. The need 
to accommodate these divergent and complex cultural characteristics within the developing 
city led to the delineation of four different residential zones for these disparate groups. The 
Upper Nairobi, consisting of the higher grounds to the west and north of the city rising to 
5,500 feet in areas such as Spring Valley, Muthaiga, Karen, Kileleshwa and Lavington, were 
earmarked for European residential housing. Plots in these areas were laid out in parcels of 5, 
10 and 20 acres with strict limitations on any further subdivision. The Parklands-Eastleigh 
area to the north east of the city was considered a ‘middle class’ zone and was, thus, reserved 
for residential estates for the Asian community. By the 1950s, it had become necessary to 
identify a new area for the growing Asian community as the Parklands-Eastleigh zone was 
limited for expansion by the African municipal housing in Eastlands and the European 
residence to the north. Thus, the area to the south of Nairobi in places such as South B, South 
C and the misleadingly named, Nairobi West, were added (Morgan, 1967; White et al, 1948). 
With the exception of the political elite and the emerging new upper class commanding 
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business and manufacturing industries in Kenya, this zoning has largely remained intact in 
post-independent Kenya.  
 
This brief discussion has demonstrated that the zoning of Nairobi’s residential estates 
according to race and ethnicity started during the colonial period; first, through the railway 
administration before the colonial administrators continued with the same lay out.  
 
The migration of labour from the rural areas did not end in the White highlands only but 
extended to the major urban centres in places such as Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and 
Eldoret. In these towns, the migrant labourers encountered people of different ethnic 
backgrounds competing for the same economic opportunities, which made such new entrants 
feel unwanted. To countenance the challenges of integration in this new environment, people 
belonging to one ethnic group, or those emanating from the same region formed tribal 
associations. Thus the birth of the Luo Union, Abaluhya Union and the Akamba Union for 
the respective communities going by the same names which already had a large number of 
migrants in the urban centres. The ethnic exclusiveness in these unions presented a familial 
atmosphere that provided the migrants with a full sense of participation in urban life. These 
associations further acted as social security for members during periods of crisis such as 
unemployment, death, or the mere opportunity to talk in familiar idioms, therefore, 
strengthening the continuation of customary practices. While coming together in these 
associations provided members of the specific ethnic community with an institutional avenue 
through which economic and social differentiation could be countenanced, the fact that the 
associations brought together the intellectual and illiterate members of the ethnic group, the 
intellectuals as leaders of national thought, ended up playing significant roles in ethnic 
associations which stressed the importance of the ethnic community and village life more 
than the nation in the conceptions. Okumu (1975:187) asserts that this aspect contributed 
substantially to the continued primacy of ethnic interests over national identity and 
citizenship by those who took the reins of power immediately after independence in Kenya. 
Notable leaders who rose from leading the ‘tribal associations’ to national office included 
people like Paul Ngei, Martin Shikuku and Jaramogi Oginga of the Akamba, Abaluhya and 
Luo unions respectively. He further suggests that these associations were not traditional to 
African societies but were a product of the colonial situation and modernization. That the 
formation of these associations was a response to circumstances arising from colonialism – 
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urbanisation – supports the view that political ethnicity has its roots in the colonial period. 
Many of Kenya’s immediate post-independent leaders honed their political aspirations in 
these associations; it is, thus, arguable that their ethnicalised version of politics in Kenya 
today is traceable to this period.  
 
I have previously stated that the forging of the Kenyan nation as a colonial construct was 
based on modular political and ideological concepts that emerged in Europe in the 18
th
 
century. According to Smith (1991: 11), the nation was conceptualized as “a named human 
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass 
public culture, a common economy and common legal rights for all members”. Transposed to 
a colony like Kenya, this created a problem as the inhabitants had disparate histories and 
cultural practices and did not consider themselves as one nation. This understanding of the 
nation also created the risk of an ethnic community exploiting it to further the collective 
interest of one particular community to the exclusion of the rest. It is against the background 
of this interpretation that the colonial government based the creation of a civic and territorial 
nation on the ‘dominant ethnic group’ model where the culture of the new state’s core ethnic 
community becomes the main pillar of the new national political identity and community. 
Deriving the name of the country, Kenya, from the Kikuyu’s sacred mountain, kiri-nyaga112 
reinforces this view. He posits that, “the nature of the Kenyan territorial nation is heavily 
influenced by the aspirations, needs and culture of the Kikuyu community” (ibid: 111). This 
‘dominant ethnic group’ model was also used in Zimbabwe to advance the Shona identity, 
while excluding the Ndebele. This explains the sense of entitlement to leadership exhibited 
by the Kikuyu and arguably lies behind the resultant ethnic violence each election year – with 
the exception of 2013 - since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1990.
113
 This 
observation supports my view that the seeds of ethnicity were sowed in Kenya during the 
colonial period and have continued to affect Kenya’s quest for national identity. 
  
The appropriation of land from indigenous Kenyan communities, especially of the Kikuyu in 
Central Kenya by the British colonists, is the other framework in which the ethnicity question 
is to be viewed. Elkins (2005: 8-20) notes that Kenya’s unique position as a colony was born 
of the fact that it became the settlement of white colonists who were expected to form the 
                                                            
112 ‘Mountain of Brightness’ and the abode of the Kikuyu God, Ngai.  
113 Since the introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya in 1990, a majority of the Kikuyu community have 
always voted for their own candidate in all Presidential elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. 
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economic backbone of the colony. To demonstrate how deeply the Kikuyu were affected by 
this appropriation, Elkins (ibid) states that in Kiambu alone, they lost over 60,000 acres of 
fertile land. A further establishment of settler farms to the east, south and north of Kikuyu-
land, together with the presence of the government-controlled Aberdare forest reserve to the 
west, and the southward expansion of Nairobi exerted more pressure on the Kikuyu. As 
immigration into the colony continued, particularly after the First World War, the colonial 
government formulated new interventionist policies that aimed at ensuring the viability of the 
colony. Key among these were policies to remove the Kikuyu from the remaining land and 
into the exploitative wage economy; new reserves were created for them in marginal areas 
that could hardly sustain them economically. This resulted in overpopulation in the reserves, 
such that with time a significant number migrated to the Rift Valley where they settled as 
squatters and labourers on European farms. They were, however, denied any land rights and 
continued to live as squatters until 1963 when independence was granted. In the Rift Valley, 
huge swathes of land were also appropriated in areas such as Kericho and Nandi Hills 
disenfranchising thousands of the Kipsigis and the Nandi communities. It is my submission 
that these developments relating to land alienation, which first started in the highlands of 
Central Kenya before spreading to the Rift Valley, propagated the seeds of ethnic discord and 
the resultant inter-ethnic violence in Kenya.  
 
While the discussion in this section has laid emphasis on the colonial invention of ethnicity, 
recent research (Spear, 2003; Parsons, 2012) suggests that complex historical processes of 
ethnic transformation have always been at work leading to the adoption and endurance of 
ethnicity. I will consider these other approaches that have emerged which could be applied to 
the understanding of the phenomenon of ethnicity in Africa, its origins and the continued 
resurgence of its anachronistic forms among migrant workers, its perverse failure to fade 
away in the face of modernization and its explosive intrusion into the national political arena. 
I turn now to discuss these approaches: instrumentalist, primordialist and constructivist. 
The instrumentalists focused on the ways ethnicity was mobilized by migrant workers to 
counter anxieties, poverty, insecurity and competition in the urban cities; by nationalists to 
build political constituencies and gain access to national resources; and by the cultural elite to 
enhance their status (ibid). This approach was, however, unable to explain the affective 
aspects of ethnicity that has made it such a powerful and effective means of political 
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mobilization. The primordialists, on the other hand, sought to explain these affective aspects 
of ethnicity by evoking a common history, culture and destiny. A supposed ‘kinship relation’ 
amongst them is considered as enough motivation to defend their group interests. Just like the 
instrumentalists, the primordialists are unable to explain the circumstances and reasons for 
invoking ethnicity and why it is such a powerful force. Both approaches, though, 
acknowledge the existence of ethnicity and ethnic groups as part and parcel of a fundamental 
social order.  
It is, thus, the constructivists, who were left to explain the reasons for ethnicity’s perversity. 
The constructivists, Spear suggests, “focused on the degree to which modern expressions of 
ethnicity were invented by colonial authorities and African intellectuals in the name of 
reproducing a traditional social order” (2003:17). According to this view, “Africans did not 
belong to fixed ethnic groups but participated instead in fluid, overlapping social networks of 
kin, age-mates, clients, neighbours and chiefdoms (ibid).”   These networks were, however, 
dismantled on the advent of colonialism: new chiefdoms and native authorities were created 
and administered by both native chiefs and colonial authorities; the African languages and 
traditions were standardized and propagated by the missionaries; and new histories got to be 
written by a new crop of educated Africans.  The net effect of these changes was the 
transformation of earlier ethnic forms and the emergence of distinctive ethnicities, which 
were then appropriated by the local people. To quote Robert Papstein (cited in Spears 
2003:18), “ethnicity was politicized and hardened, as a slow-evolving, fluid ethnic self-
awareness, was transformed into a new harder ‘tribal’ structure to the extent that ‘tribalism’ 
was stronger and more politically relevant in 1981 than in 1881.”  
The relationship between the Kikuyu and the Meru people of the central Kenya highlands, 
prior to, and during the colonial period, provided by Parsons (2012), best illustrates this 
constructivist perspective. He (2012:69) suggests that during the pre-colonial period, one 
could move from one ‘tribe’ to another if the adoptive and prospective hosts were sufficiently 
willing. This was possible because there were significant cultural and linguistic continuities 
among the Meru and the Kikuyu people; as did their sharing of a patrilineal line of descent, 
patrilocal marriage practices and the organization of society along age sets. New identities 
were, therefore, often assumed through migration, commerce, enslavement and intermarriage. 
However, when the colonial administration sought control of the central Kenya highlands, 
they introduced an ethnic frame to group a people, whose identities had hitherto been fluid, 
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into coherent and bound categories based on a shared set of characteristics. They particularly 
wanted to shift conquered populations, whose statelessness seemed chaotic and confusing, 
into understandable and manageable administrative units for ease of governance (ibid: 67). 
Implicitly, they invented new identities. The chiefs, who spoke on behalf of the ‘tribe’ and 
asserted authority over them, aided the colonial administrators in cultivating the notion of 
distinct ethnic identities.  While the creation of ethnic identities, in this case, is attributed to 
the imperial colonial administrators and the native chiefs, Parsons (ibid) notes that there were 
continuities between the pre-conquest and colonial era that ought to be considered in defining 
ethnic identity. He suggests that the case of the Kikuyu migrant in Meru best illustrate the 
dynamics of choice and constraint which shaped ethnic identity at the individual level.  It was 
only after realizing the difficulty of imposing a ‘state-sponsored’ tribal cultural area into a 
viable administrative unit that the colonial government developed policies that promoted a far 
more flexible and pragmatic notion of colonial ethnicity. In doing so, the administrators, 
sought to protect the viability of the tribally-based reserve by establishing that migrants 
would be adopted into new tribes. They, thus, abandoned their hitherto passionate obligation 
to protect the fragile tribal cultures such that by 1940, the colonial government was urging the 
Meru elders to accept anyone willing to convert to the authority of the Meru elders as a Meru.  
Parson (ibid: 75) asserts that “artificial (ritual) rebirth was made the necessary condition of 
stable inter-penetration of the reserve. Those who successfully completed these rituals, to the 
extent that host communities accepted them, became legal inter-penetrators, while those who 
refused and hence provoked a local backlash were infiltrators who remained subject to 
expulsion under the Native Lands Trust Ordinance (NLTO).” This way, the less populous 
Meru community assimilated the Kikuyu. 
From the foregoing, I am inclined to agree with Spear’s (2003: 24) observation that “ethnic 
concepts, processes and politics predated the imposition of colonial rule, developing in the 
context of conquest states, regional exchange networks, dispersion, migration, settlement and 
urbanization.” Ethnicity has endured for a long time to the extent of developing its own 
integrity, structural principles and transformative processes and histories. Against this view, 
ethnicity has continuously been reinterpreted and reconstructed over time in such a way as to 
appear timeless and legitimate. It was also deployed by contending parties – local ethnic 
groups and the colonial administration - in complex processes of selectivity and 
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representation that lay at the core of the people’s collective historical consciousness and 
struggle for power. It is then, simultaneously constructed, primordial and instrumental.  
Spear suggests that the role of the African agency in the invention and perpetuation of 
ethnicity played a more significant role than the colonial agency itself. He asserts that the 
African ethnic entrepreneurs were well aware of their traditions, customs and ethnicity hence 
their ability to discuss issues of the present in terms of ideas and beliefs drawn from the past, 
reformulating them and revising them in the context of the present. “Those that resonated 
with current concerns, themselves also deriving from elements of the past in the present, are 
adopted, while those that do not become irrelevant (ibid: 26).” The colonial agency did not, 
however, have a cogent understanding of their African subjects nor did they share a common 
understanding amongst themselves. Against this view, it arguable that the African agency 
found more traction in shaping the colonial agency’s policies on the construction of an ethnic 
identity for Kenya.   
5.1.3. Mau Mau: The Struggle for Land and Freedom  
 
Before I turn to discuss how the post-independent governments of Jomo Kenyatta (1963 to 
1978) and Daniel arap Moi (1978 to 2002) undermined the creation of a national identity by 
failing to eradicate the negative aspects of ethnicity, I briefly contextualize this discussion by 
introducing the Mau Mau struggle for independence.  
 
The appropriation of land in Central Kenya; the creation of native reserves; introduction of 
punitive taxation and forced labour; the controlled movement of the African labourer through 
the introduction of the kipande; and the introduction of indirect-rule through the appointment 
of African subordinates, willing to exercise delegated power of the Colonial Administration 
in the form of colonial chiefs - some of who were very brutal: all these engendered the 
bitterness that laid the ground for armed resistance and the birth of the Mau Mau 
movement.
114
 Between 1950 and 1952 a series of oaths were administered in Central Kenya 
to inspire courage and radicalize the Kikuyu resistance to colonial rule. The oaths triggered 
panic in the colonial government hence its declaration of a State of Emergency in October 
                                                            
114 Resistance to colonialism in Kenya was not only executed by the Kikuyu and the Mau Mau movement, 
resistance was staged in various forms by other Kenyan communities such as the Nandi, Luo, Borana, Giriama, 
and the Abagusii. I have, however, elected to illustrate my arguments using the Mau Mau as it was probably the 
most known of all the resistance movements in Kenya.  
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1952 and the launch of Operation Jock Scott to obliterate the Mau Mau resistance. The same 
year saw the arrest and detention of most of the major African political leaders, including 
Jomo Kenyatta, Bildad Kaggia, Achieng Oneko, and Fred Kubai. Kenyatta, who had been 
more moderate in agitating for territorial nationalism through the Kenya African Union 
(KAU), became Kenyatta the hero and the unifying symbol of the struggle. Instead of 
heralding the collapse of the Mau Mau as had been anticipated, it radicalized its leadership 
making the resistance more violent. Kenyatta was not a member of the Mau Mau (Maloba, 
1993; Ogot & Ochieng, 1995; Anderson, 2005; Elkins, 2005). The Mau Mau slogan of ithaka 
na wiyathi, which translates as ‘land and freedom’ encapsulated the spirit of the struggle. 
Land and freedom, as will be demonstrated below, became the defining call for freedom.  
 
The Mau Mau rebellion was eventually defeated militarily in 1954. Maloba (ibid) suggests 
that the rebellion was clearly instrumental in forcing the British government to immediately 
undertake political reform. Among these reforms were the reinstatement of African political 
parties in 1955, and the institution of several constitutional reforms that eventually led to the 
attainment of political independence on 12
th
 December 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as Prime 
Minister. 
 
Part II: Challenges of Nationhood: Ethnicity, State Control and National 
Identity 
 
5.2.1. Sowing the Seeds of Discord: The Kenyatta Era 
 
The attainment of political independence in 1963 thrust on the independence leaders the 
challenge of building a national community that would continue holding together the 
disparate communities within the boundaries of the colonially-invented nation (Smith 1991). 
The task of the leaders, notes Ochieng (1995:91), was to transform the inherited colonial 
institutions to serve the culture, needs and aspirations of the people of Kenya. It was expected 
that the benefits of economic and social development would be distributed equitably, that 
treatment based on ethnicity, race, belief and class would be discarded and, instead, every 
Kenyan would be accorded an equal opportunity to develop while remaining faithful to the 
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aspiration of building the nation. This task required selfless leaders of great vision who would 
sacrifice their personal ideals for the sake of the nation. 
 
In this part, I discuss how the first independence government of Jomo Kenyatta faltered in 
fulfilling the aspirations and hopes of many of those who were looking forward to 
independence. While such a discussion could become very detailed, for present purposes I 
elect to focus on three main areas: namely, the land question, ethnicity and politics. 
 
There is consensus, Kimenyi and Ndungu observe (2005: 138), that Kenya’s land issues are 
the primary source of the ethnicity question. While its history is traceable to the colonial 
period – the migration of Kikuyu labourers from Central Kenya to the Rift Valley to work on 
settler farms - the Kenyatta government exacerbated the problem. On independence the land 
issue was not resolved, instead the decision of the second Lancaster Constitutional 
Conference of 1962 - agreeing that, indigenous communities renounce any claims to land that 
previously belonged to them - was upheld. However, the Europeans could dispose of it on a 
willing-buyer-willing-seller basis hence enabling the Kikuyu migrants to purchase the land. 
The pastoralists who had been evicted from their land in the Rift Valley, first, by the 
colonialists, and now by the Kikuyu settlers, remained disenfranchised. 
 
Independence also heralded a new wave of migration to the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces. 
The creation of settlement schemes in these provinces soon after independence was intended 
for settling those who had been rendered landless by colonial appropriation. Kimenyi and 
Ndungu (2010:142), for instance, provide evidence suggesting that the Kikuyu were the main 
beneficiaries of the Million-Acre-Settlement Scheme programme initiated by the government 
to settle the landless in Lamu, Kilifi, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru and Trans Nzoia in the former 
Coast and Rift Valley Provinces. As Kanyinga observes (quoted in Kimenyi and Ndungu 
2010), the Kikuyu were the best-placed ethnic community to raise capital through land 
purchase cooperatives. Leys (1975), cited in Kimenyi and Ndungu (2010), reports that in a 
survey of 162 cooperatives, 120 were exclusively Kikuyu, and an additional 38 consisted of 
Kikuyu and other ethnic communities. There was very little attempt made to incorporate the 
indigenous communities in these settlement schemes. From the foregoing, it can be noted that 
the Kenyatta government did not put any reasonable effort into promoting the settlement of 
the original inhabitants of these districts, but instead promoted a Kikuyu land agenda. 
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Deprived of their ancestral land a second time, it engendered bitterness as the Kalenjin, 
Maasai and Samburu communities on the one hand, and the Mijikenda on the other, 
considered the settlement schemes in the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces to have been 
created on lands inscribed with their history, religion and memories. This, among other 
factors, provided fertile ground for the isolation and attack of the Kikuyu in the ethnic 
violence of the 1990s. 
 
Aware of the existence of profound ethnic sensitivities as a result of the divide-and-rule 
strategies instituted by the colonial administration, the first government of independent 
Kenya, led by Jomo Kenyatta, had the onerous task of building a nation with one identity. In 
essence, a nation state in which all people were equal before the law without any 
discrimination based on ethnicity, colour or creed. Bogongo (quoted in Wanyonyi, 2010:40) 
suggests that with the threat of secession by the Somali ethnic community of north-eastern 
Kenya to join the Republic of Somalia, post-independent leaders were faced with the 
challenge of uniting all the 42 ethnic communities, as well as the many religious groups, 
under shared political and economic systems. The Uhuru
115
 government had to formulate 
policies that would ensure that her citizens had the greatest share of subsequent development.  
 
The formulation of Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965 entitled ‘African Socialism and its 
Application to Planning in Kenya’116 setting down the principles and strategies of Kenya’s 
development after independence, was seen as an instrument that would help Kenya overcome 
her challenges. For instance, it stated that, “our system of African Socialism will guarantee 
every citizen full and equal political rights. Wealth must not be permitted to confer special 
concessions on anyone…(Tom Mboya, quoted in Ochieng, History of Kenya, pp144-147)” 
While pledging equal opportunities as outlined in this Sessional Paper, Kenyatta did not 
remain faithful to its intentions. Instead of promoting uniform development across the nation, 
his government laid emphasis on investing in areas considered fertile and with high rainfall - 
and hence with suitability for agriculture - which would guarantee quick returns on 
investment, further marginalizing areas with less potential. Infrastructure development, 
industry and commerce ventures were concentrated on the major urban centres of Nairobi, 
Mombasa, and notably in the Central Kenya towns of Kiambu, Thika, Muranga and Nyeri 
                                                            
115 Swahili word for Independence 
116 Its formulation is credited to Tom Mboya who was then Minister of Economic Planning and Development.  
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leading to growth imbalance between regions and different groups of the population 
(International Labour Organization, 1972:2). This turn of events diluted the sense and pride 
of belonging to the newly independent nation. In northern Kenya, the Somali renewed their 
demand to secede, while communities in other marginalized parts of Kenya such as the 
Turkana and Pokot started to perceive Kenya as a ‘foreign’ country. To rephrase Anderson 
(1983:6) they could not imagine themselves belonging to the same nation as the inequality 
had become too deep and horizontally wide for a sense of comradeship to be sustained. 
Hence the reference by many a Pokot, Turkana, Borana or Somali resident in the north of the 
country on a trip to Nairobi (or any other major urban areas within what previously 
constituted the White Highlands) as ‘travelling to Kenya’, a perception that gained currency, 
particularly during the Kenyatta era. 
 
Entrenchment of politicised ethnicity in government continued unabated. Seeking security in 
ethnic numbers and returning favours soon started to characterize Kenyatta’s rule. Members 
of the Kikuyu community were appointed to important positions in the civil service, and 
procedures for government contracts, loans and business licenses were soon relaxed to enable 
the Kikuyu community to benefit from the fruits of independence. As Maxon (1995:122) 
states, “many of the social issues publicly aired during the initial decade of independence 
took on a pronouncedly ethnic character as some ethnic groups, usually the Kikuyu, were said 
to be holding the best jobs in the civil service.” By 1974, for instance, Odipo117 argues that as 
Kenyatta was aging his ethnic kinsmen took advantage to fill the civil service with members 
of his community. Thus, top jobs in the Ministry of Finance, the Kenya Ports Authority, the 
Ministry of Defence except the Armed Forces Command, in the Office of the President where 
four out of the eight Provincial Commissioners, were Kikuyu. The Ndegwa Commission 
Report of 1971, which recommended the participation of civil servants in commerce and 
industry, saw the emergent Kikuyu bureaucrats start wanton accumulation of wealth, 
directorship in companies, commerce and all things they had detested in the colonial 
administration. This ethnic bigotry did not go down well with the rest of the country. Soon 
some non-Kikuyu elites in government started challenging this state of affairs with the then-
Vice President, Jaramogi Odinga, for instance, terming the ‘African Socialism’ espoused by 
the Kenyatta government as “simply a cloak for the practice of tribalism and capitalism” 
(Ogot & Ochieng, 1995:99-100). 
                                                            
117 Sunday Standard, January 10, 1999. 
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5.2.2. Politics of Power and State Control 
 
Whereas the political parties and processes leading to independence seemed to transcend any 
ethnic, religious and racial identities, the attainment of independence revealed internal power 
dynamics couched in ethnic tones. The politics of the two independent parties, the Kenya 
African Union (KANU) and the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), and later the 
Kenya People’s Union (KPU) demonstrate that in the struggles to control the state, the seeds 
of politicised ethnicity were further broadcast. Oyugi (1998:29) contends that with KANU 
favouring a unitary system of government and having the support of the majority ethnic 
communities – the Kikuyu and the Luo – while KADU’s preference for a majimbo 118 
(federalism) system and having the support of minority ethnic communities, the stage for 
ethnic competition was set. He (ibid) further avers that between 1963 and 1964, the conflict 
between the KANU government and the only opposition party, KADU, led to areas, which 
were predominantly pro-opposition being denied funds from the central government to run 
the federal (majimbo) governments. This resulted in communities in the KADU areas venting 
their anger against the Luo and Kikuyu communities, which were predominant in KANU. In 
the face of these frustrations, KADU disbanded to join KANU signalling the end of the first 
phase in the on-going inter-ethnic suspicion and tension and the onset of one party rule.  
 
However, this dalliance between the Kikuyu and the Luo in KANU was short-lived. 
Dissatisfied with the ethnic dimensions the Kenyatta government was taking, the unresolved 
land question, corruption and the formulation of new dictatorial laws such as the Preventive 
Detention Act of 1966, Jaramogi Odinga was prompted to resign as Vice President to form 
the socialist-leaning KPU. Beyond its opposition to the Western orientation of the KANU 
leadership, KPU aimed at replacing the persistently ethnic basis of politics with a framework 
founded on ideological or social and economic grounds. Odinga’s resignation was followed 
soon thereafter by that of 18 Members of Parliament and 9 Senators to join KPU. The inter-
ethnic differences previously camouflaged in party accommodations now became more 
pronounced (Wanyonyi, 2010: 40). Kikuyu members of parliament who resigned alongside 
                                                            
118 Federalism has always been wrongly interpreted in Kenya to mean the creation of ethnic enclaves for the 
communities that are indigenous to the federal region and an expulsion of migrant ones. 
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Odinga were branded as traitors, presumably to the ‘Kikuyu nation’, and went on to lose in 
the subsequent by-election. It is only members of the Luo community that made it back to 
parliament, hence ending up by ethnicalizing KPU. Instead of addressing the grievances 
raised by Odinga’s party, Kenyatta hardened his stand, viewing his opponents as agents of 
Communists who were out to depose him. KPU was thus banned; Odinga and other leaders of 
his party were put in detention in 1969. Tom Mboya, perceived as a flamboyant, intelligent 
and ambitious Luo politician, was gunned down on the 6
th
 June 1969, presumably by the 
Kikuyu elite fearing that he might out-manoeuvre them in their schemes to succeed Kenyatta. 
Afraid of this threat, the Kikuyu resorted to oathing ceremonies to reinforce ethnic solidarity 
and prevent political power from leaving the ‘House of Mumbi.’119 Three months after this 
assassination, while visiting Kisumu in Luo country to open a hospital built with funds from 
Russia,
120
 Kenyatta’s motorcade was stoned prompting his elite bodyguards to shoot at the 
crowds. 43 people died. This marked the end of Kenyatta’s visits to Nyanza until his death in 
1978 (Anyang-Nyongo, 1989:32; Murray-Brown, 1972: 317; Ogot & Ochieng, 1995: 92-
102). With the elimination of Mboya, the detention of Odinga and his supporters, Kenyatta’s 
ethnic-based leadership had been secured. 
 
The significance of the split between Kenyatta and Odinga in 1966 and the events that 
followed thereafter, is that it cemented ethnic animosities between the Luo and the Kikuyu. 
Being two of Kenya’s largest communities, the effects of ethnicity soon spread to other 
communities, as they had to devise strategies of surviving the Luo-Kikuyu political axis. The 
so-called ‘ethnicalization’ of Kenyan politics is, thus, best illustrated in the relations of these 
two communities and the alliances that are formed around them. It is arguable that Kenyatta’s 
last few years in office were dominated by scheming against the Luo, making the creation of 
a unified nation illusory. The post-election violence experienced in Kenya in the wake of the 
contested 2007 election results, can be best understood  as a competition for the Presidency 
between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, representing the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic conclaves 
respectively. 
 
 
                                                            
119 The Kikuyu myth of origin traces their ancestry to Gikuyu and Mumbi.  
120 Assumedly raised through the efforts of Jaramogi Odinga.  
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5.2.3. Nyayoism:121 Following the Footsteps of Kenyatta 
 
In this section, I demonstrate that the seeds of discord sown and nurtured during the Kenyatta 
regime matured in the Moi era in the form of ethnic violence. As this chapter is intended to 
provide a broad context for the understanding of the circumstances prevailing at the time of 
the Nairobi terror attack, this section focuses on the engendering of politically-motivated 
ethnicity following the introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya and its threat to national 
unity and identity. This foreshadows a discussion of the role of the Memorial Park and 
Documentation Centre in facilitating peace building, reconciliation and a dialogue of 
nationalism as it was created out of circumstances of conflict. Albeit of a different nature, it is 
nonetheless relevant to its broad mandate. 
 
Following the death of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, his Vice President of twelve years, 
assumed the reins of power in 1978. This was at a time of multiple challenges: politicised 
ethnicity was already deeply ingrained; political and economic power was under the control 
of a small clique of politicians that had thrived during the Kenyatta years; there were divisive 
succession politics and secessionist threats by the ngoroko
122
 in the north. The forging of a 
united nation remained profoundly problematical. While many Kenyans were optimistic that 
arap Moi’s leadership would provide a significant break with the corrupt and ethnic ways of 
the previous regime and herald the birth of a new era, he declared that his leadership would 
follow in the footsteps of the founding father of the nation. 
 
5.2.4. Consolidation of Power 
 
Before the first general elections of his regime in 1979, President Moi had preserved almost 
intact the structure and institutions of power he had inherited from his predecessor – the 
police, provincial administration, and the army. Yet he faced considerable opposition from 
powerful economic, political and ethnic alliances and factions who felt threatened by having 
                                                            
121 A call introduced by Moi in 1978 on becoming President to rally the nation to follow in the footsteps of 
Kenyatta in the development of the nation which soon transformed into a political philosophy for his regime 
with the rhetoric of peace, love and unity.  
122 Euphemism for bandits. The ethnic stalwarts in the Kenyatta regime, opposed to Moi ascending to the 
Presidency in the likelihood of an unexpected demise of Kenyatta, had threatened to use this illegal outfit to 
eliminate him. 
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a President who might not protect their interests. Those elections, therefore, provided 
President Moi with the opportunity to form his own team. For the first time he appointed into 
cabinet members from hitherto marginalized communities such as the Somali, Turkana and 
from his own Kalenjin community, while appointing many others to significant positions in 
the civil service. While instituting these changes, he was careful not to overtly antagonize 
some of the Kikuyu who were still holding influential positions in the civil service. His 
government also endeavoured to design social, economic and political programmes to 
incorporate all those regions and communities that had previously been alienated by the 
Kenyatta regime. One such programme was the District Focus Policy for Rural Development 
of 1983, which aimed at empowering districts in making decisions on their development 
agenda instead of the Provinces and the Ministry headquarters in Nairobi as was the case. 
Whereas it was a well-intentioned idea, it later came to be viewed as one that promoted 
ethnicity, as it implied each ethnic community in their own district setting their own 
development agenda. Schools within a district were, for instance, required to admit 75% of 
their students from their locality (read ethnic community) leading to the creation of virtually 
‘mono-ethnic’ schools. 
 
In the later parts of the 1980s, President Moi proscribed all ethnic-based organisations such 
as the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA), the Luo Union, New Kamba Union 
and the Abaluhya Welfare Association, claiming that they were enclaves for breeding and 
perpetuating ethnicity and were thus impeding his aspirations to build only one ‘ethnic group’ 
known as ‘Kenya’ (Ogot and Ochieng, 1995:195; Mbugua & Gona, 2010: 42). Up to this 
point, it is arguable, that Moi was keen on putting the nation on a path towards the 
achievement of a national identity. 
 
On the political front, however, the one party state that President Moi had inherited remained 
intact. Those opposed to the Moi policies did not find an avenue to express their divergent 
views and took their campaigns ‘underground’ eventually occasioning the 1982-attempted 
coup. The abortive coup, it can be postulated, changed the course of Moi’s leadership. Instead 
of continuing with his efforts towards the building of a unified nation, he started a ruthless 
campaign to break any opposition to his regime becoming more dictatorial. Thus, like 
President Kenyatta before him, he resorted to his own ethnic community to buttress his 
regime, heralding the inter-ethnic suspicion and conflicts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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He infiltrated the Provincial Administration, the Police and the Army with members of his 
own ethnic community and used them, especially the Provincial Administration, to track 
down and neutralize any dissent to his Presidency. For instance, by 1997, out of the 65 
District Commissioners (DC’s), 35 were from his Kalenjin community, yet in numerical 
strength this community does not constitute even a third of the Kenyan population.
123
 
 
According to Ogot and Ochieng (1995:193) “[A]s Moi consolidated his power and the 
strength and confidence of the new regime grew, nyayoism expanded to acquire ideological 
functions”. Moi emphasized that this philosophy was built on the foundational tenets of love, 
peace and unity; hence it was deserving of a central place in nation building (Moi, 1986:22). 
It became the axis under which all other ideologies, such as, African socialism, nationalism, 
patriotism, anti-tribalism, constitutional democracy, anti-ethnicity and any other positive 
ideas, revolved. Resistance to his regime continued with calls for a return to multiparty 
democracy intensifying. 
 
5.2.5. Ethnicity, Violence and Multiparty Democracy 
 
The processes leading to the introduction and establishment of multiparty democracy in 
Kenya placed intense pressure on Moi’s nyayoism foreshadowing its collapse. The return to 
pluralism in 1991, it was feared, would threaten the Kalenjin ruling elites’ hold on power and 
the massive resources they controlled. Violence became a means of retaining the status quo. 
In such situations of flux, to paraphrase Eriksen (2010:120), ethnicity attains its greatest 
importance. It subsequently became a major factor in defining and determining the 
management of socio-economic and political affairs in the country, including some elements 
of the Memorial Park.  
 
It is with this return to multiparty politics in 1991 that the ethnicalization of politics in Kenya 
became very glaring. This view resonates with Kimenyi’s (1997) argument that ethnic 
identification in politics is alive and well in Africa, which results in ethnicity being perhaps 
the single most effective predictor of political preferences. Hence, KANU, the ruling party, 
became the party for the Kalenjin and other minority groups particularly the Maasai, Turkana 
                                                            
123 (Sunday Nation, September 19, 1997, p.2) 
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and Samburu or KAMATUSA, to use Kenya’s political parlance; the National Development 
Party (NDP) became the party for the Luo while the Democratic Party (DP) and the Forum 
for the Restoration of Democracy – Asili (FORD-Asili) – were largely associated with the 
Kikuyu. The other ethnic communities aligned themselves with these political parties 
depending either on socio-cultural factors or on the political favours that were promised. The 
association of particular parties with specific communities validated President Moi’s 
argument - while objecting to the introduction of multiparty democracy - that Kenya’s return 
to it would threaten the state, polarize the country along ethnic lines and plunge it into ethnic 
violence (Muhoma & Nyairo, 2011: 410-415; FIDH & KHRC, 2007:8). 
 
 Fearing that the ‘tyranny of numbers’ that could be marshalled by the opposition parties 
might consign the ruling party to an election defeat (and as though to fulfil President Moi’s 
prophesy), politicians from his Rift Valley home-base started a campaign for the return to a 
federal system of government (majimboism), and for the forcible removal of other ethnic 
groups viewed as opposition adherents. Consequently, violence erupted in many parts of the 
Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces. An examination of the ‘violence hotspots’ reveal 
that the violence mainly occurred in areas that were settled by migrant communities after 
independence and in the border areas previously settled by the colonists as buffer zones
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preventing the different ethnic communities from interacting with each other. Muriungi 
(1995), for instance, posits that the democratic transition in 1991 – and, I would add to this, 
the run up to the elections of 1997 - inflamed latent ethnic hatred, particularly against the 
Kikuyu, who are said to have benefitted disproportionately from the settlement schemes. For 
supporting the opposition parties, the Kikuyu and Luo seemed the perfect target for 
displacement. The motivation for this violence was to intimidate a sufficient number of 
people to either flee their homes – and hence not vote – or to induce them to vote for the 
ruling party, as a guarantee for their security and continued stay in the region (Kimenyi & 
Ndungu, 2005:149; FIDH & KHRC, 2011:9). The election results of 1992 and 1997 in which 
President Moi, the KANU candidate, won with minority votes suggests the success of this 
strategy. 
 
The run up to the 1997 elections was once more riven with much apprehension among ethnic 
groups, as the memories of the ethnic clashes preceding the 1992 elections were still fresh. 
                                                            
124 Refer to 5.1.2 for the details of the divide-and-rule strategies employed by the British colonists in Kenya.  
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The zoning of the country according to political party and ethnic affiliation and declaring the 
zones as exclusive party enclaves did not help in building confidence in a peaceful election. 
In response to the eviction threats and another election defeat staring it in the face, the 
Kikuyu threatened to revive the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) and transform 
it into a political party believing that GEMA’s unity would help propel the Kikuyu back to 
leadership. Frantic efforts by the opposition to form political party alliances were also mooted 
with little success. In this state of flux, the ruling party again unleashed the tricks it used to 
win the 1992 elections by instigating violence. Violence occurred in other parts of the 
country as indicated in Table 5.1 below.  
 
Table 5.1: Ethnic and Political Unrest in Kenya, 1991 – 1998. 
 Year/ 
Period 
Location Ethnic 
Communities 
Causes Effects 
 Rift Valley    
Mar.-Apr. 
1992 
Kericho district 
(Belgut/Muhoroni 
border) 
Kalenjin vs. 
Kisii and Luo 
Kalenjin burnt down Luo 
homes triggering 
retaliatory attacks.  
 
Political dimension 
because Luo were 
associated with FORD an 
opposition party and the 
Kipsigis, KANU, the 
ruling party.  
Property destroyed 
and death of 24 
people Luo forced 
out of region 
Nov 1992 
to March 
1993. 
Ainamoi/Buru 
Farm and 
Thesalia 
Holdings. 
Kalenjin vs. 
Luo 
An attempt by the 
Kipsigis and the 
Provincial Administration 
to evict Luo from Buru 
Farm. 
Displacement of 
Luo. 
Threatened voters 
made to vote in 
accordance with 
the wishes of the 
Kipsigis. 
 
Destruction of 150 
houses and 
property, 250 
families displaced.  
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At various 
times in 
1991, 1992, 
1996 and 
1997. 
 
Nakuru district in 
the settler farms 
in Molo, Njoro 
and Olenguruone. 
 
Kalenjin vs. 
immigrants 
mainly Kikuyu, 
Luo and Kisii 
 
Politically instigated as 
Rift Valley politicians 
wanted to create a KANU 
zone free from the 
opposition. 
 
More than 1,500 
people killed and 
another 300,000 
displaced. 
Collapse of the 
agriculture sector 
in the district. 
Oct. & Nov 
1991, 
March 1992 
Nandi district 
(Songhor 
location, Tinderet 
division, 
Cheboigony and 
Kapenguria 
farms. 
Nandi attack 
non-Kalenjin 
people mainly 
the Kisii.  
Politically instigated after 
cabinet ministers, 34 
Councillors and top 
KANU officials vowed to 
expel non KAMATUSA 
ethnicities from the Rift 
Valley Province. 
Non-Kalenjins 
ejected from the 
area. 
On various 
dates in 
1991,1993 
and 1997 
Narok, Gucha 
and Trans Mara 
districts. (Along 
Kisii, Maasai and 
Kikuyu 
borderlands. 
Maasai vs. 
Kisii. 
Politically instigated, as 
the Kisii are believed to 
have ditched KANU for 
the opposition. 
Cattle rustling as Maasai 
raid the Kisii for 
livestock. 
Land dispute between the 
Kisii and the Maasai 
24 people killed, 
hundreds 
displaced. 
 
Voters influenced 
to vote parties 
against their 
choice. 
Jan. 1998 Laikipia district 
(Ol-Moran 
division and 
Ngarua 
Kikuyu, 
Samburu and 
Pokot. 
Politically instigated as 
the Kikuyu largely 
supported opposition 
parties while the Samburu 
and Pokot supported 
KANU. 
3 people killed, 
others injured and 
property 
destroyed.  
Kikuyu were 
directed to either 
vote for KANU or 
be expelled from 
the area. 
 
 Coast Province    
Aug. to Nov 
1997 
Kwale district 
(Matuga, 
Ngombeni 
location, 
Mtongwe, 
Msambweni, 
Shonda)  
Coastal 
communities 
against the Luo 
and Kikuyu 
immigrants 
Local KANU politicians 
supported 
majimbo/federalism, 
hence planned to attack 
upcountry people. Kikuyu 
and LUO targeted for 
they were perceived to be 
in the opposition. 
Business rivalry. 
About 65 people 
killed including 13 
police officers, 
thousands 
displaced, 
destruction of 
property including 
a police station 
and loss of jobs 
for the displaced. 
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Aug. to 
Sept. 1997 
Mombasa district 
(LIKONI, 
Kisumu Ndogo, 
Maweni and 
Shauri Yako) 
Digo vs. 
Kikuyu, Luo, 
Luhya and 
Kamba 
Politically instigated as 
local politicians rallied 
their tribes to support 
federalism and eject those 
opposed. 
62 killed including 
10 police officers, 
over 100, 000 
others displaced. 
Upcountry 
communities 
ejected from the 
area to stop them 
voting for 
opposition 
candidates. 
 Nyanza Province    
Nov. 1997 South Nyanza 
(Maasai Kisii- 
border) 
Maasai vs. Kisii -- 30 people killed. 
 NAIROBI    
Oct. 1995 Langata (Kibera 
slums) 
Luo vs. 
Nubians. 
Political differences, Luo 
support FORD-Kenya, 
the Nubian KANU. 
5 people killed. 
 
Source: Kimenyi and Ndungu (2005: 128-139). 
 
KANU’s win in those elections further entrenched inter-ethnic division as the ethnicity card 
had been used to play communities against each other. In the first half of 1998, there was 
open political bickering, accusations and counter-accusations of instigation of violence that 
created a lot of uncertainty as the fears of retaliation remained constant. It was in this state of 
flux that the 1998 Nairobi terror attack occurred. 
 
Though the Kenyan leadership, through President Moi and the leading figures of the four 
major opposition parties, came out to rally Kenyans to stand united in the face of the 
atrocities occasioned by the 1998 Nairobi terror attack, this study reveals that this public 
portrayal of unity was simply feigned to suit the prevailing circumstances. Deep within the 
bowels of Kenyan politics, ethnicity and political rivalries remained. The conspicuous 
absence of the opposition’s ‘Big Four’ leadership during the first anniversary 
commemoration in 1999 buttresses this position (Sunday Standard: 8
th
 August, 1999). 
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Part III: Peace, Reconciliation and the Projections of National Identity 
5.3.1 Inspiring Unity and Nationalism  
 
The bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in 1998 inspired Kenyans in all walks of life to 
come together in a rare display of unity never otherwise witnessed in the country’s recent 
history (Akahenda, 2002; Kasfir, 2005). Their response in offering assistance in rescue, first 
aid, food and clothing and in offering prayers in places of worship across the country was 
unprecedented.  
 
What however captured the attention of many Kenyans was the way in which the tragedy 
brought together leaders from across the political divide, particularly President Daniel arap 
Moi and leaders of the main opposition political parties,
125
 who a few months earlier had 
been feuding following the divisive presidential campaigns of the general elections of 1997. 
Nowhere was this show of nationalism more poignantly demonstrated than in seeing 
President Moi, Mwai Kibaki, Charity Ngilu, Raila Odinga and Wamalwa Kijana riding on 
one vehicle to the site. 
 
Fig.5.2. President Moi (left) Mwai Kibaki (2
nd
left) and Charity Ngilu (right) being briefed by 
General Agoi
126
 (middle) at the bomb blast site. (Source: East African Standard, 12.08.1998). 
 
                                                            
125 The Democratic Party’s (DP) Mwai Kibaki, Ford Kenya’s Kijana Wamalwa, National Alliance Party of 
Kenya’s (NAC) Charity Ngilu and National Development Party’s (NDP) leader Raila Odinga. 
126 Head of the Kenya Army Search and Rescue Team. 
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Their speeches at the site were equally laden with exhortations to nationalism. Rarely did 
they make reference to ethnic groups in their speeches; but instead there were phrases such as 
‘our loss’, ‘our beloved motherland’, ‘we shall overcome’ and ‘God bless Kenya’. Even the 
Presidential Press Service (PPS) that traditionally devotes no time to the opposition 
politicians, unless when praising the President, gave them coverage on this occasion. 
 
Their coming together during this tragic occasion received positive commendation. The 
Sunday Nation (16.08.1998) commentary, for instance, noted that in an unprecedented show 
of cooperation, “there was contact and proximity, there was sober deliberation and profound 
absence of posturing and populism. For the first time in multiparty Kenya, the political 
leadership behaved in the manner of statesmen and stateswomen.” 
 
The National Convention Executive Council
127
 (NCEC), for its part observed that, “although 
the tragedy has compounded national problems facing the country, Kenyans had used the 
chance to bridge their differences to respond to a national disaster…ordinary Kenyans have 
shown a unique and un-paralleled sense of nationalism and unity of purpose.” 
 
I posit that the positive display of unity and nationalism in this instance was consistent with 
human reaction in the aftermath of disasters of such magnitude (Sturken, 2007). The 
outpouring of emotion and display of unity soon diminished, ordinary Kenyans went back to 
their ethnic comfort zones while politicians continued calculating how to woo them to their 
ethnically-inclined political parties in preparation for the next elections.
128
 Even before the 
dust of the 1998 bombing attack had settled, there was accusation that the media coverage of 
the rescue mission was ethnically nuanced reflecting the ethnicalized political affairs at the 
national level. It was, thus, necessary that in accordance with the wishes of the founding 
trustees, the August 7th Memorial Park and Documentation Centre played a role in promoting 
peace-building, reconciliation and foster nationalism upon its completion in 2004. The post-
election violence witnessed in the aftermath of the disputed presidential elections in 
2007/2008 – which took a notably ethnic angle – was instrumental in refocusing the 
                                                            
127 A not-for-profit national organization established by the civil society in 1997 to advocate for constitutional 
reforms, advancement of social justice, respect for human rights, and multiparty democracy with the long- term 
view of the realization of sustainable democracy and development in Kenya. 
128 Kenyan politicians start their electioneering in readiness for the next elections immediately after a general 
election. Any visitor to Kenya, at any time, would be forgiven for thinking that the country is soon going for a 
general election. 
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Documentation Centre’s activities. The formation of the Peace Builder’s Kids Club (PBKC) 
is one such initiative to address the challenges of ethnicity, conflict and threats to 
nationalism. It is to these issues that I now turn. 
 
5.3.2 Manifestations of Ethnicity 
 
In this section, I revisit how the monster of ethnicity became manifest during the period of 
rescue alluded to in Chapter 2 by building on Obwogo’s (1999) argument that the Kenyan 
mainstream media took an ethnic angle in their coverage of the rescue efforts through their 
portrayal as embodiment of tragedy of two Kikuyu victims, Rose Wanjiku
129
 and Sammy 
Nganga.
130
An examination of newspaper articles devoted to individual victims of the bomb 
blast published in two of Kenya’s leading newspapers, the Daily Nation and the East African 
Standard between 10
th
 and 17
th
 August
131
 1998 supports Obwogo’s argument.  
 
Of the 12
132
 news items published focussed on the rescue, 8 were dedicated to members of 
the Kikuyu community with Rose Wanjiku featuring in 6. Only 3 items discuss members 
belonging to a different ethnic community; 2 items to the rescue of Akinyi Odindo and her 13 
year-old son whose story would have inspired the rescue teams and those families whose 
relatives were still trapped or reported lost, considering that the two were rescued on the first 
day the professional teams moved to the site on the 9
th
 August 1998. There is also the story of 
Mr Koimburi’s133 search for his brother. The media went ahead to give details of Rose’s 
family, including her mourning son, disputes on her marital status and burial. Similarly, 
Nganga’s story did not end on being rescued, the media coverage extended to his 
recuperation in hospital. His was the face the world saw, shaking hands with members of the 
high-profile Israeli rescue team. His was the story that the world heard as it learnt that 
Kenya’s ‘Rose’ was gone. Trying to turn Rose into another Princess Diana and referring to 
her as “Kenya's candle in the wind” was a pure show of ethnic chauvinism as a similar story 
                                                            
129 Rose was an employee of Ufundi Cooperative House who died as rescuers battled to save her life under tons 
of rubble where she had been stuck for more than 36 hours. 
130 A scrap-metal dealer who was in the Ufundi Cooperative House with business partners when the bombing 
struck. He was in communication with Rose while trapped next to each other but was lucky to be rescued after 
more than 30 hours.  
131 Professional rescuers from Israel, South Africa, the UK, USA and France were engaged from 9th August up 
to 16th August, 1998 when the mission was declared over.  
132 See table in Appendix 5 for details. 
133 A Luo. 
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could have been written about the other victims as well. In their discussion of the challenges 
of creating a Kenyan national narrative, Coombes et al (2014:43) see a role for the print and 
electronic media “since they have been functioning as avenues for the promotion, if not 
creation, of narratives of ethnicities and oftentimes narratives of real or assumed historical 
injustices with the aim of justifying entitlement to certain offices.” It is, therefore, not strange 
that in this instance, the media created and promoted a one-sided narrative portraying the two 
members of the Kikuyu ethnic group of being the embodiment of the tragedy. 
 
This position was further supported by Mr Ali Mwadame, the immediate former chairman of 
the August Seventh Bomb-blast Victims Association (ASBVA). This is what he said in an 
interview:
134
  
“Apart from Rose and Nganga, there were other people rescued from the collapsed 
buildings after many hours, if not days. The whereabouts of others remained unknown 
for many days and the media should have also reported these incidences.”  
 
This leads me to my other argument which suggests that, whereas ASBVA was formed as an 
umbrella welfare body to advocate for the interests of all surviving victims and family 
members of those who had died, ethnic rivalry has stymied its efforts of actualizing the 
association’s objectives. Ethnic competition and wrangling amongst the members, especially 
for the position of chair
135
 has been the association’s greatest undoing. This ethnic rivalry is, 
however, reflective of politics at the national level to which I now turn. 
 
In this section, I briefly discuss the political events prevailing at the national level between 
2002 and 2008 to provide context to the ethnic division that permeated the leadership of 
ASBVA. The three
136
 leading opposition parties approached the 2002 national presidential 
and parliamentary elections, as a united front through a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on power-sharing should they win in those elections. The three parties coalesced 
around a new political vehicle, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), with Mwai Kibaki 
                                                            
134 Personal communication (Nairobi, 9th August 2012). 
135 The position of chairman in this association is very powerful overshadowing the Secretary, Treasurer and 
Organizing Secretary. In the entire period of my interaction with members of the association, there was very 
little reference to the other officials. 
136 National Alliance Party of Kenya of Charity Ngilu, Liberal Democratic Party headed by Raila Odinga and 
Mwai Kibaki’s Democratic Party. 
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as their preferred presidential candidate. Having rallied the ‘big five’137 ethnic communities 
to their side, as expected, NARC won the elections by garnering a decisive 62.2% of the total 
presidential votes cast paving the way for Mwai Kibaki to be declared President (Nunley, 
2006). However, when the president named his cabinet, he appointed his Kikuyu ethnic 
community members and their cousins
138
 to important ministerial portfolios,
139
 going back on 
the terms of the MOU, to the chagrin of the coalition partners. This prompted a rebellion by 
the LDP-allied side of government culminating in the 2005 constitutional referendum’s140 
defeat of the Kibaki-allied side and the subsequent divorce of the coalition partners. The 
break-up set the scene for the highly divisive 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections 
(Lind & Howell, 2010:339; Mutua, 2008:285). By the time of the elections in December 
2007, the country was divided right down the middle. President Kibaki led a new political 
alliance, the Party of National Unity (PNU), and drew support mainly from his Kikuyu 
community and their neighbouring cousins; while another group, consisting mainly of the 
Luo, Luhya and the Kalenjin supported the Raila Odinga-led Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM).
141
 The vote was very close. Contrary to the expectations of many, when the results 
were announced on the 30
th
 December 2007, President Mwai Kibaki had won and was 
immediately sworn in as President at dusk on the lawns of State House. This sparked 
spontaneous outrage that morphed into inter-ethnic violence pitting the Luo and the Kalenjin 
on one side and the Kikuyu on the other. After a whole month of violence, more than 1300 
people had been killed and over 600,000 others displaced. The intervention by the 
international community, through negotiations led by immediate former Secretary General of 
the United Nations, Kofi Annan, culminated in the power-sharing agreement on 28
th
 
                                                            
137 According to the 2009 population census, the ‘big five’ in order of numerical strength are the Kikuyu, Luhya, 
Kalenjin, Luo then the Kamba. 
138 The Meru and the Aembu people who also inhabit the central Kenya highlands share many cultural traits 
with the Kikuyu. 
139 Finance, National Security and Provincial Administration, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and Education 
ministries were given to David Mwiraria, Dr Chris Murungaru, Kiraitu Muriungi and Prof George Saitoti 
respectively. 
140 Kenyan’s had advocated for a new constitution since the early 1990’s but the regime of Daniel arap Moi 
(1978-2002) resisted only yielding minimum reforms in 1997. NARC came to power in 2003 with a promise to 
enact a new constitution in 100 days; however, the split in government after Kibaki appointed his cabinet made 
it a difficult promise to fulfil. There was acrimony throughout the process of drafting the constitution with both 
sides of the coalition refusing to compromise on aspects such as: retention of an all-powerful Presidency, 
centralized power vis-à-vis devolution and land reform. While Kibaki’s DP and NAPK supporters were for the 
retention of the above, the Raila Odinga-led LDP with the support of the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) advocated change. When the plebiscite was called, the pro-draft leaning side of President Kibaki lost it 
by garnering 48.88% against the opposition’s 51.12%. 
141 The orange was the symbol of the movement opposing the draft constitution in the 2005constitutional 
plebiscite under the leadership of Raila Odinga. Buoyed by its defeat of the draft, it morphed into a political 
party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and went ahead to contest in the 2007 elections. 
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February, 2008 and the subsequent formation of the Grand Coalition Government following 
the enactment of the Kenya National Accord and Reconciliation Act (Muhoma & Nyairo, 
2011; Mutua, 2008). The power sharing deal was on a 50%-50% basis in which Mwai Kibaki 
remained President while Raila Odinga became Prime Minister. Again, just as in 2003, 
President Kibaki retained the most important portfolios in government. Bickering, sabotage 
and power games became entrenched in the running of affairs of government for the rest of 
its five-year tenure. 
 
The leadership of ASBVA has been plagued by ethnicity since its formation in 2001 
overshadowing the real purpose of its existence: to advocate for the welfare of victims of the 
1998 Nairobi terror attack. Douglas Sidialo
142
 who was its founding chair had the support of 
the majority of the members in the first two years of its formation. Sidialo stated that in his 
first year, all the members were united and supportive of each other in their quest for 
continued medication, government support and in pursuing compensation from the US 
government. However, from May 2003 divisions fashioned along ethnic lines started to 
emerge and became more visible as they set out plans for the 5
th
 commemorative events. He 
noted that his officials started to pull in different directions, each one believing that a 
politician from his ethnic community would be more sympathetic to their cause. Thus, the 
Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya thought that Chris Murungaru, Raila Odinga and Moody Awori 
respectively would support the event and the group to achieve its objectives. In the 
association’s meetings, members started taking sides along ethnic lines whenever any 
donations were received by the group. How to nominate beneficiaries for school fees 
assistance, for instance, always ended up taking an ethnic dimension. Disillusioned, he opted 
not to offer himself for re-election in November 2003. Between 2005 and 2007, Naomi 
Kerongo
143
 was chairperson and during her tenure, no significant ethnic competition was 
reported. This could arguably be attributed to the fact that she was not from any of the ‘big 
five’ communities and would therefore be a unifying factor in rallying the association to 
achieve its objectives. 
 
                                                            
142 Personal interview (Nairobi, 10th January 2012).  
143 An Abagusii. 
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Paul Walla, a Luo, succeeded Naomi Kerongo in 2008 and worked with a committee of four 
other members drawn from different ethnicities.
144
 His tenure was, however, riven with 
ethnic antagonism that brought the association to the brink of obscurity with many of its 
active members, including the committee, withdrawing from its activities. Whilst the 
intention of electing the five from different ethnic communities was for the purpose of 
projecting a national identity, the wrangling at the national political level cascaded down to 
its ranks. Soon, mistrust based on ethnicity and associated political party affiliations, divided 
the members. They however continued with the plans for the tenth anniversary amid these 
divisions. To the credit of the officials, and more so Mr Walla,
145
 Raila Odinga, the Prime 
Minister (PM), presided over the occasion. In his speech, the PM empathised with their 
suffering and promised that the government would henceforth take over from where the U.S. 
government had left in 2003 and would assist them to access the requisite medical assistance 
– for those still in need of surgical interventions – and offer vocational training to survivors 
who lost limbs, the deaf and the blind to enable them to restart their lives again and that the 
Kenyan government would support the pursuance of reparations from the U.S. government. 
Despite frequent visits by Walla and his team to the PM’s office, the promises were never 
fulfilled. Walla, who kept on promising that the PM would honour his word, soon lost favour 
with his officials and the association. He was seen as another ‘big-talking’146 Luo, just like 
Raila. Ethnic favouritism was also witnessed in the way Walla shared job advertisement 
notices forwarded to him on a weekly basis by Pamela Slultz, the U.S. Embassy Deputy 
Chief of Mission, for opportunities
147
at the U.S. Embassy, the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) and USAID that were to be applied for by survivors and victims’ 
families with the requisite qualifications. Instead, Walla forwarded these notices only to his 
relatives and community.
148
 This engendered disaffection by the members and the decision to 
vote him out was reached in a meeting held on the 8
th
 April 2010. He however refused to 
hand over to Mr Mwadama, the newly- elected chair and continued his forays to the PM’s 
office, purporting to be the chair. When I attended the 14
th
 anniversary in 2012, Mr Walla had 
                                                            
144 A Luo but in his team were two Kikuyu, a Luhya and a Kamba, namely, Simon Kingori, Grace Kiuna, 
Winnie Wamau and Douglas Sidialo respectively. 
145 Mr Walla claimed to have convinced the PM to attend because of his personal (perhaps ethnic) connection. 
Personal interview (Nairobi, 7th August 2012).  
146 A common stereotype of the Luo in Kenya. 
147 As the embassy did not have jobs to offer, one way of assisting those with the relevant qualifications was in 
notifying them of job opportunities in order that they applied just like anybody else. Job vacancies in these 
organizations are internally advertised.  
148 Email communication from Pamela Slutz to Paul Walla dated 25th February, 2009. 
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still not accepted to hand over the association’s books of accounts and other official 
documents. To demonstrate his hold on power, he had prepared a separate speech as chair, 
which he went ahead and read. In the same year, he formed a splinter organization, Seventh 
August, 1998 Bomb Blast Victims Association, which drew members from his Luo ethnic 
community and their Luhya neighbours.  
 
In this section, I have demonstrated through examples the existence of entrenched ethnicity in 
the leadership of ASBVA to support the observation that politicised ethnic identity is a 
Kenyan reality. That it was evident in the events after the August 7
th
 1998 bombing is not 
surprising as it mirrors the ‘ethnicalised’ nature of politics at the national leadership level. 
With such wrangling in the leadership of ASBVA, does the Documentation Centre envisage 
itself playing any role in working towards a unified nation where Kenyan identity would 
come before ethnic identity? Does it see itself promoting programmes aimed at cultivating 
and entrenching a culture of peace and amicable reconciliation to conflict? The next section 
examines the activities of the Peace Builder’s Kids Club to ascertain the extent to which these 
aspirations, consistent with the objectives of the Documentation Centre, are being met. 
 
5.3.3. The Peace Builder’s Kids Club 
 
In establishing the Documentation Centre, the trustees of the August 7
th
 Memorial Park had 
conceived a centre whose mandate would include propagating an amicable approach to 
conflict reconciliation at the local, regional and international level. While no time-frame was 
given for the commencement of this expanded role, it was assumed that this would be 
determined by the strategic interests of the Memorial Park’s management based on the 
availability of funds. From this mandate, the management in 2007 initiated a programme 
called ‘Children as Peace Builder’s’ whose main objective was “to offer education that would 
promote peace building among children through simple and practical programmes”.149 The 
key elements of the education programme, as stated in the Memorial Parks’ official 
BlogSpot,
150
 were:  
                                                            
149 August 7th Memorial Park official brochure. 
150 http://august7thmemorial.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/peace-builders-kids-club.html#more 
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to nurture a culture of peace at individual and community level; promote forgiveness 
and compassion; break the cycle of violence and replace it with new ways of dealing 
with conflict and developing peace initiatives.  
 
After successfully running the peace education programme for six months, the programme 
was converted to a club, the Peace Builder’s Kids Club (PBKC). 
 
 
Fig. 5.3: Kenyan Industrialist, Manu Chandaria (centre), together with some children  
and the Memorial Park’s General Manager, Ms. Amunga, during the launch of the  
Peace Builder’s Kids Club in 2007. 
(Photo: August 7
th
 Memorial Park) 
 
Since their establishment in 2007, PBKC have established clubs in 51 schools in the counties 
of Nairobi and Uasin Gishu.
151
 This study, however, only focuses on club activities in ten 
schools in Uasin Gishu because this county has previously experienced ethnic clashes since 
the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya in the early 1990s. It is in this county, 
rather than Nairobi, that this study is able to demonstrate the relevance of PBKC in 
contributing to peace building, reconciliation and efforts towards fostering a Kenyan national 
identity. The selected clubs are in schools located in areas that are considered as ethnic 
                                                            
151 Uasin Gishu County is in northern Rift Valley. Also see Appendix 6 for list of schools with registered PKBC. 
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clashes ‘hotspots’ such as Langas, Kiambaa152 and Tarakwa153 in Eldoret North and Eldoret 
South constituencies, see tab 5.1, involving mainly the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities.
154
 
 
 
Fig.5.4: Map of Uasin Gishu County.  
Source: Maps of the World, 2013. 
 
Before discussing the activities of the PBKC, it is necessary to clarify the link between one of 
the most active proponents of the clubs to the 1998 Nairobi terror attack. Sometime in 
September, 2007 Richard Mibei, a teacher at Tarakwa Primary School in Uasin Gishu 
                                                            
152 It was in Kiambaa that over 30 members of the Kikuyu community, seeking refuge inside the Kenya 
Assemblies of God (KAG) church, were burnt to death by ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ at the height of the Kenyan post-
election violence on the 1st of January, 2008.  
153 Previously known as ‘Burnt Forest’ but changed after the 2007/8 ethnic clashes as the Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
communities felt that the literal meaning of the name was being put into practice through the torching of houses 
in every election.  
154 Refer to Part II, of this chapter for an in-depth discussion of ethnicity in Kenya.  
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brought his Class Eight
155
 pupils to Nairobi on a school trip. One of the places in their 
itinerary was a visit to the August 7th Memorial Park. He selected the Memorial Park for he 
was aware of the existence of the ‘Children as Peace Builder’s’ education programme and 
wanted his pupils to learn about peace and reconciliation, as his school was located in an area 
that had suffered ethnic clashes in the past. He himself was a survivor of the attack, though 
was lucky to have sustained only minor injuries. On the day of the bombing, he was at the 
Teachers Service Commission (TSC) offices
156
 in Nairobi on an official assignment. 
 
On arrival at the Memorial Park, Ms Gatwiri,
157
 as always, received the school and gave them 
a tour of the Documentation Centre where they learnt of the terror attack and its impact 
through the photographs, objects and artworks on display. Artefacts in a memorial museum, 
Williams (2007:25) posits, are important “…not only because they give displays a powerful 
appeal, but also because in many cases they exist as tangible proof in the face of debate 
about, and even denial of, what transpired.” It was necessary that the group believe and 
appreciate the nature of tragedy that befell their country in 1998. They also watched the video 
‘Seconds from Disaster’ which documents the 1998 bombing tragedy as it unfolded. The 
pupils were then exposed to artworks by other students before being given art materials – 
crayons, pencils, papers and plasticine – and tasked to create two and three-dimensional 
objects depicting the importance of cultivating peace amongst all humanity. The art pieces 
created by these pupils were poignant in their peace symbolism.  
 
                                                            
155 This is the last class of primary school before the pupils proceed to secondary school, on average these 
students would be 14 years old. 
156 TSC offices were located in the Cooperative Bank Building a block away from the bombed U.S. Embassy 
building.  
157 Education Coordinator at the Centre. 
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Fig.5.5: Peace in Kenya.  
Rachel Wanjiku (undated), Crayon on paper. 
 
This formulation captures the key elements that informed the establishment of the Peace 
Builder’s Kids Club. The map of Kenya, complete with colours of the national flag, 
symbolizes nationalism and the Kenyan identity. On the top left and right side of this artwork 
are school children, arguably expressing their desire for peace as encapsulated in the words 
‘Kenya is Love,’ ‘Peace in Kenya’. Their inclusion in this formulation accords with the 
club’s stated objective of inculcating a culture of peace-building in children. The chick in the 
top middle symbolizes the innocence of the children, and arguably Kenya, to have been hit by 
an act of terror. 
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Fig.5.6: How long shall I cry.  
Abdul, St Aquinas High School (undated), Pencil on paper. 
 
The piece by Abdul of Aquinas captures the suffering engendered by the bombing tragedy. It 
is a representation of the ‘silent cries’ that many of the survivors continue to bear. The cry for 
justice, compensation, healing and understanding has been calling for attention and healing to 
bring closure to the trauma.  
 
As Ms Gatwiri and Mr Mibei discussed these pieces, they realized that these artworks could 
be used to teach peace, tolerance, reconciliation, and national identity in schools. Since these 
subjects were not taught in the school curricula, they proposed that a club could help 
actualize the idea of peace building in schools, as pupils from distant places away from 
Nairobi would not make it to the Documentation Centre. The idea dovetailed with the plans 
of the management of the August Seventh Memorial Park hence the origins of the PBKC. 
The club targets children aged between 10 and 15 years in classes six, seven and eight. Since 
the inception of the clubs in 2007, 2500 pupils from both public and private schools have 
participated in the clubs’ activities. A two-pronged implementation strategy was designed by 
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the Memorial Park management, which took into consideration the need to have activities 
going on at the Documentation Centre while others would be school-based.  
 
This study was designed to answer one overarching question: what role has the Peace 
Builder’s Kids Club played in peace building, ethnic reconciliation and fostering a Kenyan 
identity? Purposive sampling field techniques were used in selecting the 10 schools on the 
basis of the active involvement of Ms Gatwiri and Mr Mibei in guiding their activities 
through their respective patrons. Mibei was particularly instrumental in the establishment of 
PBKC in his Uasin Gishu County. Focussed group discussions consisting of between 10 and 
14 pupils, including their patrons, and structured questions were used to elicit data discussed 
in this section. 
 
At the beginning of each school calendar year in January, the management of the 
Documentation Centre through the Education Coordinator introduces between two and three 
themes to the clubs’ patrons to be discussed and adopted in a Patrons’ Summit.158  The 
summit adopts and develops a possible list of activities to interpret the theme. The patrons 
are, however, given a free hand to derive club activities from these broad themes that they 
may deem suitable to their local contexts. Themes for the past three years have included 
Water, Environment and Trees; National Values (patriotism, unity, justice, peace, diversity, 
value-based leadership, hard work and integrity) and; Coping with tragedies.  
 
Whereas there are strong connections between the environment and peace (Maathai, 2003; 
Mische, 1989), I elect to focus on the peace building and conflict reconciliation initiatives, 
which are most applicable to this discussion. 
 
5.3.4 Peace and Conflict Reconciliation Education 
 
One of the most significant programmes of PBKC is its peace and conflict reconciliation 
education. In all the sampled clubs, pupils are trained on ways of building peace and 
resolving conflicts in their schools, home and within their community. Teachers, social 
workers, youth leaders and members of the clergy, who act as role models in their society, are 
                                                            
158 The summit is basically a workshop for all club patrons and education staff working at the Documentation 
Centre where the clubs’ previous year’s activities are evaluated and new ones planned for the new school year. 
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invited to these schools - at least once a month - to talk to the club members of the 
importance of peace. Sharing of personal experiences is an important component of what is 
expected of them. The pupils are then asked to give examples of conflicts they have 
experienced and how they resolved them. The session leader then take the pupils through a 
discussion of the various conflict scenarios – ranging from fights among pupils to those 
involving the youth and ethnic violence – and the possible ways they could be handled.  
 
Explaining different forms of violence and providing information about alternatives to 
violence is a common approach in peace education (Hariss, 2004:6). This study found that 
pupils from Uasin Gishu County made frequent reference to the 2008 post-election violence 
by stating how it affected them and were keen to learn how such conflicts could be prevented.  
One example that this study found poignant in delivering the peace message is the story
159
 of 
Mrs Josephine Wambugu, a social worker living in Cheplosgei. She was a widowed Kikuyu 
woman who had been married to a Kalenjin and had lived in the area for over 20 years. The 
ethnic divide in 2007/8 was so deep that in some areas individuals married from outside their 
communities had to choose between their community and their wives. Josephine had chosen 
to remain behind as she thought she was fully integrated to the community of Cheplosgei. 
She shared with the pupils a personal incident that happened in mid-January 2008 when 
violence reached her home area. One afternoon while at home, she spotted at a distance of 
about 600 metres a crowd of about 30 people moving towards her home while shouting. She 
could figure out that they were armed, possibly with clubs, bows and arrows among other 
weapons, perhaps having the intention to attack and destroy her property to force her to flee, 
as had happened with many others in the division. Aware of the looming danger on her life 
and property, she took four gourds-full of milk and proceeded to place them at the gate in the 
direction of the group’s approach. She garlanded the gourds with strands of Kikuyu grass160 
and returned to lock herself in the house. When the attackers reached her gate, they drank the 
milk and turned away. Josephine explains that she resorted to her knowledge of Kalenjin 
traditions and customs by invoking their peace symbols to stop the attackers from executing 
their plan. Milk is sacred to the Kalenjin community (Somjee, 1998) and is shared as an 
expression of friendship while Kikuyu grass is a peace symbol. By sharing this experience, 
she emphasises the need to learn, respect and appreciate the cultures of ones’ neighbours. It is 
                                                            
159 The story was narrated to us by one of the club members of Cheplosgei Primary School.  
160 Its scientific name is Pennisetum clandestinum 
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by appreciating your neighbours’ culture that integration can be achieved, an important 
ingredient to peaceful co-existence (Salomon, 2002).  
 
In the sampled clubs, the pupils were taught the value of respecting diversity, embracing 
dialogue and adherence to regulations - from school rules, edicts by the community to the 
national laws – as an important first step towards peace building and reconciliation of conflict 
at all levels. Club members also went out to their local community on monthly outreach 
missions, which entailed preaching messages of peace, encouraging amicable reconciliation 
to conflict through dialogue and peer counselling. They employed both visual and performing 
art such as poetry, drama, and music to convey their messages to their audiences in the 
neighbourhood and on special occasions like the parents’ days, prize giving days and the 
August 7
th
 Memorial Day, which the clubs observe. 
 
A piece by Natalie and Chelsea, standard seven pupils at Koiluget Primary School, 
encapsulates the prevailing peace in the area in 2010 after the inter-ethnic violence that 
followed the contested presidential and parliamentary elections of 2008. The white dove with 
an olive twig in its beak is a common peace symbol
161
 in the West that has been widely 
adopted in local contexts. The flower is a common symbol for expressing love, a necessary 
ingredient for peaceful coexistence. 
 
 
                                                            
161 See footnote 57 for an interpretation of this symbol. 
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Fig.5.7: We live in peace love and unity.  
Natalie and Chelsea (2010), Crayon on paper. 
 
The use of role models to teach and share experiences in peace building and conflict 
reconciliation inculcates a culture of peace to these young minds. In discussing the critical 
role of education in the quest for peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence in the Africa Great-Lakes 
region, Ndura-Ouedraogo (2009:44) posits that, “when children are educated about peace-
building, nothing will prevent them from following the teachings because they will grow up 
with these lessons in mind”. Arguably, peaceful dispositions in leadership later in life are 
developed in childhood. 
 
Evidence obtained from the club patrons, education staff of the Documentation Centre and 
these schools’ neighbouring communities suggests a positive impact of this programme. The 
patrons, for instance, attested to reduced incidences of bullying and fighting in school, while 
the Tarakwa Primary School’s Parents Teachers Association chair, proclaimed an improved 
relationship amongst the school community – parents, teachers and the pupils. 
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5.3.5 Stereotyping Ethnicity 
 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, politicised ethnicity pervades many facets of 
Kenyan society and is manifest in various ways. For instance, since the advent of multiparty 
democracy in 1992, national elections have provided the clearest evidence of the 
inflammation of ethnic feeling resulting in inter-ethnic violence. Presidential elections have 
been particularly divisive as they epitomize ethnic competitions with the expectation that the 
winning candidate would share the spoils of power with members of his own ethnic 
community. Thus in rallies, electronic and print media the politicians rally support of their 
own ethnic community first, while warning against the dangers of voting for a different 
community’s candidate. The appeal to ethnic solidarity is always supported by portrayal of 
the competing candidate, and indeed his or her entire ethnic community, in very disparaging 
terms. The build up to the 2007 elections provides one such example when tribal feeling was 
instigated to create a climate of intense tribal identification, animosity and hatred that 
culminated in the now infamous 2008 post-election violence. It is arguable that in such a 
highly charged atmosphere of ethnic survival where opposing communities are only defined 
in negative stereotypes, the very idea of a shared national identity is highly problematized. It 
is to the creation of these negative ethnic stereotypes that I now turn. 
 
The negative stereotypes of communities competing on the opposite sides of the political 
divide during the 2007 Kenyan elections were so widespread that in certain regions, such as 
parts of the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Central province and some Nairobi estates – those 
predominantly inhabited by single ethnic communities – the portraits created easily became 
synonymous with the enemy, with the additional notation that they should be vanquished. In 
the Rift Valley, for instance, Kikuyu were referred to by the Kalenjin as spots (madoadoa), 
weeds (kwekwe), enemy (bunyot), thieves (chorik) who needed to be ‘uprooted.’ Conversely, 
they referred to the Kalenjin as killers (orogani), rapists (munyitaga atumia kia hinya), 
primitive (acurie), drunkards (muriu) and cattle-rustlers who did not deserve such farmland. 
Hence in the two waves of violence in 2007 and 2008, the first seeking the displacement and 
punishment of the Kikuyu and the second seeking retribution of the Kikuyu against Luo and 
the Kalenjin, neighbour turned against neighbour. Kenya was on the brink of the precipice, 
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split between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu where the very concept of Kenyan-ness was under 
threat. Undoubtedly, these stereotypes fanned the hatred and the subsequent conflict. 
 
Patrons of the 10 Schools in Tarakwa zone were unanimous in asserting that in the run up to 
the 2007 elections, during the post-election violence and the period before the restoration of 
calm, which enabled the displaced persons to return home, school children were prejudiced 
against members of the ‘other’ ethnic community. One would be tempted to ask, how did 
children in primary school aged between 10 and 15 years develop negative attitudes towards 
a group or members of a group that they had grown up together with as neighbours and were 
even attending the same school and church? Children not only learn by copying adults but 
also from the events in their environment. Levi and Hughes (1966: 23) affirm that children’s 
attitudes can either reflect their obvious mimicry of the behaviour of others or their true 
attitude as taught in their environment. Applied to this study, this suggests that children from 
Tarakwa zone must have learnt the stereotypes from their elder siblings, parents and other 
members of their respective ethnic communities. Their attitudes towards the ‘other’ 
community mimicked what prevailed in their environment.  
 
Realizing the dangers these negative stereotypes were having on their students, the club 
patrons embarked on a programme to debunk them. Mr Mibei stated that all the patrons in the 
ten neighbouring schools started teaching their members the basic customs and cultural 
practices of both the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, their histories and how some, like the Kikuyu, 
ended up in the Rift Valley. They also focussed on their shared identities: attend the same 
school, speak Kiswahili as a common language, their foodstuff and clothing are not different. 
In contexts where conflicts are identity-based and belonging to a different group is treated as 
enmity, multi-cultural education becomes necessary in eliminating adversarial mind-sets. 
Challenging stereotypes breaks down enemy images and changes perceptions and ways of 
relating to the other group (Reardon, 1997; Salomon, 2002). The clubs reached out to their 
larger school communities – fellow pupils, teachers and parents – through poems, skits, 
drama and songs to challenge existing stereotypes. They again used occasions such as 
parents’ day, club’s day, prize-giving days, tree-planting occasions and any other events in 
the school and the neighbourhood to deflate the negative stereotypes.  
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In a survey conducted in 2013 to ascertain the veracity of the club patrons’ statement that 
negative stereotypes had been reduced as a result of the activities of the PBKC,
162
 the pupils 
were asked to write what they thought of any other ethnic community, other than their own, 
in their school and the neighbourhood. Their responses were categorized into two: one, a 
positive remark if they gave information about the said community that was in a good light 
and accurate; and two, a negative response if the remark painted the said community in a bad 
light, an overgeneralization or the information was deemed inaccurate. The responses for the 
10 clubs in Uasin Gishu are as tabulated below:  
 
Table.5.2: Pupils’ perception of other ethnic communities in Uasin Gishu County. 
Type of response No of respondents % 
Positive response 114 89.76 
Negative response 13 10.24 
Total respondents 127 
  
These findings reveal a very positive perception of other ethnic communities in Uasin Gishu 
County. The patrons of the PBKC in the schools referred to above identified the reduction of 
stereotypes in their areas as one of the clubs’ success stories. The comments elicited in Uasin 
Gishu, for instance, did not identify anything negative between the two predominant 
communities – Kikuyu and Kalenjin – in the areas sampled; instead, the Turkana and Pokot 
were negatively portrayed as a result of a generalization concerning their cattle-rustling 
activities. These results are not surprising as they are a reflection of the prevailing political 
trends both at the local and national level. It is arguable that the teaming up by the Kalenjin 
and the Kikuyu in one political alliance, the Jubilee Alliance, in the 2013 national elections 
and their subsequent win was positively received by these two communities, hence this 
positive evaluation. 
 
Stereotypes, Taylor (1981:163) asserts, “can be an important mechanism for recognizing and 
expressing ethnicity, and to the extent they are accurate reflections, and refer to positive 
attributes of the stereotyped group, stereotypes can play a constructive role in inter-group 
                                                            
162 These observations are based on the general experiences these patrons have had of their students in this zone 
since 2008.  
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relations”. Patrons in Uasin Gishu have used the clubs to promote the understanding of each 
other’s cultures for harmonious inter-ethnic relations. From the data elicited in this study, it is 
my supposition that the PBKC have contributed to a reduction of negative stereotyping of 
communities in their schools and neighbouring communities in Uasin Gishu County. It is a 
model that could be replicated in other counties in order to promote inter-ethnic 
understanding as a prerequisite to achieving a national unity and identity. 
 
Part IV Conclusion  
 
The bombing of the United States of America embassy in Nairobi on the 7
th
 August 1998 
witnessed Kenyans in all walks of live responding to the unfolding tragedy in unprecedented 
ways. Ethnic and political differences were cast aside as leaders and ordinary citizens came 
together in a real demonstration of unity and patriotism. However, in an ironical turn of 
events, ethnic bigotry soon emerged when the print media focussed almost exclusively on the 
rescue of two Kikuyu victims, Rose Wanjiku and Sammy Nganga (Obwogo, 1999). Beyond 
the rescue period, ethnicity continued rearing its head in the leadership of the ASBVA, an 
association formed to cater for the welfare of the surviving bomb blast victims. 
 
Using this incident, this chapter undertook a historical overview of politicised ethnicity in 
Kenya to demonstrate that it is a deeply ingrained problem whose roots are traceable to the 
colonial period but which continued through the Kenyatta regime (1963-1978), then Daniel 
arap Moi’s (1978-2002) and finally to the Kibaki (2003-2013) presidency. The 
ethnicalization of politics through the three regimes has seriously impacted on Kenya’s socio-
economic and political development. The post-election violence of 2007 to early 2008, in the 
aftermath of which 1300 people were killed and another 600,000 displaced and which took a 
notably ethnic angle, was instrumental in refocusing the activities of the Peace Builder’s Kids 
Club and the development of new programmes on reconciling the nation. The main argument 
in this chapter is that despite the deeply entrenched nature of politicised ethnicity in Kenya, 
the Documentation Centre through the PBKC has played a role in peace building, conflict 
reconciliation and the cultivation of national identity. Children, as has been canvassed, are 
better placed to play this role, as they are yet to develop fixed mind-sets and stereotypes of 
other communities. The PBKC was thus established with the view of influencing change 
192 
 
within their schools and neighbouring communities. While children are said to learn from 
their parents/elders, the converse is equally true. It is against this premise that the activities of 
the PBKC are to be understood. 
 
This chapter has discussed the contributions of the PBKC in Uasin Gishu County in peace 
building and conflict reconciliation. As has been demonstrated, having a positive attitude 
towards members of a different community promotes inter-ethnic understanding, an 
important recipe for fostering cohesion and projection of national identity. Fieldwork data 
from club patrons suggest that, unlike in 2008 and 2009 when their pupils held negative 
prejudice against other communities, the clubs have influenced these prejudices and turned 
them from negative to positive. The testimony of teacher Crispine Owako
163
 that “the clubs 
have had an extremely positive influence because it started when the neighbourhood was full 
of tribalism but at the moment the club members have helped in spreading the peace 
messages thereby people around co-exist positively” supports my argument. 
 
Lastly, this chapter has indicated that at the end of the tour of the Documentation Centre, 
children are given art materials and asked to create pieces of art that encapsulates their 
perceptions of peace. As demonstrated, the clubs are moving in a positive direction. This 
study has additionally revealed that members of the PBKC perform drama, dance and recite 
poems during their outreach missions to the community and on important school days such as 
parents and prize-giving days. This supports this thesis argument that visual and performing 
art play a critical role in mediating trauma of the 1998 terror attack and that these media are 
also applicable in peacebuilding, conflict reconciliation, fostering cohesion and in projection 
of national identity. 
                                                            
163 A club patron at Langas Primary School in Eldoret Municipality.  
Chapter 6: Post-1998: The Escalation of 
Terrorism in Kenya 
 
6.0. Introduction 
 
The Kenyan Muslim population according to the 2009 national census is estimated at 4.3 
million people and constitute about 11% of the total Kenyan population of 38.6 million 
people.
164
 The Muslim community is concentrated in the coastal counties of Mombasa, 
Lamu, Kilifi and Kwale; north-eastern counties of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera; and Marsabit 
and Isiolo counties in the former Eastern Province. Nairobi is also home to a sizable 
population of Muslims who are mainly concentrated in the suburbs of Eastleigh, Pumwani, 
Majengo and Kibra. Other major towns in the country such as Nakuru, Kisumu, Machakos 
and Eldoret also have sizable pockets of Muslim populations. Terrorism activities have, 
however, mainly been carried out in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Wajir and Mandera 
counties.
165
  
Collection of data for this chapter was undertaken between October and December 2013 in 
fieldwork in Nairobi’s Pumwani-Eastleigh area, Pate’s Siyu, Kwale and Mombasa. The 
selection of these areas was informed by their link to suspected perpetrators of the 1998 
Nairobi terror attack, and more recently, Al Shabaab-linked Islamic radicalisation and 
terrorism acts. Whereas the north eastern region has been a major theatre of terrorism, it was 
not possible to undertake any studies there, though fieldwork in Nairobi’s Pumwani-Eastleigh 
area yielded useful data that demonstrated its connection to other wider terror networks in 
Nairobi and Somalia. Three purposively selected focus groups participated in the discussions 
in three sessions that lasted for three to four hours per group. Key informant interviews were 
also conducted. The main focus of the inquiry was their understanding of the origins of 
terrorism in Kenya, factors contributing to its escalation and its impacts on Islamic identity 
and interfaith relations in Kenya. 
 
Terrorism activities in Kenya have escalated in the aftermath of the August 7
th
 1998 bombing 
of the United States of America embassy in Nairobi. This escalation has mainly been 
triggered by counter-terrorism strategies developed by the U.S. government and its 
                                                            
164 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2009 Census results. 
165 See appendix 3 for map of Kenyan counties 
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subsequent designation of Kenya as a ‘strategic’ partner in the fight against terrorism in the 
Horn of Africa (Mogire & Agade, 2011). Prodded by the U.S., Kenya has implemented 
activities perceived to be anti-Islamic hence attracting opposition, some of it violent, from 
local and international Muslim groups and opponents of the U.S. The perception of terrorism 
as relating to “far-and-removed happenings” associated with foreign places such as Lebanon, 
Beirut, Jerusalem, Cairo, and so on, that many had previously encountered on evening 
television and radio news, had changed. Terrorism targets had moved closer to home to 
become part of the Kenyan reality. 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts: Part I, “Mapping the territory and the escalation of 
terrorism”, examines the recent introduction of terrorism in Kenya focussing on the activities 
of one Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the nexus of terrorist activities in eastern Africa. This 
part also analyses the factors that have contributed to this escalation. Part II, “Radicalisation 
and Appropriation of Islamic identity,” builds on the analyses presented in Part I to argue that 
the broad historical, political and economic factors affecting the Muslim community in 
Kenya have been seized by radical Islamic preachers and used to manipulate and indoctrinate 
the youth to embrace extremist ideologies espoused by militant organizations such as the 
Muslim Youth Centre and Al Shabaab. The terror attacks, some targeting churches, have 
threatened Christian-Muslim relations and the aspirations for national unity in Kenya. Part III 
summarises what has been discussed in the chapter. 
 
This chapter’s main thrust is to demonstrate that cases of terrorism perpetrated by extremist 
Islamic organizations have escalated post the 7
th
 August 1998 Nairobi terror attack and to 
explore the possible underlying causes of this escalation. This has engendered a perception 
that Muslims in general support terrorism and hence the suspicious treatment of an Islamic 
identity in Kenya. Continued acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures instituted by 
the government have not boded well for interfaith relations and are a threat to Kenya’s 
tenuous nationalism and identity.  
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Part I: Mapping the Territory and the Escalation of Terrorism 
 
6.1.1. The Fazul Abdullah Mohammed Connection  
 
The journey towards understanding the increased spate of terrorism in Kenya in recent 
history goes back to the 1998 terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, and specifically 
to one man, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed
166
 also known as Abdul Karim or Harun Fazul, the 
Al Qaeda operative who co-ordinated the Nairobi terror attack. His signature on many 
terrorism activities in the region was so evident as to have influenced the U.S. resolve to have 
him captured no matter its implications as encapsulated by this statement in Prestholdt 
(2009:453), asserting that “Fazul has been a public rationale for U.S. counter-terrorism aid to 
African governments and even for the military intervention in Somalia.” His story is the 
strand that ties together the 1998 Nairobi terror attack, the 2002 Mombasa attacks on Paradise 
Hotel in Kikambala, and the Somali-based Al Shabaab terrorist group Kenyan attacks. It is to 
the story of Fazul Abdullah that I now turn.  
 
Fazul Abdullah, a Comorian citizen born in 1972, travelled to Pakistan in 1990 on a study 
scholarship. He however dropped out of school to join an Al Qaeda training camp in 
Pakistan, where he met Osama bin Laden and was indoctrinated with the ideologies of Al 
Qaeda. He returned to Africa in the mid-1990s and travelled widely in countries within the 
Horn of Africa before moving to Kenya in 1997 to lead
167
 the coordination of the U.S. 
Embassy bombing on August 7
th
 1998, which, as we have discussed, resulted in the death of 
over 200 people and injury of over 5000 others. After the bombing, he visited Comoro, 
United Arab Emirates and perhaps returned to Pakistan (Prestholdt, 2009; Vittori et al, 2009). 
It is significant to note that it is the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi rather than 9/11 in 
New York City that prompted the declaration of war on Al Qaeda by George Tenet, the then 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (Tenet & Harlow, 2007).  
 
                                                            
166 This man used over 10 aliases to conceal his identity.  
167 This was occasioned by the death of Abu Ubayda Al Banshiri, Bin Laden’s then deputy, in a ferry accident 
on Lake Victoria in 1996. 
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He returned to Kenya in 2001 arriving in Siyu where he introduced himself as Abdul Karim, 
an Islamic preacher who had felt the urge to preach to the villagers. Within a few months of 
his arrival, he had assembled a team along the Kenya-Somalia coastline and islands, between 
Mogadishu and Mombasa, to coordinate the attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in 
Kikambala, Mombasa and the attempted shooting down of an Israel-destined private jet on 
28th November 2002. He settled on Lamu’s remote northern island of Pate in Siyu where he 
integrated and was introduced by Sheikh Aboud Rogo
168
 to his future wife, Amina Kubwa, 
daughter of Mohammed Kubwa Seif, the local councillor, hence establishing kinship with the 
local leadership who would guarantee him security. The choice of Lamu as a launching pad 
for the attack is crucial: its geographical proximity to Somalia with its easy access via the 
ocean or by land across the porous Kenyan-Somalia border; and the existing bonds of history 
with the Middle East, facilitating the movement of terrorist agents within and across the 
region (Kagwanja, 2010; Rosenau, 2005). In keeping with the local fishing traditions, Abdul 
Karim established a lobster fishing business
169
 to provide cover for his clandestine activities. 
According to Issa Mohammed,
170
 also a fisherman, Abdul Karim, worked many, and at times 
odd, hours venturing out to the deep-sea where only the very skilled and experienced 
fishermen dared. He engaged him together with two other local youth in his fishing business 
and sometimes spent time with them when not working. Issa was among those arrested by 
Kenyan detectives between November 2002 and May 2003 when the hunt for Abdul Karim 
and his co-conspirators was initiated. In hindsight, Issa thinks that the deep-sea fishing 
voyages must have been a cover to network with other conspirators, receive items for the 
assembly of his bombs and to gain mastery of the ocean that would become necessary for the 
escape to Somalia after the Mombasa bombings.
171
 The small, relatively fast, fibre-glass-
fabricated motor boats, like the ones used by Abdul Karim in his fishing business, have 
become the vessel of choice for moving a small group of people and arms to-and-from 
                                                            
168 A Siyu-born Islamic cleric who was based in Mombasa and came to prominence in 2002, when alongside his 
father-in-law and brother-in-law, Mohammed Kubwa Seif and Mohammed Kubwa respectively were charged 
with the Paradise Hotel bombing in Kikambala. Sheikh Rogo dropped out of primary school to pursue Islamic 
education in a madrassa in Siyu before proceeding to Mombasa to advance his Islamic education. He only came 
to prominence after the killing of Fazul in 2011. Police sources believe that he took over the leadership of Al 
Qaeda in the region after the killing of Fazul. (The Standard 3rd September, 2013) 
 
169 Al Qaeda provided capital to several members of his team to set up similar fishing ventures along the Kenyan 
coast.  
170 Personal Interview, Siyu 22nd October 2012. 
171 Kenyan investigators believe that the terrorists that survived the Kikambala attack regrouped in Lamu before 
escaping to Somalia. 
197 
 
Somalia. Indeed a draft United Nations report (UN Security Council, 2003) confirms that the 
perpetrators of the Kikambala attacks in Mombasa in November 2002 used similar vessels: 
MV Midrarah and MV Sauda, vessels that our informants confirmed having seen in Siyu 
within the same period. A few weeks prior to the Mombasa attacks, Abdul Karim moved to 
Mombasa, where he lived in the Saba Saba neighbourhood and worshipped at Masjid Musa 
mosque,
172
 as did Aboud Rogo.  
 
After the attacks the surviving members of the team, including Abdul Karim, escaped to 
Lamu then on to lawless Somalia, where Al Qaeda maintains training camps for its recruits 
under Abdul Karim, then its East African coordinator (Joshua, 2004). In Somalia, they 
worked with and got protection from organizations such as Al-Ittihad-Al-Islammiya (AIAI), a 
long-standing Somali militant group that later folded into the Islamic Court Union (ICU) and 
strove to root out the U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Stewart, 2012; 
The Standard Newspaper 5.08.2008). ICU’s reign in Somalia was short-lived; Ethiopian 
forces – with the support of the African Union - invaded Somalia in December 2006 leading 
to its disintegration in early 2007. Many of its hard-core elements, including Fazul, joined the 
ICU youth wing, Al Shabaab, to become a separate military organization. As the ICU was 
being driven out of Mogadishu, Prestholdt (2009), quoting Pentagon sources, avers that the 
U.S. intelligence presumed that Fazul was trying to escape from Somalia with a contingent of 
ICU fighters. Thus, a deployment of Special Forces was sent to eliminate him together with 
other Al Qaeda members, a mission that failed as none of its top barons was killed. 
Henceforth, Al Shabaab continued retaliatory attacks against Kenya and Ethiopia for 
supporting the U.S.-backed invasion and counter-terrorism initiatives in the region. It is 
against this background that Kenya deployed two military battalions and teamed up with U.S. 
and British forces to patrol the Kenya-Somalia border and the Indian Ocean to prevent any 
terrorist infiltration into Kenya. Henceforth, Somalia became a major focus for Kenya’s 
counter-terrorism strategies (Kariuki, 2003; West, 2006; Rabasa, 2009). The U.S. equally 
viewed Somalia as a potential breeding ground, safe haven and transit point for terrorists 
(Mogire & Agade, 2011; Lyman & Morrison, 2009).  
 
                                                            
172 This mosque has in the last few years acquired a reputation for its radical sermons and frequent clashes with 
the police.  
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Abdul Karim taught at the Shanga na Uti madrassa and worshipped in any of the nine 
mosques of Siyu and is reputed to have even started a local football club which he named 
Kandahar,
173
 which competed with the island’s other team, Al Qaeda,174 and played as the 
goalkeeper in the latter team (Joshua, 2004; Rosenau, 2005). While not teaching soccer, 
Abdul Karim recruited local Siyuan residents to join Al Qaeda, both Kenyan and FBI 
investigators allege. His recruits identified with his brand of Islamic fundamentalism – which 
stood out but were largely ignored by the locals. Ali Mohammed
175
 stated that Karim ‘did not 
want them praying near graves or celebrating Maulidi’176 – practices that are common along 
the Lamu coast. Suspected-terrorist recruits
177
 associated with Abdul Karim include the fiery 
Mombasa-based street preacher Sheikh Aboud Rogo, Saleh Ali Saleh, Ali Nabhan, Ibrahim 
Rogo, Mohammed Kubwa Seif, Mohammed Kubwa, and Sheikh Abubakar alias Makaburi.
178
 
Some of these people were seen in the island of Pate in Siyu variously, prior to and 
immediately after, the Kikambala terror attacks. Some of them – for instance the Kubwas – 
were eventually arrested and charged before Kenyan courts for conspiracy to commit murder 
based on evidence demonstrating their involvement in the Kikambala terror attacks. 
 
Fazul is said to have also masterminded an attempted attack on the new U.S. Embassy in 
Nairobi in June 2003 by deploying a light aircraft with the intent of bombing it, a plan that 
was foiled by Kenyan security forces (Cilliers, 2010; Rosenau, 2005). In this attack, just like 
the Mombasa ones, Al Qaeda cells located in and operating from Somalia participated. From 
this study, it was apparent that Al Qaeda used the various remote islands in Lamu as plotting 
and sheltering spots for the two Mombasa attacks. It is to these islands that they also escaped 
en route to Somalia where their main training bases are situated. In the region, Al Qaeda has 
established ‘terror centres’, and as many as 10-15 ‘sleeper cells’ in Kenya alone (Rosenau, 
2005).  
 
It is these terror attacks of 2002 that reinforced concerns that East Africa was increasingly 
becoming a breeding ground for Al Qaeda terrorists, prompting President George Bush to re-
evaluate American foreign policy on Africa with security becoming one of its critical 
                                                            
173 Fazul received his training in Afghanistan’s Kandahar and Somalia. 
174 The choice of these names apparently raised no suspicion with the local security. 
175 A local fisherman, personal interview, Siyu, 22nd October 2013. 
176 Celebrations to mark the birth of Prophet Mohammed. 
177 Though some of them were arrested and charged in court, they were not convicted for lack of evidence. 
178 Shot dead by unknown assailants on 1st April, 2014. 
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components (Morgan, 2009; Vittori et al, 2009). It is arguable that President George Bush 
was reading from a similar script to Tenet’s when he declared the global war on terror in the 
aftermath of the September 11
th
 2001 attacks in the U.S.  
 
The foregoing has demonstrated the centrality of Fazul in perpetrating acts of terror in Kenya. 
While he participated in the planning and execution of the 1998 bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Nairobi, the Mombasa attacks in 2002 and the thwarted attack on the new U.S. 
Embassy in 2003, it is possible to suggest that he inspired/encouraged the Al Shabaab group 
to attack the Kenyan targets in an effort to frustrate their efforts in pursuing him into Somalia. 
The counter-terrorism initiatives begun in the region in 2003 were in no doubt linked to 
Fazul’s escalation of terrorist activities. 
 
Fazul was killed in Somalia when he mistakenly drove into a security roadblock and refused 
to stop, forcing security forces to spray his vehicle with bullets, killing him instantly. His 
death was as brutal as that he had inflicted on hundreds of others and was celebrated by the 
local victims more than that of Osama Bin Laden, as he was the mastermind of the terror 
attacks. A survivor of the Kikambala bombing attack, Lucy Aringo, stated that, “though his 
death may seem like a little thing, it gives peace to my soul and in a way provides closure to 
my trauma” (Mutiga, 2011). 
 
Having demonstrated in this section that Fazul played a critical role in mapping the Kenyan 
territory for terrorism, the following section documents cases of terrorism and the underlying 
reasons for its escalation. 
 
6.1.2. The Escalation of Terrorism 
 
Following the 1998 Nairobi terror attacks, there was apprehension amongst Kenyans that the 
country had been thrust into the theatre of terrorism. An opinion poll conducted by the Nation 
Media Group soon after the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam terror attacks found that “most people 
in Kenya and Tanzania believe that the targeting of their countries by anti-American 
extremists and the reprisal missile attacks make further attacks more, rather than less 
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likely.”179 73% of the Kenyans interviewed said that they felt less safe than before, compared 
to 16% who believed the bombing had not affected their security. Another 48% believed that 
it would lead to increased terrorism in the world while another 11% believed terrorism in 
Kenya particularly will increase compared to 17% who thought it would decrease.  
 
The fears expressed in this survey of 1998 have indeed come to pass judging by fieldwork 
results elicited by the present research. Except in a very small minority, a majority of the 
respondents in my focus groups had not heard of any acts of terrorism in Kenya prior to the 
U.S. embassy bombing. The only terrorist incident this minority remembered was the 1980 
Norfolk Hotel bombing in Nairobi, the rest mentioned incidences in Palestine, Beirut, Cairo, 
Lebanon and Israel, confirming that terrorism was not within the realm of Kenyan reality. 
Asked whether they were aware of incidences of terrorism post-1998, a majority answered in 
the affirmative. This could mean either or both of the following factors; one, there has been 
increased reportage of terrorism-related issues in the local media, thus creating more 
awareness, or the actual acts of terror have increased. Both factors have contributed to this 
state of affairs in Kenya. This position is buttressed by Owala et al (2013:1) who agree that 
many developing countries, such as Kenya, have not in the past had many acts of terrorism 
originating from the country itself, and have for a long time reported on terrorist acts in other 
countries. In view of the increased reportage of cases of terrorism in the Kenyan media, one 
question that arises is whether cases of terrorism in the earlier decades prior to 1998 could 
have occurred but been reported as inter-faith conflict, criminal murders, or cross-border 
abductions? An examination of newspaper reports of the early to mid-1990s does not support 
such a supposition. While criminal cases were indeed reported as such, cases of interfaith 
conflicts pitting Islam against Christianity, and vice versa, did not make it to the newspaper 
pages suggesting that they probably never existed. Cross-border conflicts along the Kenya-
Somali border existed but these were motivated by inter-clan conflicts, mainly over access 
and control of natural resources such as pastures and water. What has changed since 1998 to 
qualify these cases as acts of terror is that the reported cases, as documented in table 6.1 
below, are the fact that they are motivated by external, international networks that claim 
affiliation to known terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab. Based on the 
available evidence, it is arguable that the label ‘terrorism’ became commonplace in the local 
media after 1998. This view resonates with Owala et al’s (ibid) observation that in the recent 
                                                            
179 East African, 31st August to 6th September, 1998.  
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past there have been increased cases of terrorist activities in the developing world, such as in 
Kenya and Nigeria, hence the increased media presence of these cases. Terrorism incidents 
post-1998 enumerated by our respondents mirror what was also reported in the media 
supporting the observation that there has been an escalation of terrorist. Below is a summary 
of the incidences reported in three of Kenya’s leading newspapers, Daily Nation, East 
African Standard and The Star, between 1998 and 2012.  
 
Table.6.1: Incidences of Terrorism reported in the Kenya print media between 1998 and 2012.180 
Year Date Incident Target Fatalities Injured Perpetrator 
1998 7.08 Bombing  American Embassy. 254 Over 5000 Al Qaeda 
2002 28.11 Bomb attack Israeli tourists at an 
Israeli-owned Hotel, 
Mombasa. 
15 80 Al Qaeda 
2002 28.11 Missile attack Israeli- destined flight 
from Mombasa. 
0 - Al Qaeda 
2002 18.12 Bombing Discotheque. 3 Not 
reported 
(NR). 
Unknown 
2003 13.08 Grenade 
detonation 
Terror suspect kills self 
and police officer.  
 
2  Al Qaeda 
2007 11.06 Explosives Restaurant in downtown, 
Nairobi. 
2 NR Al Shabaab 
2007 11.06 Grenade 
attack 
Bus park, in Nairobi. 3 39 Al Shabaab 
2010 04.12 Grenade 
attacks 
Policemen. 3 - Al Shabaab 
2010 18.12 Grenade 
attacks 
Travellers at Kampala 
Coach’s stage. 
1 26  
2011 01.10 Kidnapping Marie Dedieu, a 66-year 
old disabled French 
woman from her Manda 
home. 
Later died - Al Shabaab 
2011 13.10 Kidnapping Two female Spanish 
‘Medicins sans 
Frontieres’ aid workers.  
 - Al Shabaab 
2011 24.10 Grenade 
attacks 
Mwaura’s Pub181 and 
Bus park in downtown 
Nairobi. 
5  NR Al Shabaab 
2011 27.10 Grenade 
attack 
A vehicle carrying 
KCSE exams in 
Mandera. 
4 NR Al Shabaab 
 
2011 
 
05.11 
 
Grenade 
 
Worshippers, Garissa 
 
2 
 
Scores 
 
Muslim 
                                                            
180 The list is by no way exhaustive.  
181 Considered the first terror attack after Kenya’s Defense Forces’ (KDF) incursion in Somalia. 
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attack Pentecostal Church. Youth 
Centre 
(MYC)182  
2011 24.11 Blasts 
Grenade 
attack 
Public, Garissa 
Military staff of the 
KDF.  
3 
1 
NR Al Shabaab 
2011 05.12 Grenade 
explosion 
Policemen at the Ifo 
refugee camp, Garissa. 
1 3 MYC 
2012 01.01 Grenade 
attacks and 
shooting 
Revellers at a 
discotheque, Garissa. 
6 100s MYC 
2012 11.01 Bombing Administration Police 
camp in Gerille, Wajir. 
7 - Suspected 
Al Shabaab 
2012 10.03 Series of 
explosions 
Travellers at Machakos 
Bus Station, Nairobi. 
6 63 Al Shabaab 
2012 31.03 Grenade 
attack  
Bombing 
(home-made) 
Prayer rally, Mtwapa 
Restaurant 
(All in Mombasa). 
1 NR Muslim 
youth 
2012 29.04 Grenade 
attack 
Worshippers at a church 
in Ngara. 
1 10 MYC 
2012 15.05 Grenade 
attack 
 
Explosive 
Discotheque in 
Mombasa. 
Police vehicle in 
Garissa. 
1 
 
1 
5 
 
4 
Al Shabaab 
 
MYC 
2012 28.05 Explosive Assanands Music 
House, Nairobi. 
1 36 Al Shabaab 
2012 24.06 Explosives Jericho Beer Garden, 
Mombasa. 
4 30  
2012 01.07 Twin grenades 
and small 
arms attacks 
Worshippers at Our 
Lady of Consolata 
Catholic church and 
African Inland Church 
in Garissa. 
17 66 MYC 
2012 03.08 Suicide attack Eastleigh Estate. 1 6 Al Shabaab 
2012 28.08 Grenade 
attacks 
Police after Sheikh 
Rogo’s execution. 
3 100s MYC 
2012 15.09 Landmine Police in Garissa. 2 - Unknown 
2012 30.09 Grenade 
attack 
 
 
Shooting 
Sunday school at St. 
Polycarps Church, 
Nairobi. 
Police on patrol in 
Garissa. 
1 
 
 
2 
NR 
 
 
- 
Suspected 
Al Shabaab 
terrorists 
2012 27.10 Shooting Police officer in Daadab 
refugee camp, Garissa. 
1 - Unknown 
2012 18.11 Explosives Matatu183 in Eastleigh, 10 25 MYC 
                                                            
182 A radical Islamist youth movement founded in 2008 in Majengo area of Nairobi as an advocacy group 
claiming to articulate social, economic and religious issues of impoverished and disadvantaged young Muslims 
in Kenya. It has, however, transformed into an Islamic radicalism hub for the preaching of jihadist ideologies 
and recruitment of local youth to the Al Shabaab. It has expanded to Mombasa, Garissa and Somalia and is 
accused of encouraging violent action inside Kenya, one of its primary goals. It carries out some of its terror 
attacks in cooperation with Al Shabaab (Anzalone 2012). 
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Nairobi. 
2012 05.12 Roadside 
bomb 
Joska area, Eastleigh, 
Nairobi during rush 
hour. 
1 6 Suspected 
MYC 
2012 07.12 Explosives Mosque in Eastleigh, 
Nairobi. 
7 8 Al Shabaab 
2012 19.12 Explosives Public outside Al Amin 
Mosque, Eastleigh 
during rush hour. 
2 10s Suspected 
MYC 
2012 20.12 Shootings Public in  Garissa. 3 - Al Shabaab 
 
Besides these widely reported incidents, Kenyan authorities together with her Western 
counterparts reported foiling numerous terrorist attacks against Western interests in Kenya, 
reinforcing the fear that the country will continue facing such threats. One such was the foiled 
attempt by Fazul to blow up the newly opened U.S. Embassy in Nairobi using a light aircraft 
in 2003 (Mogire & Agade, 2011; West, 2006). The West’s warnings of imminent terrorist 
attacks, temporary closure of their embassies
184
 and suspension of flights
185
 to and from their 
countries confirms this claim. An analysis of these incidents, while revealing an accelerating 
trend, also identified two notable periods in which they occurred, suggesting that they were 
triggered by particular events.  
 
The first period is between 1998 and 2004 when the first major incident of terror attack, the 
1998 bombing of the U.S. Nairobi Embassy occurs with subsequent events related to it. The 
personal involvement of Fazul in these incidents is notable: the targets, the Paradise Hotel in 
Kikambala, the Israeli-destined Arkia airliner and the new U.S. Embassy. Although the last 
two were not successfully executed, these targets could suggest that Al Qaeda considered it 
still had unfinished business against the U.S. and its allied state of Israel (Otenyo, 2004). 
Arguing on the premise that these latter incidences were a continuation of the 1998 Nairobi 
terror attack, one could say they have been motivated by the same objectives, namely: “the 
desire to drive the United States from all Muslim lands, especially in the Arabian peninsula” 
(Bergen et al, 1998:19). The selected targets – had the foiled attacks succeeded – would have 
had significant impact on U.S. and Israeli interests in the region raising Al Qaeda’s profile as 
a terrorist group. America’s support for Israel is a cause that has been frequently adduced for 
anti-American feelings in many parts of the Muslim world (Kegley Jr, 2003; Mogire & 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
183 Public service vehicle. 
184 The new U.S. embassy was closed between 22nd and 24th June 2003.  
185 British Airways and Israel’s El Al suspended flights into Kenya in May 2003. 
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Agade, 2011); as Otenyo suggests (cited in Mogire & Agade, 2011), the very fact of Kenya’s 
friendship with the U.S. and Israel renders it a terrorist target.  
 
The second wave of terror attacks began in 2007 but there is very little reportage of incidents 
between 2008 and 2010. Then this increased significantly towards the end of 2011 and 
reached its peak in 2012. These attacks were characterised by the selection of soft targets 
such as bus termini, pubs and market places, places that are not normally associated with 
stringent security surveillance. The weapons of choice were the un-sophisticated Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IED) with grenades being the weapon of choice. The intention, it appears, 
is not geared at inflicting mass casualties but to undermine government efforts at securing her 
citizens and the disruption of economic activity (Kegley Jr, 2003). The ousting of the Islamic 
Court Union government in Somalia by the U.S. and African-union backed invasion by 
Ethiopian forces in 2007 marked the beginning of a new wave of terrorism in Kenya. In the 
aftermath of this invasion, Kenyan and U.S. forces set up joint positions along the Kenya-
Somalia border to capture militants fleeing Somalia. Kenyan officials are reportedly said to 
have detained over 100 refugees before extraditing them to Ethiopia, to the great chagrin of 
Somali Islamists (Fisher 2013; Prestholdt 2011). The ousting of ICU and the inability of TFG 
to govern effectively the whole of Somalia created a vacuum that was easily filled by militant 
organizations such as Al Shabaab. Kenya’s support for TFG in its struggle against the ICU 
has been counter-productive. Al Shabaab vowed retaliation and threatened to carry out terror 
attacks in Kenya for its partisan role in Somalia. The recruitment of local youth to join Al 
Shabaab notably went a notch higher from 2007 lending credence to Al Shabaab’s claims of 
responsibility for the terror attacks in Kenya (Anzalone, 2012).  
 
Towards the end of 2011, Al Shabaab started cross-border forays into Kenya to kidnap 
Western tourists, especially in northern Kenya and on the Indian Ocean islands. One notable 
incident is the 1
st
 October 2011 kidnapping of Marie Dedieu
186
 from her Kenyan resort in 
Manda to Somalia, where she died a few weeks later in the hands of her captors (Nzes, 2012). 
Kenya, incensed by the damage these attacks were inflicting on her tourism industry, and the 
perceived lukewarm
187
 support for the war on terror, was spurred to intervene in October 
                                                            
186 A disabled French woman who had lived in Manda for many years. 
187 The failure by the Kenyan government to pass the ‘Suppression of Terrorism’ bill attracted criticism from the 
U.S. government and other Western allies who threatened to discontinue military aid if Kenya showed no 
commitment on the war on terror (Fisher 2013).  
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2011 by sending her military troops to pursue the enemy, Al Shabaab, in their own country in 
an operation codenamed “Linda Nchi.”188 This prompted Al Shabaab to warn that it would 
launch a campaign of terror in Kenya; and true to her word, there have been 29 attacks 
involving grenades or improvised devices, which have left 99 people dead and over 300 
others injured since Kenya’s incursion into Somalia in 2011. A sample of the attacks 
experienced during this period is as tabulated in table 6.1. In these waves of attack, churches 
henceforth become part of the terrorists’ agenda. According to Yakub Dahiye,189 the Muslim 
Youth Centre (MYC)
190
 justifies these attacks on the basis that “Kenya is a Christian nation 
that discriminates against the Muslims hence the need to take the war to adherents of the 
Christian faith.” The entry of the MYC introduces a new perspective to terrorism in Kenya: 
the Muslim-Christian conflict.
191
  
 
This section has demonstrated the acceleration of terrorism in Kenya after the 1998 Nairobi 
terror attack. The discussion has been premised on the existence of two different waves of 
terror attacks in Kenya between 1998 and 2012. It suggests that that these waves were 
triggered by, first, the anti-American ideology espoused by Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda and 
its followers; and secondly, Kenya’s support of the ousting of the Islamic Court Union in 
Somalia and the subsequent rendition of the fleeing Islamists to Ethiopia and Kenya’s own 
defence forces invasion of Somalia in 2011. Many in Kenya have therefore attributed the 
recent escalation of terror attacks to its military’s invasion of Somalia (Fisher, 2011; Nzes, 
2012).  
 
Having demonstrated that terrorism activities are indeed on the rise in Kenya, this study 
sought to establish from its informants the other factors that are contributing to this situation. 
While it is not possible to discuss all the factors they identified, I will in this section 
consolidate them into three major categories: marginalisation; Islamic madrassa; and 
counterterrorism.  
 
                                                            
188 Swahili for ‘protect the nation’. 
189 Personal interview, Nairobi (13.12.2012). Yakub frequently prays at Riyadha Mosque in Pumwani where 
MYC is based.   
190 See note 182. 
191 See 6.2.2 for a brief discussion on interfaith conflict. 
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6.1.3. Marginalisation 
 
The former North Eastern Province, a region mainly occupied by ethnic Somalis, is by 
common consent the most disadvantaged region in Kenya. Since independence it has 
experienced a history of insurgency, misrule, repression, chronic poverty, massive youth 
unemployment, insecurity, poor infrastructure and lack of basic services - all combining to 
produce some of the country’s bleakest socio-economic and political conditions (Crisis 
Group, 2012). This marginalization started way before independence when the region was 
declared the North Frontier District (NFD) and closed to development because it was of 
marginal economic interest to the British colonists. The formation of the Somali Republic in 
1960 saw a majority of Kenyan Somalis in the NFD agitate for secession to become part of 
Somalia, an agitation that was turned down by the Britain-sponsored Regional Boundaries 
Commission of 1962. They did not see their community having “a stake in a newly 
independent, multicultural and ‘Christian’ Kenya” (ibid: 2). The forced incorporation into 
Kenya was thus seen as a betrayal of their aspirations as a people hence engendering an 
armed rebellion – the Shifta war192 of the 1960s. The government sent in its security forces to 
suppress the rebellion and declared a state of emergency in the province that was to last for 
almost 30 years, a period that witnessed grave brutalities against the Somali people. They 
perceived these brutalities as a wholesale condemnation of a people for espousing a Somali 
identity. The breakdown in Somalia in 1991, coupled with its long and porous border with 
Kenya, heralded a new era of insecurity and inter-clan conflict due to the increased 
availability of guns, and an influx of Somali refugees - some of whom fought on the side of 
their Kenyan clans. The government continued sending security forces to mop up the illegal 
arms and to flush out non-Kenyan Somali for confinement to refugee camps. Believing that 
the refugees were hiding amongst the citizens, the operations violated the rights of Kenyans 
of Somali origins too, alienating them further from their government. Screening missions to 
the North Eastern Province were also launched by the government to identify the refugees but 
these also promoted the perception that the Kenyan Somali were being discriminated against. 
They perceived as discrimination the rigorous and often arbitrary screening requiring them to 
show evidence of citizenship on the pretext of preventing Somali Somalis from infiltrating 
the country (Mwangi, 2012). While the latter may seem a justifiable precautionary measure 
                                                            
192 A rebellion by Somali-speaking people of North Eastern Province advocating for secession to become part of 
the Somalia Republic. 
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on the side of government, other border communities, like the Abakuria, Teso and Maasai are 
not subjected to similar scrutiny.  
 
Anyone travelling along Kenya’s coastal strip, from Shimoni to Siyu and Taveta to Bura will 
notice the endemic poverty and chronic underdevelopment pointing at the state of 
marginalization of the region. From the dilapidated state of roads to school buildings in poor 
shape, lack of water, poorly distributed health facilities and neglected farms to dilapidated 
housing structures; all attest to government neglect of the region. Coastal residents assert that 
successive regimes from 1963 have marginalized them by failing to develop or facilitate the 
local Muslim people to invest in their own area. Instead, ‘upcountry’ people have been 
supported in investing in the tourism sector through government loans and grants to build 
hotels, restaurants and other tourism facilities because of their close association with those in 
power (Vittori et al, 2009). Jobs in these sectors, they alleged, are equally dished out to 
‘upcountry’ people, especially in the professional cadres; anyone with a Muslim name is 
hardly considered for employment. Owing to this government neglect, Muslim non-
governmental organizations such as Al Haramaiin Islamic Foundation, Ibrahim Bin Abdul 
Aziz Foundation, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Help Africa People, African Relief 
Agency and the Islamic Charitable Foundation, and so on (Kagwanja, 2010), have 
conveniently filled the gap left by government. Consequently, they have carved a niche for 
themselves by working with and developing the coastal region and other Muslim dominated 
regions of northern Kenya. However, in the aftermath of the 1998 terror attack, many of these 
non-governmental organizations were deregistered and accused of having linkages with terror 
groups. Many civic leaders in Muslim communities contend that the crackdown on larger 
welfare-oriented Muslim NGO’s had impacted on community-led initiatives such as the 
running of orphanages, schools and health centres in the former Coast Province and North 
Eastern Province, increasing poverty in Islamic communities (Lind & Howell, 2009: 343-
344). Hence, eliciting resistance as this was seen as an attempt by the government to continue 
their marginalization. Rather than addressing the causes of marginalization, the government 
assumed that banning these organizations would diminish the danger of the local youth being 
attracted to the radical Islamist ideas advocated by international terrorist networks. 
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6.1.4. Islamic Madrassa 
 
Madrassa have become the new grounds for the recruitment of terrorists (Haynes, 2006: 500). 
Although these schools are intended to spread literacy among the under-privileged youth 
through the study of the Koran by focusing on its tafsiri, sharia, hadith, mantiq and historia 
(interpretation, law, recorded sayings and deeds of the Prophet, logic and Islamic history), 
some are being used as indoctrination centres advocating extremism against non-believers. Al 
Haramaiin Islamic Foundation, which supported madrassa schools along the coast in the mid-
2000s, is thought to have promoted Salafist
193
 teachings in these schools, thus the emergence 
of Islamic extremism, especially amongst the youth. Critics allege that madrassa propagate 
anti-Western propaganda in the context of references to extra-national conflict, such as the 
American-led campaigns and meddling against Gadaffi in Libya, Sudan, Somalia and the 
enduring Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This portrayal enables them to build an image of a 
tormented Islam under attack from the West. They also cite the intrusion of Western cultural 
values and behaviour patterns as evidence that their faith is being denigrated. Sheikh 
Mohammed Idriss
194
 has observed that madrassa have now become more conservative in the 
interpretation of the Koran and fears that their narrow interpretation could be exploited by 
extremist groups to recruit the youth to support terrorism. He adds that his organization “is 
opposed to teachings that introduce unsuitable ideologies to youth, adding that those behind 
the violence were using youth for their selfish interests and agenda” (The Standard, 2013).  
 
In reaction to these fears, the government instituted an investigation into the madrassa Islamic 
schools suspected to be propagating extremism and deported foreign clerics suspected of 
preaching it; and tried controlling madrassa by asking their heads to provide details of their 
students, location and their source of funding. This was interpreted as a government strategy 
to control Muslims and the growth of Islam (Amnesty International, 2005) and was, 
therefore, resisted for it was viewed as a further scheme to discriminate against them. 
Commenting on the heightening trend of radicalisation of the Kenyan Muslims, particularly 
                                                            
193 A strand of Islam that works towards returning the entire Muslim community to an ideal world lived strictly 
according to the teachings of the Koran and as lived by the Prophet under the guidance of Allah’s law. They 
considered the local forms of Islam ‘primitive’ and in need of ‘purification’ to return the Muslim community to 
the ways of Allah (Haynes 2006: 491). It also strives to revive Islamic thought within the boundaries of Islamic 
principles – where Islamic solutions are sought for contemporary problems (Gunaratna 2002).   
194 Chairman of the Council of Islamic Preachers of Kenya (CIPK).  
209 
 
in the north-eastern region of Kenya, Mr E. Hogendoom
195
 stated that “one long-term factor 
is that for the last couple of decades, there has been an increased funding of conservative 
madrassa that have made the Muslim community much more conservative and isolated from 
central government.”196  
 
6.1.5. Counter-terrorism: A plot against Islam? 
 
While the 1998 Nairobi terror attack on the U.S. Embassy was registered in the U.S. 
terrorism radar alert, it was not considered serious enough a threat to warrant a U.S. policy 
shift towards East Africa. However, the September 11
th
 2001 attacks and the subsequent 
terrorist activities in Kenya in 2002 reinforced concerns that East Africa could become more 
attractive to Al Qaeda terrorists, prompting George Bush’s foreign policy shift to include 
eastern Africa (Vittori et al, 2009). The desire to vanquish existing Al Qaeda terrorists from 
the region and to deter their further expansion culminated in the formulation of the East 
Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative (EACTI) in 2003. It was intended to provide training and 
equipment for counter-terrorism units, as well as support for legislators and other senior-level 
decision makers involved in policy formulation to counter terrorism. Kenya, which had 
become a haunt for terrorism in the region, supported the initiative. Its implementation took 
various forms, that have instead of deterring a further spread of Islamic fundamentalism and 
its associated terror, ended up eliciting resentment from Muslim communities who see these 
measures as proof of the prejudice against their faith (Mogire & Agade, 2009; Morgan, 
2009). Members of the Muslim communities interviewed for this study had the following 
grievances against these initiatives, which I now discuss.  
 
This study was informed that since Fazul’s hideouts in Siyu, Malindi and Mombasa were 
uncovered, there have been indiscriminate raids on madrassas, internet cafes, fisheries, non-
governmental organization’s offices and even homes over suspicion that they harboured 
terrorists. An internet café operator in Mombasa’s Saba Saba area, Mr Salim Ahmed, for 
instance, narrated how in 2008 his café was raided by the Anti-Terror Police Unit
197
 (ATPU), 
                                                            
195 Project director, Crisis Group Horn of Africa  
196 www.crisisgroup.org/en/multimedia/podcast/2012/kenya-hogendoorn-kenya-somalia-islamist- 
radicalisation.aspx 
197 A special unit of the police set up in February 2003 to plan and execute anti-terrorism operations in Kenya. It 
receives security assistance particularly training and equipment from the United States and United Kingdom.   
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five times in a period of two weeks, over suspicion that Fazul had been frequenting the place. 
He was thus suspected of either being sympathetic to or engaged in activities that supported 
terrorism, without any shred of evidence. His six desktop computers were seized and taken 
away by ATPU purportedly to search any information linking him to terrorism. His home 
was not spared either as they suspected he could have hidden more computer devices there. 
Raiding his house, he said, violated his privacy as the house was completely turned ‘inside-
out’ including inspecting personal property belonging to his wife, a great violation of his 
privacy. They threatened to kill him if he did not give passwords to files and storage disks 
used by Fazul and his group. Failing to find anything incriminating in his café and house was 
not enough; he was arrested and interrogated at Kilidini Police station for three days and later 
released. According to him, the interrogating officers tortured him in an effort to extract 
information – which he did not have – linking him to terrorists. All this time, he was kept 
incommunicado without his family being informed or being allowed to access the services of 
a lawyer. Some of his computers were never returned and his complaints to the police have 
not yielded any positive results to date. He harbours bitterness against the government for the 
indiscriminate treatment meted out to him simply for being Muslim and on the tenuous 
suspicion that he was sympathetic to terrorism.  
 
The story of Ahmed mirrors the experience of many other Muslims in Mombasa, Lamu, 
Nairobi or Garissa. There are many who own fishing businesses, taxi operations, hotel 
business – and even hawkers – who have faced similar treatment reinforcing the view that 
Muslims are being discriminated against in Kenya. This position is supported by Amnesty 
International (2003) who accuses ATPU and America’s Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) of engaging in arbitrary arrests, torture of suspects, detention without charge and 
rendition of suspects contrary to Kenyan law. In carrying out its mandate, ATPU has indeed 
committed a wide variety of human rights abuses against Muslims that are in violation of 
national, regional and international law (Open Society Foundation, 2013).  
 
They also cited the disappearance, killing and rendition of suspects including those of a 
section of Muslim leaders to stand trial in foreign countries for terrorism charges – as an 
affront to their faith and rights as Muslims. They claimed to have witnessed increased cases 
of mysterious disappearances and unlawful killings of terror suspects, especially from April 
2012. Among those they said had been killed by ATPU are people like Sheikh Aboud Rogo, 
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Issa Abdalla, Omar Faraj, Kassim Omolo Otieno and Ibrahim Ramadhan Hamisi, people that 
were known to them. Those whose whereabouts remain unknown include Badru Mramba, 
Jacob Musyoka, and Salim Abubakar. This list is in no way conclusive as it only contains 
names that my Mombasa focus group enumerated. As might be expected, the government 
denied involvement in these incidents, though the local Muslim community in Mombasa is 
not convinced. Such treatment is bound to make the Muslim community lose trust in their 
government and reduces any chances of collaboration in the fight against terrorism.  
 
The Kenyan Muslim community reviles the deportation and rendition of terror suspects. They 
remember the cases of 13 Kenyans who were rendered to Uganda on suspicion that they 
participated in the July 2010 bombing of a restaurant in Kampala that killed 76 people 
watching the World Cup. Alamin Kimathi,
198
 who was lured from Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport, Nairobi, while en route to Kampala with his lawyer to arrange legal 
representation for the Kenyan rendered victims, ended up becoming the most visible symbol 
of the renditions. He was mistreated, tortured and psychologically abused before being 
charged with terrorist acts. He remained incarcerated for one whole year, to be finally 
released for lack of evidence (Angira, 2011). As a Kenyan-renowned Muslim rights defender, 
his story drew condemnation from the Kenyan Muslim fraternity. Upon his release, he stated 
that “it is sad that Kenyan citizens were being taken to Uganda like bags of charcoal, …even 
though the ‘Suppression of Terrorism Bill’ had not been passed in Kenya, it was alive with 
all its abuses (ibid: 13.09.2011).” 
 
The rendition of Kenyans to Uganda was not the first since the counter-terrorism initiatives 
began. In 2007, Kenya rendered about 85 people to Somalia, who were subsequently 
rendered to Ethiopia on the fall of the Islamic Court Union in Somalia following its invasion 
by the Ethiopian forces
199
 (Fisher, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2008; Open Society 
Foundation, 2013; Prestholdt, 2011). The rendered suspects on these two incidents were 
reportedly tortured in violation of their rights. Kenya’s own Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs – a Senior Legal Counsel – Mutula Kilonzo stated that the renditions 
were illegal as they violated the Kenyan constitution. His position was in accordance with an 
                                                            
198 Executive Coordinator of Muslim Human Rights Forum. 
199 See pages 204. 
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earlier ruling by a High Court Judge
200
 that the renditions were illegal. (Mogire & Agade, 
2009:478).  
 
The rendition, disappearance and killing of people suspected of terrorism, while in 
contravention of the law, suggests the existence of a deliberate move to erase terror suspects 
rather than taking them to court for fear that, they will be released for lack of solid 
evidence
201
 as happened to Alamin and Ahmed. It smacks of discrimination to have Muslim’ 
rights trampled upon even after a declaration, by none other than the Justice Minister, that the 
renditions were illegal. The violation of human rights and the use of extra-judicial measures 
to address terrorism could be counter-productive as terror groups could use these affronts to 
recruit and to justify their use of violence.  
 
In Nairobi, the study elicited cases of discrimination facing Kenyan Somalis in search of 
identification and travel documents such as Identification Cards (ID) and passports. Some, 
like Aden Farah,
202
 an ethnic Kenyan Somali claimed to have gone to the registration office 
in Pumwani over ten times without success. He said that, unlike other Kenyans, they asked 
him to produce both of his grandparents’ identification cards, a letter from the local 
administration chief and birth certificate to prove that he was truly Kenyan and not a Somalia 
Somali. His school leaving certificates were not enough to convince the registration 
personnel that he was Kenyan. What makes his situation, and that of many other Somalis in 
similar circumstances, difficult is that they hail from pastoralist communities whose 
grandparents moved from one place to another in search of pastures and not many were able 
to, or considered it useful, to obtain identification cards when registration exercises were 
conducted. Farah knew of other people that had bribed the registration officials to acquire the 
identification cards. Acquisition of a Kenyan passport is even more difficult, especially for 
the ethnic Somali. They are subjected to a more stringent procedure that includes proof of 
Kenyan identity and reasons for applying for the passport.
203
 Joseph Tallam,
204
 an 
immigration official in Nairobi, justified the application of these stringent measures on the 
Somalis by arguing that non-Kenyan Somalis have previously managed to acquire passports 
                                                            
200 Ruling rendered on 29th September, 2010 by Justice Aggrey Muchelule. 
201 Interview with a Kenyan intelligence police, Mombasa, 2nd October 2013. 
202 Personal interview, Nairobi 15th October 2013. 
203 It is a constitutional right for any Kenyan to acquire a passport without having to give reasons for it. 
204 Personal interview, Nairobi 15th October 2013. 
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using illegally acquired Kenyan identification. He explained that the fact that there are many 
more Somalis than any other ethnic groups applying for Kenyan passports raises their 
suspicion. Corruption has been attributed as one of the factors contributing to increased 
insecurity and terrorism in Kenya because its perpetrators have been able to secure Kenyan 
identification documents enabling them to pursue their terror activities without arousing any 
suspicion (Morgan, 2009; Rosenau, 2005).  
 
The Somali residents of Eastleigh
205
 suburb of Nairobi have never forgotten the one-week’s 
raids and rancour visited upon them by the police in mid-January 2010. This followed a 
January 15
th
 demonstration in the city streets by the Muslim fraternity, protesting the 
detention and subsequent deportation of controversial Jamaican cleric Sheikh Abdullah al-
Faisal who the government accused of spreading radicalism. Whereas the protests drew 
participants from Nairobi’s Muslim community in general, the police zeroed down on the 
Somali population in Eastleigh claiming that the suburb was harbouring terrorists from 
Somalia and refugees who had escaped from the Daadab refugee camp in North Eastern 
province. More than 2000 Somalis, including Kenyans who could not produce identification 
cards were rounded up for screening; those refugees found to be in the city illegally were 
returned to the camps. The plight of many a Kenyan Somali is captured by the protestation of 
Izzakabdi Mahfur,
206
 a victim of the police swoop. 
 
“I am a Kenyan but that did not matter because I am Somali; they said I was an Al 
Shabaab sympathiser engaged in criminal activities by harbouring those fighting the 
Somali-government! We are feeling harassed for being Somali.”  
 
This was just one in a series of regular police operations and harassment carried out in 
Eastleigh. They also complained that their businesses are the subject of regular extortion by 
the police in the belief that they were selling contraband goods smuggled from Somalia.  
It is such forms of discrimination against Kenyan Somalis in the issuing of identification and 
travel documents, the unwarranted police raids on Muslims neighbourhoods and harassment 
                                                            
205 Eastleigh is often referred to as ‘Little Mogadishu” for the large concentration of Somalis in the area. Many 
Somalia Somalis take refuge here, it is also known for the large presence of Somali-religious clerics (Anzalone 
2012). 
206  Personal interview, Nairobi. 15th October, 2013. The name has, however, been changed to protect his 
identity. 
214 
 
that have been seized by Islamists and used as a justification to recruit them to Al Shabaab. In 
mosques such as Abu-Bakr al Siddique, Al-Hidaya and Masjid-al Amar in Eastleigh, Nairobi, 
discrimination has been used as a justification to show that it is for being Muslim that they 
are mistreated - hence the need to rise-up and join forces fighting for Islam (Anzalone 2012).  
These incidents suggest that being Somali and Muslim is an identity that is increasingly being 
associated with terrorism justifying the kind of treatment meted out by the authorities to the 
ethnic Kenyan Somali. Many in this community narrate at least one incident that has 
happened to them where he or she has been stopped or singled out from a bus by security 
forces and asked to prove their Kenyan identity.  
 
Alienating Kenyan Muslims further is the recent enactment of the ‘Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, 2012’, meant to strengthen counter-terrorism measures in Kenya. While the Act contains 
significant improvements from the clauses contained in the previous contentious 
‘Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003,’207 there still exists a perception that it is targeted at the 
Muslims. They are not convinced that a new anti-terror law is all that was needed since 
security forces have continued to commit acts against their community in contravention of 
the law. Salim Ahmed, for instance, pondering aloud, wondered: ‘If the police raided my 
cyber café and home without a search warrant, arrested and subjected me to torture in 
contravention of the existing law, what difference will a new anti-terror law make?’ The 2012 
killing of Sheikh Rogo and Hashim Khan,
208
 and the mysterious disappearance of people in 
Mombasa in the same year, added to their doubts of the new legislation.  
 
These fears appear not to be baseless as the Act has continued to receive criticism from 
human rights activists and Muslim leaders. Hassan Omar Hassan, a human rights advocate, 
states that the Act legitimizes arbitrary seizure of property, entry into a suspect’s property, 
                                                            
207 Under pressure from the U.S. government to formulate an anti-terror law, the Kenyan government acquiesced 
and drafted a raft of measures for presentation to Parliament under the ‘Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003. 
This bill, however, received massive opposition from Muslims, human rights groups and even politicians 
prompting its review. Its critics asserted that the bill, if passed into law, would have wholesomely taken away 
the fundamental rights of Kenyans without dealing with terrorism. They particularly singled out clauses which: 
contravened the constitution; advocated indefinite detention and denial of rights to legal representation during 
interrogation; holding suspects incommunicado; empowering the cabinet minister responsible for the security 
docket to declare a person or organization terrorist ; curtailment of freedom of association; and allowing police 
to use force to arrest terrorists (ICG 2012; K-HURINET 2003). 
208 A Mombasa Muslim preacher who was allegedly pulled out of a bus he was traveling in by people 
identifying themselves as police, just for his body to be found a few days later at the Tsavo National Park in 
April 2012. 
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and listening to private phone conversations without a police warrant (Odula, 2012). For his 
part, Mr Abdikadir Mohamed,
209
 chairman of the Parliamentary Constitutional 
Implementation Committee (CIC) – himself a Muslim and lawyer – criticises the immense 
power the Act grants to the Inspector General of Police. The Act accords the Inspector 
General of Police the power “to arrest if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that an 
entity has committed or is planning to commit a terrorist act, attempted to commit or 
participated in or facilitated the commission of a terrorism act” (Republic of Kenya, 
2012:1671). According to this clause, therefore, it seems the government is not obligated to 
‘prove beyond any reasonable doubt’ that someone has committed a prohibited activity. The 
Open Society Foundation (2013: 64) further assert that a general lack of due process pervades 
the Act and qualifies this observation by referring to the constitutional provision that requires 
the police to produce a suspect in court within 24 hours, whereupon the detainee is put under 
the jurisdiction of the court. This Act, however, allows the police to apply to the court for a 
continued detention of a suspect up to a period of 30 days as investigations are carried out 
and this could be extend up to 90 days if a further application is made by the police. 
Following the September 21
st
 2013 terror attack on Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, 
emerging evidence suggests that the government’s responses did not accord with the 
provisions of the law. Though the Muslim community is on record condemning the massacre 
of innocent civilians,
210
 this did not spare the arrest and interrogation of over 40 Muslims in 
connection with the act (Open Society Foundation, 2013; Kegoro, 2013). Does the 
implementation of aspects contained in this Act portend an increase in community tension 
and the risk of encouraging ‘home grown’ terrorists?  
 
The period towards the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 witnessed increased cases of 
violent activities targeted at Muslim youth in Mombasa with the justification that these 
activities were intended to flush out terrorists operating within the precincts of Masjid Musa 
Mosque. It is too early at this stage, just after the event, to provide an objective analysis of 
the situation but this will be dealt with in the next chapter. This part discussed the underlying 
factors that contributed to the escalation of terrorism in Kenya, the following part 
                                                            
209 East African, 30th September – 6th October, 2012. 
210 Adan Wachu, Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) issued a statement 
condemning this act of terrorism Daily Nation, September 23rd, 2013).  
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demonstrates that radicalisation of the Muslim youth and interfaith tensions are among the 
impacts occasioned by this escalation.  
 
Part II: Radicalisation and the Appropriation of Islamic Identity 
 
This Part discusses the appropriation of Islamic identity by terrorists and extremist Islamic 
clerics to radicalise the youth in the country, positing that this radicalisation threatens to 
ignite interfaith conflict between Christians and Muslims. The activities of one Muslim cleric, 
Sheikh Aboud Rogo, will be used as a case study to demonstrate this claim; but I first present 
a contextual overview of radicalisation in Kenya.  
 
6.2.1. Radicalisation: Sheikh Aboud Rogo, the Case of a Muslim Cleric 
 
While Kenyan Muslims, just like Muslims in other parts of the world, have been exposed to 
various strands of radical Islam in the last four decades, it is not until the 1990s that there 
emerges a new generation of Salafi jihadist militant groups espousing “a distinct puritanical 
theology and a potent political narrative” (Crisis Group, 2012:6) in Kenya. Bin Laden, its 
chief proponent, advocated a total devotion to Islam, promoted the cult of martyrdom and 
justification of terrorism. Its spread to Kenya, I must clarify, was through the arrival of a 
devout group of Al Qaeda-trained Muslims inspired by Islamic scholars who were willing to 
sacrifice their lives in the name of Allah. They embarked on mapping out areas for possible 
attack in Kenya. The success of the mission is manifest in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy 
in Nairobi that resulted in massive casualties and destruction of property.  
 
Bin Laden’s selection of Kenya, it is arguable, was informed by his knowledge of the 
perceived marginalization of Muslims in Kenya, which he hoped to manipulate and deploy 
for his anti-American and jihadist pursuits. Gunaratna (2002) suggests that Al Qaeda’s 
success in her recruitment drives is attributed to her deployment of propaganda particularly 
calling on Muslim youth to reflect on their state in society while reiterating the beneficial 
rewards in dying fighting for Islam. One of my discussion groups in Mombasa opined that the 
violence that rocked the coastal towns of Kenya, such as Mombasa, Lamu, Malindi and Voi 
in 1992, following the banning of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), could have convinced 
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Bin Laden that Kenya had the right mix of ingredients to support terrorism: a large and 
marginalized Muslim community.  
 
The claim by Osama bin Laden in a CNN interview in 1997, that he is most outraged by “the 
presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the land of Mecca and Medina, the holiest place of 
the Muslims” (Bergen & Smyth, 1998:17) prompting him to declare jihad on the United 
States of America, provides this study with the first hint that the 1998 terror attack on the 
U.S. Embassy in Nairobi was couched on Al Qaeda’s Islamic anti-American sentiments. 
Additionally, at an earlier date in February 1997 as the U.S. attack on Iraq was imminent, Bin 
Laden joined other leading Islamic radicals to call on Muslims “to kill the Americans and 
their allies – civilian or military” (ibid) wherever they were found. This framing was further 
buttressed by the Islamic Liberation Army of the People of Kenya (ILAPK), who in claiming 
responsibility for the Nairobi attack, cited the same objectives that motivates Bin Laden’s 
jihadist ideology.  
 
“I did it for the cause of Islam,” and of Bin Laden, “He is my leader, and I obey his orders” 
were the words of Muhammed Sadiq Howaida
211
 in confessing his participation in the 
planning and execution of the Nairobi embassy bombing. Howaida was sent to Kenya in 
1994 by Bin Laden to start planning for the attack. He settled in Witu Lamu, and married a 
local woman of Arabic origins. To camouflage his intentions and in keeping to the local 
livelihood sustenance traditions, he set up a fishing business in the town. The story of 
Howaida mirrors that of Fazul who also settled within Lamu and was integrated in the local 
community. Using an Islamic identity, Al Qaeda members wove themselves into the fabric of 
the coastal religious communities to gain an entry and acceptance. Taking advantage of the 
poverty and state of under-development along the coast, the terrorists, who masqueraded as 
devout and benevolent Muslims, identified causes to support to endear them to the local 
community. Fazul, for instance, helped renovate the towns’ Friday mosque and established a 
football team to keep the local youth engaged.  
 
By virtue of their Islamic identity, they are accepted in the community and are even allowed 
to marry local women and to establish businesses. Intrigued by how Lamuans could allow 
                                                            
211 Howaida was one of the planners of the 1998 terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy and was arrested on the 
same day, 7th of August, 1998 by Pakistani officials in Karachi while attempting to sneak into Afghanistan.  
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strangers to live in their midst without ascertaining what their real identity is, Athman 
Saidi
212
 informed this study that as long as one was not a kafiri
213
 and was capable of paying 
‘dowry,’ nothing could deter him from marrying a local woman. He added that other non-
Muslim immigrants in places like Witu have not only failed to marry locally without 
converting to Islam but have also not penetrated businesses associated with the local Muslim 
community, such as fishing. Identifying with Islam in this region undoubtedly facilitated their 
terrorist intentions as no one became suspicious of their movements and activities. 
 
Muslim clerics have joined the bandwagon of those using Islamic identity to radicalize the 
youth and advance the cause of terrorism in the country. Their fiery sermons against the 
perceived discrimination of Muslims worldwide - which they then connect to the local issues 
affecting Muslims – are given religious interpretation to legitimize the call to violence. It is to 
these clerics and their manipulation of Islamic identity that I now turn. 
 
The story of Sheikh Aboud Rogo whose name was mentioned in several of the places where 
this research was undertaken, will be used as a case study to demonstrate this point. Siyu’s 
chief, Ahmed Yunus, knew Sheikh Rogo from his childhood days before the latter relocated 
to Mombasa. He found him to be well versed in global politics and history, especially Islamic 
and world history, which he deployed to hit out at Americans for the injustice meted out on 
Muslims. Mbarak Hashim,
214
 a Mombasa resident, corroborates this portrayal of him saying: 
“Sheikh Rogo was a very eloquent, intelligent and charismatic religious preacher who kept us 
glued to our mats during his sermons. He certainly had a firm grip on all of us. He interpreted 
world history and politics interspersing them with verses of the Koran to demonstrate the 
injustices we were also being subjected by the ‘Christian’ government in Nairobi. Though 
these sermons painted my reality, I was always afraid that he was being too radical.” 
 
He always argued that the salvation of the Muslim community lay in resisting the invasion of 
their religion by the West and, therefore, called on the youth to travel to Somalia and join up 
with their Al Shabaab brethren to root out the infidels. In many of his sermons, he says, 
Sheikh Rogo minced no words in advocating jihad against infidels and their leaders, top of 
                                                            
212 Personal interview, Lamu (23th November, 2013) 
213 Swahili reference to a non-believer of any faith.  
214 Name changed for security reasons. 
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the list being the U.S., the interim Somalia president, Sheikh Shariff Ahmed, top Kenyan 
politicians and some Kenyan Islamic leaders, all of whom he accused of conspiring to bring 
down Islam. He presented the war in Somali as the ultimate jihad and exhorted his listeners to 
martyrdom in support of this war.  
 
Sheikh Rogo’s base in Mombasa was the Masjid Musa mosque in Majengo where his radical 
sermons were very popular among the youth. It is his association with the mosque that gave it 
the reputation of being Kenya’s centre of Islamic radicalisation. In an interview with Ishaq 
Jumbal,
215
 a mosque committee member, I was informed that the mosque was introducing a 
new policy to ban Tuesday’s and Thursday’s evening lectures which militant preachers, such 
as the late Aboud Rogo, had presided over to radicalise the youth through a selective 
interpretation of Koranic verses.  
 
In Nairobi, Sheikh Rogo was a frequent speaker at events organized by MYC in Pumwani 
where he served as one of its ideologists (UN Security Council 2011). Ahmad Iman Ali,
216
 
founded MYC in 2008 as an informal advocacy group for Muslims with the intention of 
highlighting the social and economic challenges afflicting Muslim youth in the lower levels 
of society, such as those in Pumwani, who were increasingly getting disillusioned with what 
they perceived as anti-Muslim discrimination in the country. As MYC’s ideologist, he 
encouraged the youth to remain steadfast in their determination to fight injustices against 
Muslims all over the world. Aden Farah remembers some of the sermons in which Sheikh 
Rogo argued that Kenya had become a legitimate field for jihad because of its alliance with 
the U.S., African Union, Ethiopia and Israel in waging war against the Muslims under the 
guise of fighting Al Shabaab and ‘terrorism’. The latter being a term that had to him become 
a synonym for ‘a war against Islam.’ Of the Muslim youth of Pumwani, he equated their 
suffering to that perpetrated against other Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia and 
urged them to take up arms against those responsible for their poverty.  
                                                            
215 Interview, Mombasa, 6th October, 2013. 
216 He was Sheikh Rogo’s student in Mombasa who spearheaded the recruitment of many Kenyans to join and 
fight with Al Shabaab in Somalia against Kenya’s military invasion. He was declared the Amiir (Commander) of 
Kenyan fighters in Somalia after the death of Fazul. Since 2011, Ahmad Iman Ali has called for jihad in Kenya 
by instructing Kenyan MYC fighters in Somalia to hit back and cause blasts in Kenya (UN Security Council 
2011).  
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Fig.: 6.1: “Paradise is but a taxi journey away in Nairobi.”217 Eastleigh, Nairobi, 18th 
November, 2012. Photo: Nation Media Group. 
 
He always referred to Al Shabaab’s grenade attacks in the country as an approach that was 
available for them to express their displeasure at the Kenyan government; sermons that the 
youth easily connected with. It is against this premise that I argue that it is the Muslim 
identity of these disillusioned youth that Sheikh Rogo exploited to advance Al-Shabaab’s 
jihadist war in Somalia. It may suffice to mention that besides Sheikh Rogo, other radical 
Islamic clerics have used the Muslim identity to promote terrorist activities in the country.  
 
On the 27
th
 August 2012, Sheikh Rogo was killed when his car was shot at while driving to 
Mombasa along the Malindi – Mombasa Road. His killing sparked one of the worst forms of 
interfaith violence yet witnessed in Kenya. In Mombasa, Muslim youth immediately went on 
the rampage, burning down and vandalizing churches in what Awadh Babo, a Standard 
Newspaper
218
 reporter described “an orgy of grenade and gun attacks that lasted for three 
days,” and whose aftermath was the killing of three police officers and injury of many others 
(Mwangi, 2012). This spate of riots was condemned by Christians and Muslims alike. 
Speaking on behalf of Muslim leaders, Sheikh Juma Ngao, chairman of the Kenya National 
Muslim Advisory Council (KNMAC) stated:  
“those who torched churches or killed in the name of Islam were not true Muslims, 
Islam does not consider Christians as infidels as taught by the late Rogo, Muslims are 
                                                            
217 A line from the poem “Dreaming of Paradise: My Sheikhs Welcome Me Home,” MYC, October 28th, 2011. 
218 The Standard Newspaper, 3rd September, 2012.  
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expected by the Koran to protect Christians, Jews and Muslims and their places of 
worship.”219  
The attack on churches was intended to trigger an interfaith conflict pitting the Christians 
against the Muslims. It is to the interfaith conflicts triggered by these attacks that I now turn. 
 
6.2.2 Interfaith Conflict  
 
The appropriation of an Islamic identity to advance the cause of terrorism in Kenya has 
engendered other consequences that have increasingly become a threat to Kenya’s fragile 
national unity: an interfaith conflict between the Christians and Muslims. Tension between 
Islam and Christianity did not start with the torching of churches and attack on Christians 
after the killing of Sheikh Rogo. It was ignited right from the beginning after it emerged that 
the 1998 terrorist attack was the work of a group linked to Al Qaeda. This observation was 
noted by Willy Mutunga,
220
 stating that, “there is an on-going political strategy since the 
bomb tragedy to divide Kenyans and create division by identifying them with their faith. The 
tragedy should not be used to whip up emotions. Christians must not be confused by 
propaganda surrounding the August 7
th
 events to become religiously intolerant vis-à-vis their 
Moslem brothers and sisters.”  
 
The new-found unity of purpose between the leaders and the Kenyan people ignited by the 
bomb blast was now facing new threats from propagandists who were keen to use the tragedy 
to divide Kenyans and cause disharmony by identifying them with their faiths. Islamic 
Liberation Army of the People of Kenya (ILAPK), a Muslim group affiliated to Al Qaeda 
claimed responsibility, hence raising prejudicial reactions against Muslims. In Kenya, for 
instance, the first of these prejudicial sentiments came from none other than then President, 
Daniel arap Moi. In addressing mourners after the bombing, he stated that those that 
masterminded the terror attack ‘could not have been Christians’, a statement that implied that 
Muslims were responsible for the violence. This statement drew condemnation from its 
leaders who argued that their religion, just like Christianity, does not support acts of terror or 
the killing of innocent people for that matter (Bergen & Smyth, 1998; Haynes, 2006).  
                                                            
219 Ibid. 
220 A Muslim and Human Rights activist, currently Kenya’s Chief Justice since 2012. The East African 
Standard, 16th August, 1998. 
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The grenade attacks by Al Shabaab on churches and church-related events in Nairobi, Garissa 
and Mombasa on various dates between 2010 and 2012, and the attacks in Mombasa 
especially after the execution of Sheikh Rogo as indicated in table 6.1, were meant to ignite 
interfaith conflict, a bait that has seemingly been taken up by the Christians. The manner in 
which they were condemned as Islamic acts of terror by many Christian preachers have not 
helped promote amicable interfaith relations. Such ascriptions have had the negative effect of 
influencing their faithful to believe that Islam supports terrorism. Muslims, on the other hand, 
also used these incidents to incite hatred. For instance, after Sheik Rogo’s execution, Al 
Shabaab called on Kenyan Muslims to protect their religion stating that “Muslims must take 
the matter into their own hands, stand united against the kuffar – non-Muslims and 
inferentially Christians – and take all necessary measures to protect their religion, their 
honour, their property and their lives from the enemies of Islam” (Cornway-Smith, 2012). 
Inherent in this statement is a call to violence to vanquish the kuffar. The view that Islam 
supports terrorism in Kenya is vindicated by findings of a survey conducted by Pew Research 
Centre in 2010, which found out that 48% of Kenyan Christians view Muslims as supporters 
of violence while another 30% believe that many, if not most, or all Muslims support Al 
Qaeda or other violent Islamic groups (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010). In the 
focus group discussions I undertook at the Kenyan coast in Mombasa, Kwale and Siyu, nine 
out of the 36 participants professed the Christian faith. This group believed that at least 25% 
of Muslims in Kenya supported terrorism. 15 of the Muslims in the group believed that 
terrorism was not linked to Islam but was instead perpetrated by individuals following 
terrorist ideologies that were not necessarily supported by Islam. The remaining 12 members 
preferred not to express their opinions.  
 
That interfaith tension provoked by terrorist acts exists is further supported by the October 
2013 call by the Christian clergy in Kenya to have their members at the coast armed, citing 
worries over attacks on their congregations and churches by Islamist terrorists. This followed 
the October 20
th
 and 21
st
 incidents when two evangelical pastors, Charles Mathole and 
Ibrahim Kithaka of the Vikwatani Redeemed Gospel Church and East African Pentecostal 
Church were respectively killed in their churches. Within the same period, the Seventh Day 
Adventist Church in the Majengo area of Mombasa was torched, a year after a similar fate 
befell it in the aftermath of Sheikh Aboud Rogo’s killing in 2012. While Christian clerics 
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blamed the attacks on increased radicalization of Muslim youth, the Muslims interviewed for 
this study blamed it on ‘Nairobi’s war on terror’. It is my view, that the reference to Nairobi 
in this particular instance has implied connotations of “an up-country Christian-led” and 
‘Nairobi-run’ government that is executing a discriminatory campaign against coastal 
Muslims in the name of ‘war on terror.’ Lending credence to this view is the observation by 
some Muslim clergy that church leaders have been silent on the treatment of Muslims in the 
current counter-terror operations which could suggest that they are quietly supporting it. 
Reverend Wilybard Lagho, Vicar General of the Catholic archdiocese of Mombasa, views the 
increased attacks on churches as raising further the interfaith suspicion that has existed since 
the war on terror began and which rose sharply after the killing of Sheikh Abould Rogo in 
2012 (Lind & Howell, 2010; Nzwili, 2013; Princeton & Stephen, 2004).  
 
The idea of church clergy seeking to keep guns to protect their congregations and themselves 
against terror attacks by Muslim youth is a matter of grave concern. It is an indictment of the 
interfaith relations.  
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the escalation of terrorism activities in Kenya post the 1998 
Nairobi terror attack focussing on the introduction of Islamic radicalism in Kenya, through 
the Al Qaeda-linked terrorists and proselytizers advocating a Salafist ideology calling for a 
return to the puritanical form of Islam as they believe was practised during the days of the 
Prophet. Espousing these puritanical ideologies and political grievances against the West, 
especially the U.S., for injustices visited upon Muslims in places like Afghanistan, Palestine 
and Iraq, won them sympathisers in Kenya. I have discussed the activities of one of these Al 
Qaeda advocates, Fazul Mohammed, the nexus that masterminded the planning and execution 
of terrorism activities in the region: from Nairobi to Mombasa and Somalia to Kampala 
through Al Qaeda and the Al Shabaab terrorist groups. His activities reinforced the fear that 
East Africa was becoming the hub for terrorism in the Horn of Africa, hence the formulation 
of strategies, such as the East African Counter-terrorism Initiative, by the U.S. government – 
supported by Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia to combat terrorism.  
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The activities incorporated in this initiative, such as coercion of East African nations to 
formulate anti-terrorism laws, strategies to stabilize Somalia and the formation of the Anti-
Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in Kenya, while well-intended, were interpreted as targeting 
the Muslim community. In implementing its mandate, ATPU’s activities – raids of terrorist 
haunts, indiscriminate arrests, torture, renditions, forced disappearances and execution of 
suspected terrorists - was met with revulsion. Rather than de-escalate the acts of terror, their 
activities radicalised sections of Islamic youth as they were viewed as discriminatory against 
their faith. The counter-terrorism initiatives were a threat to Islamic identity as it equated 
Muslims to terrorists. These initiatives, together with the marginalization of Muslim 
communities in the coastal and north- eastern regions (as manifest in the broader political and 
deeper historical contexts concerning the identity, political and economic rights) instigated 
resentment towards the government (Lind & Howell 2010). This marginalization – real and 
imagined - has consequently been manipulated by Islamist extremist to enlist the support of 
the youth to join militant organizations such as Al Shaabab for the advancement of terrorism.  
The escalation of terrorism in the last few years as indicated in table 6.1., some targeting 
churches, have raised temperatures regarding the Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya. While 
there is no likelihood of this escalating to an all-out interfaith violence, there are worries that, 
if not contained, Al Shabaab might borrow a leaf from Nigeria where the Boko Haram
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Islamic group has perfected the unleashing of terror attacks, mainly against Christians and 
resulting in massive casualties on an almost weekly basis (Walker, 2012).  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that post-1998 Islamic identity in Kenya started to be viewed 
with lenses tinted in terrorism colours. Muslims are generally treated with suspicion wherever 
they go, especially with the increased incidents of terrorism. Being Somali was also 
problematized. Subsequently, straightforward things such as the application for identification 
cards necessitated further proofs of Kenyan identity. This conclusion supports one of the 
other arguments in this study: that ethnicity threatens Kenya’s tenuous nationalism and 
identity. The unity of purpose exhibited in the aftermath of the 1998 terror attack on the U.S. 
Embassy in Nairobi was short-lived.  
                                                            
221 An Islamist jihadist militant and terrorist organization in north eastern Nigeria that seeks the establishment of 
a ‘pure’ Islamic state ruled by Sharia law putting to stop what it deems Westernization (Walker 2013:2 ). 
Violence linked to Boko Haram has resulted to about 10,000 deaths between 2001 and 2011. Al Shabaab’s 
attacks on churches and public spaces mirrors tactics used by Boko Haram.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 . Summary of Chapters 
 
This dissertation’s subject, memorialisation, could have been developed along a number of 
different lines relating to the August 7
th
 1998, bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. 
However, this research project had to stay within the scope of one PhD study, and so for 
pragmatic reasons, I have selected among topics sub-themes that would enable an 
understanding of the tragedy, its impacts and the management of the trauma it caused. 
Consequent to the bombing, media reportage of the rescue efforts manifested the political 
aspects of ethnicity, which this study has discussed to reveal origins in the colonial period 
and a subsequent perpetuation in post-independent Kenya during the regimes of Jomo 
Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki, the first, second and third Presidents of the 
Republic of Kenya. This study has also devoted attention to the escalation of terrorism in 
Kenya post-1998 and also analyses the appropriation of Islamic identity by radical Islamists 
belonging to Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab groups as a strategy for rallying support for further 
terrorist activities in the region. The culmination of which, at the time of writing, was the 
September 21
st
,
 
2013 terrorist attack on Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi. Increased 
radicalisation, including attacks on churches, presents a threat, to not only the interfaith 
relations between Christianity and Islam, but also to the security and stability of Kenya as a 
whole. Underpinning the present research are concepts such as cultural and trauma memory, 
history and identity, conflict and reconciliation. I hope this study will stimulate further 
interest in the subject and enable other researchers to explore those angles that could not be 
addressed within the scope of this thesis.  
 
This body of work ‘Remembering the 1998 Nairobi Terror Attack: Cultural and Trauma 
Memory and the Reconciliation of a Nation’ has examined the material, symbolic and 
functional elements of the August Seventh Memorial Park in Nairobi as a lieu de memoire 
(Nora 1989). Building on Winter’s (1995:56) observation that, “the power to mediate 
bereavement lies in the strength of ‘traditional’ forms of social and cultural life as represented 
in art, poetry and ritual,” this study has analysed the monuments and events at the Memorial 
Park to reveal how families affected by the bombing tragedy have been able to come to terms 
with their loss. This healing is demonstrated in the manner they engage with the monuments 
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and the performances enacted there, especially during the annual commemorations and 
whenever they visit the site and the Documentation Centre. This process was poignantly 
displayed on 2
nd
 May, 2011, following the execution of Osama bin Laden, when a group of 
survivors trooped to the Memorial Park to ‘celebrate’ his killing and to derive closure to 
those whose trauma had not healed, as stated by Douglas Sidialo.
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 Their coming together 
for the annual ritual of commemoration stimulates the community to collectively recall the 
tragic event and through it enhance group solidarity as well as facilitate the transmission and 
sustainability of memories (Connerton, 1989: 3; Halbwachs, 1992:38).  
 
Chapter 1 examined the research methodologies deployed in assembling data to test my key 
argument in the study. These comprised of participant observation, analysis of published and 
archival material, ethnographic and qualitative interviews and focus group discussions. In the 
literature review, for instance, comparisons and analyses were drawn between 
memorialisation processes in Kenya and those in other African countries such as South 
Africa, and then with similar processes in the rest of the world. The chapter, in keeping with 
the themes of this body of work, interrogated such broad conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks as collective memory, history, materiality, ethnicity, nationalism and liminality 
that underpin key concepts of memory, history and identity, affirming the place of this study 
within the context of memorialisation.  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the processes leading to the establishment of the August 7th Memorial 
Park in Nairobi. The chapter opened by describing the event of the bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy on the 7
th
 of August 1998 before proceeding to discuss its implications for culture 
and trauma memory. The chapter then presented a historical perspective on memorial 
monuments in Kenya focusing on three specific examples whose histories provide this study 
with a broad perspective to memorial monuments in Kenya: the Nairobi War Memorial, the 
Kolowa Massacre Memorial and the Nyeri Memorial, all of which relate to collective 
memories of the colonial period in Kenya. Describing the processes leading to the 
establishment of the Memorial Park enabled this chapter to highlight issues germane to the 
study, such as the entwined relation between memory and history, individual and collective 
memory, appropriation and re-inscription of monuments and the dichotomy between ethnic 
and national identity.  
                                                            
222 See page 105  
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Chapter 3, therefore, built on the materials described in Chapter 2 by analysing a series of 
visual and commemorative rituals associated with the August 7
th
 Memorial Park to 
demonstrate their contribution in providing closure to the trauma experienced by the 
survivors and the victims’ families. Visual and performing art, as discussed in this chapter 
and Chapter 4, may offer models that individuals or communities experiencing trauma 
resulting from some of the common tragic events in Kenya, such as road accidents and cattle 
rustling, could adopt. These have implications for policy on trauma healing and management 
in Kenya. 
 
The focus of Chapter 4 is on the survivors of the Nairobi terror attack and the coping 
strategies employed to manage the traumatic memory it instigated. Emphasis in this chapter is 
placed on letting the survivors narrate their own experiences of the tragedy as this enables the 
conversion of ‘traumatic memory’ to ‘narrative memory,’ a prerequisite for trauma memory 
healing (Antz & Lambek, 1996: 120). This chapter also articulates the main argument of this 
study that performance and visual art are critical ingredients to the healing process as 
demonstrated through the role of music and film. 
 
Given that a tragedy as traumatic as the Nairobi terror attack could instigate projections of 
ethnicity, as highlighted by media reports of the rescue efforts, Chapter 5 undertook a broader 
examination of the problem of ethnicity in Kenya. It traced its origins to the colonial period 
when the British colonists planted seeds of ethnic consciousness through the divide-and-rule 
tactics they employed to subjugate their subjects, hence raising the consciousness of existing 
differences among the local communities. It then broached the independence struggle and its 
presentation as a Kikuyu-only affair, and the impact this framing has continued to have on the 
construction of nationhood in Kenya. One section examined the development and 
entrenchment of ethnicity by Kenya’s post-independence leaders. The ethnicisation of 
politics, especially with the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in the early 1990’s, had 
a tremendous negative impact on ethnic relations resulting in inter-ethnic conflicts in each 
presidential election between 1992 and 2007, problematising the quest for nationhood. The 
violence witnessed in the aftermath of the 2007 elections saw Kenya draw perilously close to 
disintegration and civil war. This analysis provided a broad context for understanding the role 
the Documentation Centre plays in peace building, reconciliation and fostering of nationhood 
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as demonstrated through the activities of its ‘Peace Builder’s Kids Club’ (PBKC) and its 
other educational outreach programmes in Uasin Gishu County. As regards peace building 
and conflict reconciliation, it is hoped that this study might offer lessons from PBKC that 
would be useful in understanding and mediating conflicts.  
 
In Chapter 6, the problem of terrorism in Kenya was considered. This chapter’s main 
argument is that after the 7
th
 August 1998 Nairobi terror attack cases of terrorism perpetrated 
by extremist Islamic organizations escalated. This engendered a perception that Muslims in 
general support terrorism and hence a suspicious treatment of anyone of Islamic identity in 
Kenya. It suggested that the continued acts of terrorism and the counter-terrorism measures 
instituted by the government have not boded well for interfaith relations and are a threat to 
nationhood in Kenya.  
 
7.2 . The September 21st 2013, terror attack on Westgate Shopping Mall 
 
In Chapter 6, this study examined incidents of terrorism in Kenya between 1998, when the 
first major incidence of terrorism, the Nairobi terror attack, occurred, and 2012 when it 
escalated to unprecedented levels. This, it suggests, could have occurred due to Kenya’s 
military incursion into Somalia in October 2011 to fight the Al Shabaab terror group whose 
attacks in Kenya had become more frequent and daring. Rather than de-escalate the attacks, 
the incursion galvanized the Al Shabaab terror group into intensifying grenade attacks, 
church torching and assassinations, culminating in the September 21
st
 2013, bombing of the 
Westgate Shopping Mall in Westlands,
223
 Nairobi. In its wake was the death of 70 people 
with another over 200 sustaining injuries, making it the worst case of terror attack since the 
1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. What exactly happened?  
 
At around noon on the 21
st
 September, 2013, a group of between 10 and 15 gunmen stormed 
the Mall and began lobbing grenades and shooting indiscriminately on shoppers, before 
moving from store to store as they herded shoppers along to act as their human shields. Police 
                                                            
223 This is a high-profile shopping mall located in Westlands; an affluent residential suburb frequented by 
expatriates and wealthy Kenyans and attracts approximately 10,000 persons during weekends (The Standard 
23rd September, 2013).   
229 
 
from Parklands station were the first to arrive at the scene and immediately thereafter, a gun 
battle ensued inside the Mall. According to Constable Mutua,
224
 they reacted to the reported 
 
 
Fig. 7.1: Fire at the Westgate Shopping Mall on Day 3,  
(The People Newspaper, 2013). 
 
information believing that this was an ordinary case of armed robbery, as is common in 
Nairobi. Reinforcements of the General Service Unit’s Recce commandoes were, however, 
soon deployed as it became clearer that the problem was larger than they had anticipated. 
Gunfire exchanges between the police and the terrorists went on throughout that night. Most 
of the ‘hostages’ and survivors were, however, rescued on the second day as military 
reinforcements were deployed. Explosions and gunfire continued on the second and third 
days with reports filtering out that some interior floors and the car park had collapsed, but the 
Kenyan forces were by now fully in control of the building. On the fourth day, President 
Kenyatta announced the end of the siege and revealed that the security forces had killed five 
terrorists and apprehended over 15 suspects. By the time the siege ended, Red Cross Kenya 
announced that 69 people had been reported dead, 49 missing and over 175 others injured 
(Nation team, 2013; Harel, 2013).  
 
Al Shabaab terror group claimed responsibility for this attack. The Open Society for Justice 
(2013: 24), quoting Al Jazeera sources, states that its spokesperson, Sheikh Abdulaziz Abu 
                                                            
224 Named changed for security reasons; personal communication, Nairobi 30th September, 2013.  
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Muscab, justified the attack on Westgate Shopping Mall on the basis that it “...is a place 
where tourists from across the world come to shop, where diplomats gather. It is a place 
where Kenya’s decision-makers go to relax and enjoy themselves. Westgate is a place where 
there are Jewish and American shops. So we have to attack them.” “We have warned Kenya 
but it ignored (us), still forcibly holding our lands…while killing our innocent civilians. If 
you want peace in Kenya, it will never happen as long as your boys are in our lands,” said 
Sheikh Ali Mohammed Rage, another Al Shabaab spokesman (Nation team, 2013:4). That 
inflicting death on civilians did not trouble them is found in their justification that the Kenyan 
Defense Forces had bombed innocent Somali civilians in refugee camps and in Gedo and 
Jubba regions of Somalia.  
 
I discern two levels of interpretation from this attack; first, the attack on Westgate was aimed 
at forcing Kenya to rethink its military presence in Somalia; the terrorists had hoped that the 
massive killing of innocent civilians would make Kenyans pressure the government to 
withdraw her forces. The killing of civilians further suggests that this act of terrorism was 
also aimed at attracting the attention of the electronic media and the international press; the 
victims themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists as was demonstrated in this incident. 
Anzalone (2013:1) suggests that from Al Shabaab’s perspective, the attack on Westgate was a 
media triumph as it came in the midst of a growing rift among jihadists inside and outside of 
Somalia regarding consolidation of power by the group’s amir, Ahmed Godane. The attack 
also followed a year in which Al Shabaab had lost control of significant swathes of territory 
in Somalia, particularly the economic centres of Baidoa and Kismaiyu. Attacking Westgate, 
therefore, returned the beleaguered group to international news headlines catapulting it back 
into the public limelight. Second, the attack on Westgate Shopping Mall, an Israeli-owned 
complex, accords with the global Islamist revulsion of anything American and of their Zionist 
partners. Their perceived injustices against Muslims across the world is the factor justifying 
attacks, according to Osama bin Laden in his 1998 interview with the CNN (Bergen & 
Smyth, 1998; Otenyo, 2004). As observed by Kegley Jr. (2003:2), terrorism “had become a 
sadistic assault on the principles and political culture of the United States and its allies.” The 
fact that major acts of terrorism in Kenya, with the exception of the 1998 Nairobi terror 
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attack on the U.S Embassy, have been against Israeli-owned interests, is not lost to this 
research.
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In chapter 6, I discussed the emergence of interfaith tensions between Christians and Muslims 
incited by Islamic fundamentalists through recent terror attacks on churches and Christian 
crusades.
226
 This observation is supported by revelations that Muslims caught up in the 
Westgate crisis were given preferential treatment by the terrorists. According to reports from 
the survivors, gunmen asked customers whether they were Muslims and those answering in 
the affirmative, and could prove so, were allowed to escape. “When I mentioned the first 
word of the shahada,
227
 they moved on. That is how I survived.”228 In the wake of this attack, 
the Anti-Terror Police Unit is also alleged to have indiscriminately targeted Muslims and 
arrested 40 of them on suspicion of involvement in the attack (Open Society for Justice, 
2013: 20). 
 
In his statement to the nation, the President urged “all Kenyans to stand together and see this 
dark moment through. Donate blood. Provide information to the authorities. Comfort and 
reassure the affected families. Let us shame the Devil and his works by demonstrating our 
timeless values of love, compassion and solidarity” (Kenya News Daily, 2013). In addition, 
in response to this call, Kenyans in all walks of life united in condemning the terrorists and 
donated blood to the various hospitals in which survivors were receiving treatment while 
others served refreshments – tea, water and snacks – to the security contingent on site for the 
entire four days of siege. In circumstances reminiscent of 1998 when terrorists attacked the 
U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya had also just come out of a divisive election and its leaders, 
especially the opposition, were still smarting from the Supreme Court ruling that declared 
Uhuru Kenyatta validly elected as President of Kenya in the March 4
th
 national elections. Just 
as President Moi and leaders of the opposition had done in 1998 in a show of unity, President 
Uhuru Kenyatta joined other leaders, including his challengers in the March 4
th
 presidential 
                                                            
225 The first was the December 31st, 1980 bombing of the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, then owned by the Blocks, a 
Jewish family. The second attack was the November 28th, 2002 simultaneous attack on Paradise Hotel, 
Kikambala and an Arkia flight departing from Mombasa, both owned by Israelis.   
226 Church conventions held in the open to preach and win converts to Christianity. 
227 The first of the five pillars of Islam asserting a Muslim’s expression of faith and states that “There is no god 
but God and Muhammad is the prophet of God”. 
228 Anonymous attribution. Daily Nation, September 23rd 2013.  
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elections, Raila Odinga
229
 and Musalia Mudavadi,
230
 in a press conference at State House, 
Nairobi. Again this turned out to be another ‘spur of the moment’ demonstration of unity as 
soon thereafter, while addressing a Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) 
Parliamentary Group (PG) meeting on the 19
th
 November, 2013, Raila Odinga insinuated that 
the Westgate attack could have been a conspiracy plotted by the Jubilee leadership to enable 
the President and his deputy to be excused from attending to the criminal cases facing them at 
the International Criminal Court in the Hague, Netherlands.
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 In the official PG statement
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(29
th
 October, 2013) they called  
“upon the President to immediately form an independent judicial commission of 
inquiry to establish the circumstances behind the planning and execution of the attack 
and the subsequent conduct of public officials and institutions including the 
Disciplined Forces and the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS)”.  
It is an allegation that was countenanced by the President’s ruling coalition, thereby 
provoking political bickering that was detrimental to the country’s healing process after the 
terror attack and the acrimonious Presidential election dispute settlement by the Supreme 
Court. It is against this premise that this study notes that it might be necessary for Kenyans to 
seek national healing and unity in processes that exclude current political manoeuvring which 
has sadly demonstrated an inability and unwillingness to move beyond the ethnicalized nature 
of politics that has been inherited from the previous regimes. Their statements and 
exhortations to national unity in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy were apparently only 
rhetorical, going by the statement attributed to CORD and its leadership.  
 
Hope for a Kenyan nation that is devoid of ethnic posturing is provided, albeit in a simple 
way, by a non-state-driven memorial event organized on the 21
st
 October, 2013, exactly one 
month after the Westgate Shopping Mall tragedy, which excluded any major politicians and 
                                                            
229 Leader of Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) and went to the Supreme Court to dispute the 
election results. In condemning the terrorists, he stated that “…this is not the time for grandstanding, it is not the 
time for partisan politics but a time to unite the country together and that the Kenyan spirit has been 
demonstrated by the Kenyans who came forward yesterday to assist the victims of the attack…we want to 
appeal to all Kenyans to come together… we want to assure the government that we will work together to 
address the security situation in the whole country…” in a K24TV statement on 22nd September 2013.  
230 Contested the Presidency under the banner of Amani coalition. 
231 Following the post-election violence of 2007/8, investigations by the International Criminal Court identified 
and named six persons as being culpable in the planning and execution of murder, rape and forcible eviction of 
victims from their homes. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were among those named long before they 
ascended to power as President and Deputy President respectively.  
232 Cordkenya.blogspot.co.uk  
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religious leaders. The memorial was planned for Karura Forest by Friends of Karura Forest 
(FKF) in conjunction with the families of those who had lost relatives or sustained injuries 
and attended by mourners from various races, religious inclinations and ethnicities, therefore, 
giving the crowd of about 400 people, a ‘We are One feeling.’ The theme of ‘oneness’ 
dominated the event as was demonstrated in the speeches and activities on the day.  
 
The event started at exactly 11.30 am, the time when the terrorists fired their first shot. 
Timing the event to coincide with the time the terrorists struck is a way of bringing the 
memories of that past to the ‘now time.’ The singing of the national anthem in Swahili was 
the first event performed after the participants had completed the procession walk that had 
started from the Karura forest gate to the memorial spot. Then Christian, Islamic and Sikh 
prayers were recited to remember all victims who perished in the tragedy. There was a 
performance of a Hindu song by a band of juniors from the Hindu community, which was 
then followed by a choir dressed in uniform mirroring the proposed national dress, belting out 
renditions of patriotic songs in conformity with the theme of the day.  
 
 
Fig. 7.2: A Kenyan choir sings at the Westgate Memorial, Karura. 21
st
 October 2013. 
AP Press/Ben Curtis. 
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Performing the national anthem in Swahili, the national language spoken by a majority of 
Kenyans, patriotic songs and the uniform with a collar in colours of the national flag were 
symbolic acts of identity and nationalism. This was meant to pass the message to the 
terrorists that though scarred, the tragedy was not going to intimidate, divide, nor cause 
despondency amongst Kenyans.  
 
When he rose to speak, Prof. Njuguna Karanja, the chair of FKF – who lost a nephew – 
exhorted the victims and their relatives to remain united stating that though “the memory of 
the tragedy hurts, it saddens us but it must not break us. We are one and have come to remind 
ourselves to build a nation that all can live in, young and old, white and black, Christian and 
Muslim, Hindu and Jain” (AFP News Agency, 2013). This encompasses all those living in 
Kenya, citizens and non-citizens, as the tragedy did not choose its victims. In the crowd were 
people with flags from different countries, among them the U.S, France, Ghana, China and 
France, countries whose citizens died in the tragedy.  
 
He announced that a one-hectare Memorial Park, Amani
233
 Garden, would be devoted to the 
memory of the victims of the Westgate Shopping Mall tragedy. He added that the choice of 
Karura forest was symbolic as it had become a place where people in all walks of life walk 
and jog, while children play in the serenity of the quiet and peaceful nature of the forest. 
Taking the cue from Prof. Karanja, Mr Sharad Rao, FKF’s vice chair noted that some of 
those who died and their families were frequent visitors of Karura forest, which is 
international in character and had truly become a place where people in all walks of faith, 
culture and traditions meet (Obuya, 2013). To launch the garden, families and relatives of 
those killed in the attack planted a tree sapling for each of the 70 victims lost to the tragedy. 
Planting of trees to remember a tragic event, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a way to symbolize 
hope and rebirth in many traditional African societies.  
 
A memorial plaque containing names of victims of the Westgate Shopping Mall tragedy, onto 
which wreaths were laid, was unveiled on this occasion. Mwangi (2013) notes that the 
chairman intimated plans for a Memorial Park on the scale of the August 7
th
 1998 Memorial 
Park to commit to memory victims of the Westgate Shopping Mall tragedy. Whereas the 
shape and scale of the proposed memorial is difficult to contemplate at the moment, the idea 
                                                            
233 Swahili for peace. 
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that it has been suggested arguably points at the growing recognition that such visual aids 
could catalyse the provision of closure to, and inscription to memory of, traumatic tragedies 
resulting in the death of many people. Inscription of names in a memorial helps those who 
 
 
Fig.7.3: A relative observes the memorial plaque containing names of victims of the 
Westgate Shopping Mall during memorial held on 21
st
 October 2013.  
(Photo: Ben Curtis, 2013). 
 
mourn to come to terms with their tragedy by enabling them to either touch or read the names 
(Winter, 1995: 115; Benton, 2010). This event arguably prefigures the kind of thinking that 
will inform the conceptualisation of the proposed memorial to be erected to the memory of 
the victims of the Westgate Shopping Mall. Visual and performing art, as demonstrated on 
the occasion of this commemoration, will likely be part of the new monument.  
 
As this study draws to an end I am able to identify several lines of enquiry, which seem 
worthy of future enquiry. 
 
7.3 Recommendations for Further Research 
 
Islamic radicalisation along the Kenyan Coast is a subject that my respondents considered 
sensitive, if not dangerous, to discuss openly. It is noted that radicalisation of Muslim youth 
in Kenya, especially with the recently reported (Onsarigo & Otieno, 2014) youth 
radicalisation workshops in the Masjid Musa mosque in Mombasa, the mosque’s invasion by 
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the police and the resultant violence, is a matter of grave concern. This study, therefore, 
suggests that further investigations need to be undertaken to ascertain the full extent of the 
radicalisation of youth in Kenya as it could lead to further terrorist attacks in the country if 
the phenomenon is not properly understood. There was a challenge in accessing published 
literature on terrorism in Kenya because it is a current phenomenon hence the reliance on 
newspaper sources, especially for Chapter 6. I however believe that this does not compromise 
the reliability of this data as other sources such as key-informant interviews with people 
reputed to be knowledgeable in contemporary cases of terrorism in Kenya were used to 
complement newspaper reports. 
 
What impacts has terrorism had on interfaith relations in Kenya? This study has observed that 
the recent terror attacks on churches have bred interfaith animosities between Muslims and 
Christians, which, if not checked, could accelerate and engender serious interfaith conflicts. 
Thus, more focussed research on interfaith relations in the wake of terrorism in Kenya is 
recommended.  
 
In Chapter 2, this study identified with the claim that 'traditional African communities' did 
not build monuments to commemorate tragic events that led to mass deaths in the past, but 
instead engaged in ceremonies to re-connect with ancestral spirits that may have been 
‘wronged’ and thereby allowed such atrocities to happen (Mbithi, 1991), and planted peace 
trees. This explains the incorporation of peace trees in the designs of the August 7th 
Memorial Park, the inclusion of a tree planting approach in the activities of PBKC in Uasin 
Gishu County and the planting of 70 trees in the Amani Memorial Gardens in memory of 
those who died in the Westgate Shopping Mall tragedy. This study was not able to investigate 
the contribution of these 'peace trees' to the creation of memory and traumatic memory 
healing, though they appeared a consistent component in processes of memorialisation. 
Further investigation in this area would be useful.  
 
Fieldwork data suggests that the Peace Builder’s Kids Club clubs in Uasin Gishu County are 
engaged in outreach activities that are impacting positively on inter-ethnic understanding in 
their communities. There is, however, a need to monitor and measure the clubs’ activities 
over a longer period of time in order to ascertain its long-term impacts on peace building and 
national cohesion.  
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Finally, the recent attack on Westgate Shopping Mall and the on-going Islamic radicalisation 
of youth in Kenya means that this study’s narrative does not stop here. It will need to be 
continued.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Acronyms 
 
ADRA Adventist Development Relief Association 
AFP Agence France-Presse 
AIAI Al-Ittihad Al-Islami 
ACCTI Amani Counselling Centre and Training Institute 
AMREF African  Medical Research Foundation 
AP Associated Press 
ASBVA August Seventh Bomb-blast Victims Association 
ATPU Anti-Terrorist Police Unit 
AWI Association for Widows and Injured 
BM British Museum 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIC Constitutional Implementation Committee 
CNN Cable News Network 
CORD Coalition for Reform and Democracy 
DC District Commissioner 
DP Democratic Party 
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
EACTI East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FGM Female Genital Mutilation 
FKF Friends of Karura Forest 
FORD Forum for Reform and Democracy 
GEMA Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association 
ICG International Crisis Group 
ICU Islamic Court Union 
ID Identification Card 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
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ILAPK Islamic Liberation Army for the People of Kenya 
IPK Islamic Party of Kenya 
JK Joyce Kezio 
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union 
KAMATUSA Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu Association 
KANU Kenya African National Union 
KAR King African Rifles 
KAU Kenya African Union 
KCSE Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education 
KDF Kenya Defense Force 
K-HURINET Kenya Human Rights Network 
KMA Kenya Medical Association 
KNBS Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
KPU Kenya Peoples Union 
LDP Liberal Democratic Party 
MMWVA Mau Mau War Veterans Association 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MUHURI Muslim Human Rights Organization 
MYC Muslim Youth Centre 
NARC National Rainbow Coalition 
NCEC National Convention Executive Council 
NCIC National Cohesion and Integration Commission 
NDP National Development Party 
NFD Northern Frontier District 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NMK National Museums of Kenya 
NSIS National Security Intelligence Service 
ODM Orange Democratic Movement 
OR Operation Recovery 
PBKC Peace Builder’s Kids Club 
PFLP Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PG Parliamentary Group 
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PhD Doctor of Philosophy 
PM Prime Minister 
PNU Party of National Unity 
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front 
SUPKEM Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims 
TFG Transitional Federal Government 
TSC Teachers Service Commission 
UK United Kingdom 
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme 
UN United Nations 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
US United States of America 
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Appendix 2: Table of secondary sources reviewed during the study 
Documents reviewed Nature of data elicited 
Newspaper reports on the bomb blast and 
the annual commemorations 
Generated data on what exactly transpired in the 
aftermath of the blast, the planning and 
execution of the attack, the rescue efforts, 
suffering by the survivors, the August 7th 
Memorial Park, the annual commemorations 
and the wider terrorism context. 
Minutes of meetings of the Memorial Park 
Trustees 
Elicited data pertaining to the processes towards 
the establishment of the August 7th Memorial 
Park, including the formation of a board of 
trustees to oversee its affairs, funding and 
fundraising efforts, designs and the 
management of the Park and later the 
construction of the Documentation Centre. 
U.S. embassy reports and cables Generated data on the U.S. government 
involvement in the rescue efforts, confidential 
reports on prior assessment of security concerns 
for the U.S. Nairobi, the contribution of U.S. 
government in support of victims and survivors’ 
families, new strategies to fight terrorism in the 
eastern Africa region, and the role of the U.S. 
government in the affairs of the August 7th 
Memorial Park. 
Speeches made during official launch of 
the Memorial Park and in the annual  
commemorations 
Engendered data on memories of the attack, the 
suffering and trauma engendered by the victims’ 
families and survivors, quest for justice and 
compensation; and the functioning of the 
Memorial Park. 
AMREF reports Generated data on the types of trauma suffered 
and the interventions for trauma management 
techniques. 
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August 7th Memorial Park documents Elicited data on the functioning of the Park as a 
site of memory, process towards the 
establishment and management of the Memorial 
Park, the activities of the Peace  Builder’s Kids 
Club, mediation of memory and the public 
perception of the Memorial Park and the 
Documentation Centre. 
 
  
243 
 
Appendix 3: Letter from the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Michael 
Ranneberger, to Kenya’s Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, on the need for the 
Kenyan government to assist the survivors of the 1998 Nairobi terror 
attack. 
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Appendix 4: The old district boundaries of Kenya now converted to 
Counties after the Kenya 2010 constitutional changes. 
 
Source: http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-9nD-
iTfXyxA/UpLP6XWTm0I/AAAAAAAA148/EwJ6JkqP6GA/s1600/Counties+In+Kenya.png 
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Appendix 5: Newspaper coverage of the rescue efforts in the Daily Nation 
and East African Standard. 
Date East African Standard Daily Nation 
10.08.1998 ‘It’s a Miracle.’234  ‘Mother, son come out alive’ 
12.08.1998 ‘Hope for Rose fades.’235  
12.08.1998 ‘Brother tells of horrid search 
for missing kin.’236 
 
12.08.1998 ‘Thank you for saving my 
life.’237  
 
13.08.2013  ‘Goodbye Kenya’s Rose’ 
14.08.1998 ‘I mourn my Mum Rose.’238    
14.08.1998 ‘Rose, a hope that withered, 
expired, trapped in rubble’. 
 
15.08.1998 ‘Row mounts over bomb victim 
Rose.’239  
 
16.08.1998  ‘Fair tribute for a theatre man for 
all seasons.’240   
‘How we escaped from Hell.’241 
‘Burial date for Rose’ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
234 The story of Akinyi Odindo and   her son, Gabriel, who were rescued alive from Cooperative Bank building 
36 hours after the bombing.   
235 The head of the Kenya Army Search and Rescue team, General Agoi, is quoted.  
236  Joseph Koimburi on finding the body of his brother at the City Mortuary. 
237 Details the rescuing of Sammy Nganga from the rubble of Ufundi Cooperative House, 36 hours later.   
238 Philip Githuka, Roses’ son. 
239 A report on the family dispute on where Rose should be buried, and by who? 
240 An article on Abel Mutegi Njeru, a thespian who died in the process of rescue at the Cooperative Bank 
House. 
241 The piece reports the rescue of Francis Njenga and Joseph Gachoka who both worked in Ufundi Cooperative 
building. 
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Appendix 6: Schools with registered Peace Builder’s Kids Clubs 
Schools in the program 
  No. Name of School Location County 
1 Catholic Parochial Primary CBD Nairobi 
2 Gatoto Primary Mukuru Slums Nairobi 
3 Kongoni South C  Nairobi 
4 Mukuru Kwa Njenga Primary Embakasi  Nairobi 
5 Logos Christian School State House Rd Nairobi 
6 Mariakani Primary South B Nairobi 
7 Moi Educational Centre Nairobi West Nairobi 
8 Mukuru Kayaba Primary Mukuru Kayaba Nairobi 
9 Nairobi South Primary South B Nairobi 
10 Our Lady of Mercy High South B Nairobi 
11 Our Lady of Nazareth Embakasi  Nairobi 
12 Peponi House Prep Lower Kabete Nairobi 
13 REM School South C  Nairobi 
14 Reuben Primary Embakasi  Nairobi 
15 St Catherine Primary South B Nairobi 
16 St Elizabeth Primary Lunga Lunga Nairobi 
17 St.Theresa's Girls Primary Eastleigh Nairobi 
18 Loreto Convent Valley Rd Valley Road  Nairobi 
19 Makini School Off Ngong Road Nairobi 
20 Riara School Off Ngong Road Nairobi 
21 Jonathan Gloag Academy Mbagathi Way Nairobi 
22 Rose of Sharon Academy Ngong Road Nairobi 
23 Nairobi Academy  Karen Nairobi 
24 Westlands Primary  Westlands Nairobi 
25 Compuera Academy State House Road Nairobi 
26 St. Georges Primary Kilimani Nairobi 
27 Braeside School Lavington Nairobi 
28 Loresho Primary Loresho Nairobi 
29 Nairobi Primary State House Nairobi 
30 Kileleshwa Primary  Kileleshwa Nairobi 
31 St. Mary's Primary Lavington Nairobi 
32 Cheploskei Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
33 Sambul Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
34 Cheptiret Primary  Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
35 Koiluget Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
36 Tarakwa Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
37 Ngeria West Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
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38 Chesegem Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
39 Boderfarm Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
40 Boror Primary  Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
41 Central Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
42 Kamukunji Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
43 Kapkeben Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
44 Kapyemit Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
45 Kiambaa Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
46 Lainguse Primary Burnt Forest/Tarakwa Uasin Gishu 
47 Langas Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
48 Munyaka Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
49 Race Course Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
50 Moi-Marula Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
51 Township Primary Eldoret Municipality Uasin Gishu 
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